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Abstract 
 
The turn of the century was accompanied by two historically significant phenomena.  One was the 
emergence of computer networks as a vital component of advanced militaries and interdependent 
global economic systems.  The second concerned China’s rise on the global stage through economic 
reforms that led to sustained growth and military modernization.  At the same time, Chinese 
government policies and actions have drawn international criticisms.  Among these are persistent 
allegations of online espionage, domestic Internet censorship, and an increased military capability – 
all of which utilize computer networks.  These threat perceptions are heightened by a lack of 
transparency.  Unlike the United States or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, China does not 
articulate its strategic doctrine.  Further, open source material on this topic is often contradictory, 
cursory, and unclear due, in part, to the absence of consensus on cyber-related terminology and the 
infancy of this field.  With a focus on the period 1998 to 2014, this thesis identifies and analyses the 
strategic context, conceptual framework, and historical evolution which have shaped China’s 
development of cyber warfare doctrine.  Specifically, a three branch model of cyber warfare is 
constructed and applied in accordance with the holistic philosophy of Chinese defence planning.  
This allows for a better appreciation of the cyber domain of Chinese military thought and, as a result, 
a more informed yet critical assessment. 
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC, China) acquired a singular notoriety in the years 1998 to 2014.  
This was the period when multi-state accusations of computer network intrusions by China gained 
prominence, while existing open source knowledge on this topic remained superficial and 
misinformed.  Cybercrime, including state-sponsored cybercrime, was estimated in 2014 to cost the 
global economy an estimated $400 billion annually, and China itself has been one of the largest 
victims (McAfee 2014).  Concurrently, China operates one of the world’s most sophisticated Internet 
censorship and monitoring services, and has the world’s largest online population at 632 million, 
with 527 million accessing the Internet through mobile devices (USCC Annual Report 2014).  The 
Internet has become vital to the functioning of a modern society.  China’s economy has rapidly risen 
to the world’s second largest, and along with it, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has accelerated 
modernization, seeking the capability of “winning local wars under the conditions of 
informationization” (xìnxī huà; 信息化) (Information Office of the State Council of the People's 
Republic of China 2013).  Moreover, cyberspace has become a recognized domain of warfare, in 
addition to land, sea, air and outer space (Bronk 2011; Chase, Engstrom, Cheung, Gunness, Harold, 
Puska, and Berkowitz 2015; China's Military Strategy 2015; International Institute for Strategic 
Studies 2015; Krekel, Adams, and Bakos 2012; USCC Annual Report 2007; US Department of Defense 
2013).  The 2013 edition of The Science of Military Strategy, produced by the PLA’s Academy of 
Military Science, concedes that the PLA possesses defensive and offensive cyber units (Gady 2015; 
Thomas 2007, 4-5; Tiezzi 2015).  All of these factors, combined with Beijing’s growing assertiveness 
in international relations, have generated increased interest in China’s intentions.  Such 
developments are readily chronicled but inadequately conceptualized within the larger framework 
of China’s military thought.  Reasons for such a shortcoming in the literature include the fast pace of 
developments in cyber security and a lack of transparency in Chinese military affairs.  This may be 
due to genuine disagreement within the government, or intentional to hide motives.  Much of the 
writings published by the PRC are contradictory or ambiguous, using modern and ancient 
foundations, while being disseminated by varied sources.  Unlike the United States or the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and despite publication of defence white papers every two 
years, China is not transparent in its strategic doctrine (Shambaugh 2002, 57).  This needs to be 
inferred.  Hence, this thesis will pursue the question: What is the strategic doctrine to emerge from 
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China's development of cyber warfare?  The method employed, as elaborated below, is through a 
conceptual and historical investigation. 
 
 
Originality and Justification 
 
Understanding China’s cyber warfare (wǎngluò zhàn; 网络战) doctrine fills a significant gap in the 
knowledge base of Chinese military thought.  Beijing has never published a formal cyber warfare 
doctrine (Gady 2015; Mulvenon 1999; USCC Annual Report 2012).  Chinese military journals and 
newspapers provide valuable insights, and a number of external “open-source researchers” have 
pieced together some of China’s capabilities, goals, and strategies (USCC Annual Report 2009).  
However, these lack detail, specifically in issue area, and they are not a “definitive work representing 
a concise and coherent view” (Krekel, Adams, and Bakos 2012; Thomas 2004, 3).  Despite these 
inadequacies, the twin phenomena of China’s military modernization and the ubiquity of computer 
networks in the performance of modern weapon systems have attracted global concern.  China’s 
increased military prowess will alter the balance of power in the Asia Pacific region, enabling China 
to exert greater influence on contentious issues such as maritime borders, resource allocation, 
Taiwan re-unification, and the United States’ military presence in the Western Pacific.  
Advancements in space-based capabilities and the PLA Navy (PLAN) have provided China with 
limited force projection beyond the Asia Pacific region, yet in the cyber realm it already possesses 
force projection on a global scale.  Additionally, the Internet can enhance its competitiveness in the 
other domains through technology transfer, propaganda, and eroding a foreign military’s capabilities.  
China is cited recurringly as taking a holistic approach to cyber warfare (Andress and Winterfeld 
2011, 43-44; China's Military Strategy 2015; Gady 2015; Thomas 2007, 291; USCC Annual Report 
2012).  In keeping with a holistic approach, this thesis comprehensively examines open source 
information which is applicable to Chinese cyber warfare.  This includes examining historical 
developments that help clarify the prevailing situation, in contrast to a tendency in the cyber 
warfare literature to focus on the latest cyber incidents or revelations as though they were new 
occurrences when in actuality there had been precedents and recurring patterns (Carlin 1997).  For 
instance, it is common to read that the 2007 cyberattacks on Estonian were ‘the world’s first cyber 
conflict’ and the Stuxnet worm was ‘the first cyber weapon’; however, this thesis will show these 
statements are not true (Clarke and Knake 2010, 30; Markoff 2009; Safire 2004; Weiss 2007).  
Similarly, the phrases ‘electronic Pearl Harbour’ and ‘watershed moment’ have been attached to a 
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wide range of cyber incidents, yet they were not the first such incidents and they did not result in 
drastic policy changes (CBS 60 Minutes 2009; Kremer and Muller 2014, 203).   
 
Conceptualizing China’s cyber warfare doctrine requires clarifying and consolidating an 
overabundance of vague and overlapping terms.  To accomplish this, this thesis has created a three 
branch1 model of cyber warfare based on core distinctions (see the Definitions subsection below for 
further examination of terminology).  This model provides a simplified structure for all-inclusive 
analysis.  Part of China’s cyber doctrine can be inferred by examining the goals it is seeking and 
ascertaining how those could be met through advancements in information and communication 
technology (ICT).  This thesis evaluates China’s state-level goals, rather than the mission statements 
of a few frequently changing cyber-related entities.  Secondly, it examines all that cyber warfare 
includes, or can include, rather than what one definition, or a handful of different definitions, 
include.  Streamlined categorizing will aid the efficiency of this research by bringing order to a 
diverse range of topics and allowing duplicate concepts or incidents to be merged.  This could also 
aid future researchers in the same manner, or it could allow them to limit the scope of their research 
by focusing on a particular aspect within cyber warfare.  Improved conceptualization will allow the 
examination of cyber warfare to advance, rather than become trapped in a continual process of 
renaming and rediscovering.  In particular, it might reveal novel ideas in past research which were 
initially displaced by the volume of inquiry in the emerging field of cyber warfare or open the way for 
the identification of new ideas, weaknesses, and trends.  This categorization can also limit media and 
public misunderstanding, and it can provide more accurate threat assessments (discussed further in 
Chapter 2, under Computer Network Attack).  This thesis will use this model in order to identify the 
Chinese government entities responsible for developing cyber warfare, in all its aspects, and their 
relationship to one another.  Doing so facilitates a new perspective, one which might reveal ways to 
improve the organisational structure, or reveal entities which would mutually benefit through 
collaboration.  Lastly, all of these factors work towards increased transparency, which can advance 
the cause of cooperation, understanding, and trust.   
 
 
Background 
 
                                                          
1 The 2010 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines branch as “a 
subdivision of any organisation”, or relative to the ground warfare domain, as “an arm or service of the Army”. 
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An examination of China’s goals as a resurgent great power and the development path it has taken 
will show the aims of the military and the strategic thought behind its actions.  The PLA has tried to 
transform itself from a land based power, to a comparatively smaller, more mobile, high-tech power 
that is capable of reaching beyond its borders (US Department of Defense 2009; Information Office 
of the State Council of the People's Republic of China 2008).  During the 1980s paramount leader 
Deng Xiaoping pushed for quality over quantity, and the military was reduced by one million 
personnel (Dellios 1989, 77; Thomas 2004, 52).  In 1993, President Jiang Zemin officially announced a 
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) a part of the national military strategy for modernization.  RMA, 
which is discussed in detail in Chapter 5, is a theory on the future of warfare connected to 
technological changes and associated organizational changes.  Careful observation of US 
involvement in the Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraqi wars, furthered China’s interest in Net-Centric 
Warfare (discussed in Chapter 5) and asymmetric warfare, the former successfully used by the US, 
and the latter successfully used against the US (Wilson 2007).  At the turn of the century, the bulk of 
China’s traditional military force retained 1950s to 1970s era technology, which was imported and 
reverse engineered from the then Soviet Union (Moore 2000).  China has sought to modernize this 
force.  The size of China’s traditional force will shrink, as fewer numbers are needed when new 
technology is introduced.  China seeks to maintain domestic and regional stability while developing 
its economic, military, technological, scientific, and soft power.  It also seeks a balance between 
military and economic development, believing they are mutually dependant.  Beijing maintains its 
One China Policy in relation to Taiwan, and claims sovereignty over the Parcel and Spratly islands 
and adjacent waterways (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China 
2006).  
 
Deng Xiaoping, representing second generation leadership after Mao, sought to avoid international 
responsibilities and limitations, as they could slow down development of the military and economy.  
The third generation leadership of Jiang Zemin did look outward, promoting a multipolar world in 
the face of the post-Cold War unipolarity under the United States, just as fourth generation leader 
Hu Jintao promoted the ideology of a Harmonious World (Héxié shìjiè, 和谐世界) which places more 
emphasis on international relations (Lam 2004; Zheng and Tok 2007).  The successor to Hu Jintao, 
President Xi Jinping, emphasized the ‘Chinese Dream’ that included a diversity of culture in the 
global order (CCTV 2014; China's Military Strategy 2015).  However the PRC continues to avoid a 
definitive posture in terms of international commitment through concepts of non-interference, 
diversity, and equality.  It compares itself to other states through Comprehensive National Power 
(CNP - Zònghé guólì, 综合国力), using qualitative and quantitative values, and not accepting 
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traditional Western categorizations (Pillsbury 2015; Yan 2006).  For example, China includes the 
economy, soft power, and domestic stability as factors of CNP.  This is significant in that it shows a 
correlativity which holds relevance for cyber warfare.  Under CNP the economy, soft power, and 
domestic stability can be seen as militarily relevant matters.  Further, maintaining the status quo in 
regards to Taiwan and the Spratly Islands may not be China’s long-term intention, but rather a way 
to stall efforts while it builds up military strength, strength which can include economic and 
international influence. 
 
Despite not wanting to become embroiled in concrete commitments to military strategy, Chinese 
leaders cannot ignore the interconnectedness of the modern world, and they have realized the 
necessity of international cooperation.  Notably, the need for resources has fuelled China’s global 
presence.  The PRC is the world’s largest net importer of petroleum (Dunn 2014; McSpadden 2015).  
As the country’s economy grows and the middle class expands, the demand for fossil fuel resources 
will continue to grow.  This creates a requirement for sound international relations with exporting 
nations and the need for security of transportation routes, such as the Strait of Malacca linking the 
Indian Ocean and the South China Sea and expanding networks of overland pipelines.  The politics 
and military affairs of the states involved are thus relevant to China’s concerns.  Competition with 
the United States for these resources has often led to China making agreements with nations the US 
opposes on several points, such as Angola, Chad, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Oman, 
Sudan, Venezuela, and Yemen (Brookes and Shin 2006; Hanson 2008). 
 
In these suppliers Beijing finds less competition for resource access.  However, the result is often 
international criticism of China as these states may be violating human rights or supporting terrorism.  
Moreover, Beijing’s methods of befriending these exporters comes into question, especially in 
regards to arms being traded or availability of finance which may be supporting controversial 
policies.  China currently lacks the power projection to protect critical sea lanes from disruption or to 
significantly deter international criticism.  Crucial to extended power projection is a ‘blue water’ 
navy which would benefit from online technology transfer and the further development of 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
(C4ISR).  Online PSYOPS and media warfare would enhance China’s soft power.  Beijing believes that 
economic growth is critical to military development; economic growth increases energy demand, 
which in turn creates a greater military demand; thus the two are mutually reinforcing (Ikenberry 
2008; Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China 2006).  Certainly, Xi 
Jinping’s ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ and the ‘21st-Century Maritime Silk Road’ initiative, termed ‘One 
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Belt, One Road’, serves both an economic and security function (Vision and Actions on Jointly 
Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road 2015).  This large-scale 
infrastructure development project assists not only regional economies but also China’s quest for 
resources and the security of their transportation routes.  Moreover, the ability to reach markets by 
both land and sea routes is also secured. 
 
Ensuring the survival of the CPC shapes China’s strategic outlook. In order to bolster domestic 
support for policies, nationalism has been emphasized over communist ideology.  This can be seen 
with government organized protests against Japan, over visits by Japanese leaders to World War II 
war shrines and protests against the publishing of Japanese school text books which downplay 
Japan’s atrocities against the Chinese.  These protests tend to coincide with other strategic interests, 
such as territorial disputes in the East China Sea which, with the notable exception of the highly 
publicized arrest by Japan of a Chinese captain in September 2010 off the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands, are often unbeknownst to the casual observer or participant.  The mobilization of 
nationalism was also evident during the holding of a US reconnaissance aircraft in 2001, and the 
mistaken NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999.  The 2008 Beijing Olympics 
further demonstrated how China could garner national support in the face of corruption, 
environmental degradation, and a widening wealth gap.  These events highlight a strategic value in 
public manipulation through nationalism; one that is interconnected with military affairs, and one 
which is increasingly turning to online assets (Faiola 2005). 
 
Ensuring the survival of the CPC comes not only from the above strategic nationalist discourse.  It 
intimately concerns the PLA.  ‘Consolidate the ruling status of the CPC’ is the first of the missions 
entrusted to the PLA, which is a ‘party-army’ in that it brought the CPC to power and swears 
allegiance to the Party (Mulvenon 2009).  Several conclusions can be drawn from the status of the 
PLA.  China is committed to modernizing its military, in part through the purchase or illicit acquisition 
of foreign technology and subsequently reverse engineering that technology so it can be produced 
domestically.  Defence reforms in support of modernization have included favouring quality over 
quantity by decreasing the PLA’s size: from 4 million to 2.25 million personnel (Mohr 2006).  The 
PLA’s weaponry often lags one or two generations behind that of Western military powers.  
However, the total force base still poses a significant deterrent, and establishes China as a dominant 
power within the Asia-Pacific Region.  Other than deployments to the Gulf of Aden on anti-piracy 
missions, China lacks force projection beyond its region, primarily due to the lack of a blue water 
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navy and aircraft carrier fleet,2 but also due to limits in missile technology and air-defence 
penetration, and opposition by foreign powers such as the United States.  China seeks to become 
self-sufficient in many of these key capabilities.  Once it has leapfrogged and is no longer trying to 
catch up, in accordance with policy reflected in China’s defence white papers, the PRC will no longer 
need such wide scale technology transfer, and it will possess the might to shape the international 
system, rather than be bound by one that was created by foreign powers.   
 
 
Literature Review 
 
Although commonly regarded to as secret or scant, knowledge relating to Chinese cyber warfare 
may be found in a large body of open source material.  This includes articles from defence 
contractors, government organisations, information technology (IT) security firms, military journals, 
news agencies, think tanks, universities, and other non-government organisations (NGOs).  Despite 
being disjointed, superficial, and misinformed, Chinese and Western news articles do provide 
information towards inferring China’s cyber doctrine that is not available anywhere else and 
therefore cannot be ignored.  This is a consequence of cyber warfare being an emerging area of 
study that is quickly changing, a lack of transparency, and a reluctance of businesses and 
governments to make direct accusations of aggression.  Therefore, this mass collection of smaller (in 
size or scope) articles is necessary.  For example, foreign accusations of Chinese computer network 
intrusions provide insight into what is possible through cyber warfare and the direction in which it 
may be headed.  Further, even if these accusations prove to be unfounded, they illustrate a need for 
cyber defence, diplomacy, law, and transparency.  Research reports conducted by think tanks 
provide a greater depth of information than news agencies, although they often focus on a single 
aspect of China or cyber warfare, such as terrorism or computer network exploitation (Carfano 2008; 
Tkacik 2008).  Further, these reports often lack a common cyber-terminology foundation (discussed 
below under the sub-heading Definitions), which can result in disjointed explorations, repetition, and 
less depth than what is possible with a consolidated terminology aiding organisation.  IT security 
firms, meanwhile, provide valuable information through the examination of advanced persistent 
threats (discussed in Chapter 3) (see Information Warfare Monitor 2009; Mandiant 2013; Novetta 
2014).  However, these focus on a particular incident or group of incidents, rather than an 
overarching examination of state-wide capability, goals, and strategy.  Understandably, these 
                                                          
2 In 2014, the PLA possessed one aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, which was commissioned in 2012. 
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commercial entities are also reluctant to accuse China directly of wrongdoing, and they lack 
expertise in the field of international relations.   
 
Moving into more substantive literature, this research examines key government affiliated 
documents.  Firstly, two significant collections are the US Department of Defense’s annual reports to 
Congress on the military power of the People’s Republic of China, and the US-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission’s (USCC) annual reports to Congress, as well as the USCC’s regular 
hearings, roundtables and special reports.  These reports provide a review of each year’s open 
source knowledge on China’s cyber developments, and they offer a glimpse of closed source 
intelligence.  They also provide original information through extensive field research, interviews, 
testimony, and translations; and they reveal how this fits in with China’s overall defence doctrine.  
These US reports are compared and contrasted with key Chinese government reports, including 
China’s bi-annual National Defense white papers, China’s Five Year Plans, The National Computer 
Network Emergency Response Technical Team/Coordination Center Annual Reports, and a number 
of singular white papers like The Internet in China (2010).  While these white papers are lacking in 
transparency and depth, they do confirm issues mentioned in the open source material, such the 
Chinese government’s commitment to expanding cyber capabilities and training.  They also provide 
insight into possible cultural aspects of Chinese cyber warfare that do not appear in Western reports.  
Cultural considerations include the infusion of Confucian ideas, China’s long history, the Century of 
Humiliation, Harmonious Society, and the teachings of Mao Zedong and Sun Zi (Sun Tzu), which are 
discussed below.  
 
A number of essential texts pertaining to China’s development of cyber warfare doctrine will be 
referred to throughout this thesis.  Prominent Western authors include James Andrew Lewis, James 
Mulvenon, Larry M. Wortzel, Martin C. Libicki, Richard A. Clarke, Scott Henderson, and Timothy L. 
Thomas.  Timothy L. Thomas in particular produced a trilogy of books – Dragon Bytes, Decoding the 
Virtual Dragon, and The Dragon’s Quantum Leap – replete with translations and analysis of a wide 
range of influential PLA texts pertaining to cyber warfare.  While these books are indispensable, they 
do suffer from hindrances present in the Chinese source material.  Chinese authors, like their 
Western counterparts, have not reached consensus on terminology, and this can stymie a more 
sophisticated treatment of the cyber warfare topic.  That prominent Chinese authors are still 
developing these concepts is in itself revealing.  However, there is a need to coalesce all of these 
thoughts and move forward.  Similarly, two reputable Chinese books on military strategy – The 
Science of Campaigns and The Science of Military Strategy – are also said to “lack specificity on cyber 
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operations” (USCC Annual Report 2012).  These books do, however, demonstrate the importance 
given to cyber warfare, and they advocate developing a holistic approach which includes all three 
branches discussed below.  Going even further, Unrestricted Warfare, a book by two PLA senior 
colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, claims that warfare is no longer strictly a military operation, 
and that the battlefield no longer has boundaries.  Unrestricted Warfare was published by the PLA 
Literature and Arts Publishing House in Beijing in February 1999.  According to the Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service (FBIS) translation editor, the book “was endorsed by at least some elements of 
the PLA leadership” and an interview with one of the authors was published in the Communist Party 
of China (CPC) Youth League’s official daily newspaper on June 28, 1999.  Thus while the book is not 
entirely backed by the PLA, especially the older generation, it is not without merit as a source.  To 
use the ‘half empty, half full’ glass analogy, it may seem inadequate in terms of its ambiguous status.  
Yet it does have some official backing and hence a degree of legitimacy as a document assisting 
analysis, not only on the PLA’s likely developmental trajectory but also how asymmetric tactics 
against a superior hi-tech military might be employed.  The authors of Unrestricted Warfare assert 
that war has not disappeared, but its appearance has changed and its complexity has increased 
(Liang and Xiangsui 1999).   
 
China’s strategy can adapt to modern technology without losing some of its long standing traditions, 
such as its distinctive style and modes of thinking pertaining to national security.  In other words, 
China’s strategic culture remains relevant (Scobell 2002).  The concept of the weak overcoming the 
strong in Daoist philosophy, for example, has renewed relevance in computer network exploitation 
and anti-access denial (discussed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5, respectively).  Two seminal authors in 
China’s strategic culture are Sun Zi and Mao Zedong.  Sun Zi promoted deception in warfare and the 
strategy of winning a war before it reached the physical battlefield (Sun 1963).  There does not 
appear to be a definitive text which comprehensively applies Sun Zi’s proverbs to cyber warfare, but 
deception and unconventional warfare can flourish in the cyber realm (Thomas 2007, 325-335).  Sun 
Zi’s teachings work in harmony with online characteristics such as anonymity, dual use, high speed, a 
relatively low cost and low entry-level, the removal of geographical distance, and an 
underdeveloped legal framework to guide responses to attacks.  Mao Zedong’s teachings also have 
renewed importance within cyber warfare where virtual space provides increased means and depth 
for conducting guerrilla warfare which is a component of People’s War (Burles and Shulsky 2000; 
Mao 2000).  People’s War is no longer restricted to the mainland, as the Internet provides global 
reach, and China has the world’s largest online population.  Moreover, the Internet has increased 
the ability to mobilize the masses and facilitated their capacity to participate in defence.  China’s 
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national defence white papers in 2008 and 2010 both call for the armed forces to develop new 
“strategies and tactics for conducting people’s war” based on information systems (Information 
Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China 2008; Information Office of the State 
Council of the People's Republic of China 2013).  Cataloguing software exploits, cultivating hacker 
groups, mapping foreign networks, and maintaining a covert presence within foreign networks 
(discussed in Chapter 3), all fall within Mao’s ‘active defence’ strategy (China’s Active Defense 
Strategy and its Regional Impact 2011; China's Military Strategy 2015; Deptula 2011).  Engaging in 
offensive action for the purpose of self-defence – which is a feature of active defence – is also 
illustrated in information operations (discussed in Chapter 4).  The application of both people’s war 
and active defence in the cyber realm have been examined by Chinese theorists since the late 1980s 
(Thomas 2004, 40, 44-45, 48-49). 
 
The use of asymmetric warfare forms a common thread between Sun Zi and Mao Zedong.  A 
militarily disadvantaged China can use its special advantages, or effectively exploit its enemy’s 
particular weakness, to prevail in the event of conflict.  Should conflict occur over Taiwan declaring 
independence, for example, China is significantly outmatched by the military force the United States 
can bring to bear.  However, the United States relies heavily on computer networks for navigation, 
reconnaissance, communication, and the logistical aspects of force deployment.  By developing 
cyber warfare capabilities, the PRC can exploit a weakness within the US arsenal in order to increase 
its combat effectiveness, such as delaying or distracting US force deployment.  Cyber warfare also 
acts as a deterrent to conflict, in part because the United States relies on computer networks for its 
economy, infrastructure, and daily life; though for the deterrent to be credible it would require an 
acknowledged offensive capability, as occurs in the nuclear realm (Thomas 2004, 36).  Possessing 
such a deterrent would buy time for China to advance to higher standards in traditional military 
power.  Cyber warfare can debilitate an opponent, act as a force multiplier, and equalise 
opportunities against adversaries that are superior in traditional warfare.  While Beijing recognizes 
the need for international cooperation, it remains cautious.  Its ‘Hundred Years of Humiliation’ are 
part of the national discourse.  Colonialism by Western powers, Japanese occupation in World War II, 
Chinese intervention in the Korean War and involvement the Vietnam War, were not the only 
experiences to influence Chinese security thinking.  Border conflicts with India in 1962, the Soviet 
Union in 1969, and Vietnam in 1979 were to follow. Despite China’s long history, these events are of 
special note as they are within living memory, and they marked the founding and maturation of the 
CPC’s rule.  
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China’s cyber warfare doctrine incorporates all three levels of warfare – strategic, operational, and 
tactical (Thomas 2004, 39; Wortzel 2014).  In general, the strategic level deals with state-level goals 
and decisions, such as national security, foreign policy, and the decision to go to war.  This level can 
be further divided into ‘grand strategic’ and ‘military strategic’, with the latter being focused 
primarily on the conduct of war.  The operational level relates to strategy within a theatre of conflict, 
and can sometimes be distinguished by the application of code names to the operations.  Finally, 
tactical level strategy pertains to individual units and direct engagement with the enemy; leadership 
and morale play a large role at this scale (Gragido and Pirc 2011, 91-96; Tol, Gunzinger, Krepinevich, 
and Thomas 2010; USCC Annual Report 2014).  Cyber warfare, however, complicates this segmented 
approach to addressing problems.  The ability to act from great distances at high speed, and the 
increasingly non-linear dissemination of information and command, has caused time-space 
compression (Alberts, Garstka, and Stein 2000).  Additionally, it has blurred the separation between 
civilian and military participants and targets.  By removing geographic barriers and traditional roles, 
the tactical level can now impact the operational and strategic levels, such as a hacker disrupting 
force deployment logistics networks or targeting large scale financial systems (Thomas 2007, 30).  A 
complete cyber doctrine can only be realised “when commanders consider and employ capabilities 
across” all three levels (Electronic Warfare 2007).  
 
 
Methodology 
 
In order to infer China’s cyber warfare doctrine, it is necessary to examine the complete history of 
Chinese developments relating to cyber warfare.  This research analyses all pertinent open source 
material and identifies capabilities, goals, tactics, training, trends, and strategy.  These are compared 
with China’s strategic culture, state-level goals, and existing broad defence doctrine, including how it 
has adapted and transformed itself to date.  A three-branch model of cyber warfare is employed to 
organise overlapping terminology and concepts, while adhering to China’s all-inclusive approach.  
This research identifies and maps the major Chinese government and military organisations 
responsible for cyber warfare activities.  A complete list of alleged computer network exploitation 
incidents are provided and analysed, including an assessment of the validity of these claims.  
Additionally, the three branches of cyber warfare are applied to the Taiwan issue, in order to 
demonstrate how China would use these in combination to achieve its objectives.   
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Definitions 
 
Central to this thesis is the integration of a plethora of overlapping and vague terminology.  Portions 
of this section have been adapted from the 2013 East Asia Security Symposium and Conference 
paper titled, The Semantics of Cyber Warfare, and improved upon for this thesis (see Fritz 2013b). 
 
With the growth in cyber warfare as a field of study, the amount of cyber-related terminology has 
also grown.  The use of this terminology in prominent Chinese, and Western, literature is riddled 
with contradictions.  Researchers do not consistently agree with themselves, let alone others.  It is 
common to find authors who proclaim a difference between specific terms, yet they then proceed to 
use them interchangeably.  Others will introduce new terms which are unnecessary in view of viable 
existing terms.  Reasons for such discrepancies include disagreements amongst translations, PLA 
writings inconsistently incorporating or referencing US doctrinal writings, and the relative youth of 
this discipline (Mulvenon 1999; Thomas 2004, 3).  Both China and the United States have multiple 
government and military agencies putting forward their own definitions and competing to take the 
lead in this field within their respective states.  As a further complication, China lacks transparency of 
endorsed cyber doctrines.  This makes contemplating one definitive set of definitions problematic, 
as there are a multitude of them even within a single military branch. 
 
Shen Weiguang, “who many consider the father of Chinese IW [Information Warfare]”, criticized the 
United  States for not having a universal definition, yet he then proposed vague terms such as 
information alliances, information arena, Information borders, information deterrence, information 
factories, information fighting, information firepower surveillance, information frontier, information 
invasion, information pollution, information resources, information space, information territory, 
information weapons, information war, and separately, war in the information age (Thomas 2004, 
32, 35-36, 38-40, 42, 51).  Major General Dai Qingmin, former head of the General Staff 
Department’s Fourth Department authored the 2002 book Direct Information Warfare.  In it he 
introduced the terms battlefield information environment, computer network space (or bit 
battlefield), digitized armed forces, electronic camouflage, electronic/intellectual/thought-
information warfare, information colonialism, information mobilization, information supremacy, 
network psychological warfare, network warfare, people’s network war, and virtual warfare (Thomas 
2007, 117-140).  Adding further to the confusion are the introduction of terms by other prominent 
Chinese authors such as chip warfare, informatized warfare, intangible war, masquerade technology, 
media warfare (including morale bombs), system attack warfare, take home battle, and technology 
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aircraft carriers (Thomas 2004, 2, 60, 65; Thomas 2007, 87, 91, 244; Thomas 2009, 38, 48).  All of 
these have overlapping, unclear, contradictory, and/or missing elements, and their exact definition 
varies between authors.  As another example, some PLA officers distinguish between cyberspace, 
digital space, and information space (Wortzel 2014).  Clarity deteriorates further as aspiring 
theorists attempt to integrate this tapestry of terms into their own work.  Even the most well 
established and frequently used terms are found jumbled together without clear distinction.  For 
example, in the span of one short entry, The Military Balance 2015 describes China’s cyber 
developments by using the terms computer network operations (and its components), cyber warfare, 
electromagnetic forces, electronic warfare, information confrontation (xìnxī duìkàng; 信息对抗), 
information operations, information warfare, informationised conditions, and integrated network 
electronic warfare (INEW - wǎng diàn yì tǐ zhàn; —网电一体战) (International Institute for Strategic 
Studies 2015, 246; see also Krekel, Adams, and Bakos 2012; US Department of Defense 2010).  While 
the authors identified in this introductory chapter are undoubtedly respected leaders in this field, 
and their writings are exceptional on many levels, this thesis requires the ability to integrate the full 
range of cyber warfare literature and cannot adhere to the multitude of each author’s individual 
preference for definitions.  Instead, in the following conceptual endeavour, they are merged on the 
basis of core distinctions and majority trends.   
 
This thesis has organised all cyber warfare3 terminology into three fundamental branches that are 
common to both the People’s Republic of China and the United States of America.  Rather than 
introduce new terms, existing ‘best-fit’ terms are used.  These are: Computer Network Operations 
(CNO), Information Operations (IO), and Net-Centric Warfare (NCW).  Although these terms are US-
centric, they carry the benefit of having been used extensively in authoritative open source material 
over a relatively long period of time.  Regardless of which name is attached to these branches, they 
are structurally distinct, and all previous terms can be placed within one of these three, thereby 
helping to bring clarity to this field.  While the terms chosen may be open to debate, the category 
they denote below remains valid.  As shown in Diagram 1 and Table 1, their distinguishing 
characteristics are whether or not they are connected to the Internet, involve hacking, or involve 
military hardware.  These may appear to be obvious distinctions, yet they remain absent from 
                                                          
3 Cyber warfare is the use of cyberspace to engage in war or conflict, or to engage in activities relating to war 
or conflict, including altering the balance of power or enhancing defence.  The 2013 US doctrinal publication, 
Cyberspace Operations, defines cyberspace as “the interdependent networks of information technology 
infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, 
and embedded processors and controllers”, and “the content that flows across and through these 
components.”  It is important to note that this includes, but is not limited to, the Internet (see Andress and 
Winterfeld 2011, 2-5; Cyberspace Operations 2013; Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms 2010). 
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prominent definitions.  It is important to note that the terms cyber warfare and Information Warfare 
(IW) will be considered interchangeable, and they represent the broadest term encapsulating the 
other three.   
 
All three branches can be used in combination, as well as in combination with physical acts, yet their 
differences and the scope of this field warrant classification.  CNO includes computer network attack 
(CNA), computer network exploitation (CNE), and computer network defence (CND).  The defining 
characteristics of CNO are hacking (unauthorized access) into a computer or network, via the 
Internet.  If these two criteria are met, the remainder of the definition is fairly consistent amongst 
authors; although, some may also use additional terms interchangeably.  CNA includes the ability to 
deceive, degrade, deny, destroy, or disrupt, computers and networks through common hacker 
methods like denial of service, Trojans, viruses, worms, and so forth (these are examined in detail in 
Chapter 2).  CNE is typically theft, eavesdropping, and setting up for an attack, while CND is 
defending against attack or exploitation.  Information Operations entails utilizing and manipulating 
information online, without hacking, to influence actions.  Examples of IO include online censorship, 
propaganda, psychological operations (PSYOPS), and recruitment.  This categorization fits closely 
with a declassified 2003 document by the US Department of Defense, titled Information Operations 
Roadmap.  The Information Operations Roadmap includes CNO and Electronic Warfare by name.  
However, these two elements have continued to develop in their own right, and the novel portion of 
IO within the Information Operations Roadmap was the Internet PSYOPS and non-hacking operations.  
Later publications on IO doctrine endorsed by the US government and US military have continued to 
alter its overall framework, while maintaining a clear connection to the more distinct and stable 
definition used in this thesis (see Information Operations 2012; Military Information Support 
Operations 2010).  NCW refers to advanced military weapons systems, communication, and 
situational awareness that utilize closed computer networks (networks which are not connected to 
the Internet).  It concerns the application of information and communication technology to enhance 
combat effectiveness and efficiency.  These computer networks can be hacked into, but not through 
the Internet.  Additionally, NCW encompasses electronic warfare. 
 
How do these three branches fit in with the most commonly cited Chinese terms?  Key terms 
prevalent in Chinese government and military literature include information confrontation, 
information operations, information warfare, informationization, integrated network electronic 
warfare, and system of systems operations (tǐxì zuòzhàn; 体系作战) (Krekel, Adams, and Bakos 
2012).  In general, Chinese military theorists use information operations and information warfare as 
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catch-all terms equivalent to cyber warfare (see Thomas 2004, 15; Thomas 2007, 29-43, 59-70, 119).  
This thesis concurs with information warfare being a synonym of cyber warfare; however, it differs 
by using the stricter definition of IO given above.  Chinese literature has many terms which fit within 
that definition, yet none which can replace IO as the branch name in terms of breadth, precision, 
and unanimity.  Informationization is equivalent to NCW.  A large body of evidence for this 
conclusion, and justification for using NCW in its place, is given in Chapter 5.  Additionally, China’s 
system of systems operations is directly taken from prior NCW research (Alberts, Garstka, and Stein 
2000; Wilson 2007).  The two remaining Chinese terms which are most frequently referenced in 
Chinese cyber warfare literature are integrated network electronic warfare and information 
confrontation (USCC Annual Report 2012).  INEW is a combination of computer network attack and 
electronic warfare, which makes it a combination of subcomponents from within the branches of 
CNO and NCW (Krekel, Adams, and Bakos 2012).  Justification for INEW not being used as a primary 
branch of cyber warfare will be provided in Chapter 5.  Among the reasons given are that the PLA 
appears to be addressing some of INEW’s drawbacks by moving towards the concept of information 
confrontation (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2015).  Information confrontation has 
been described as using CNO, IO, and NCW in combination,4 which makes it synonymous with cyber 
warfare.  Further, the Chinese characters which are translated as ‘information confrontation’ in 
some English documents are also translated elsewhere as ‘information warfare’, which has already 
been labelled above as a synonym of cyber warfare.  The PLA is continuing to develop and refine 
these concepts, so this term might not last either.  For these reasons, this thesis prefers to use the 
pre-existing term cyber warfare.  What the name represents is more important than the name itself, 
and these decisions are applied consistently throughout this thesis.  (See Diagram 2: Venn of Cyber 
Warfare with Select Callouts for an overview of the synonyms addressed above and the location of 
these terms in relation to each other.) 
 
 
Delimitations & Limitations 
                                                          
4 These branch names are not always used directly; terms which this thesis has deemed to be their equivalent 
or subcomponents are.  For example, “network warfare [NCW], electronic warfare [a subcomponent of NCW], 
psychological warfare [IO, based on the context]”, and “cyber warfare [CNO, based on the context]” are named 
as elements of information confrontation (Krekel, Adams, and Bakos 2012; Wortzel 2014).  The US Department 
of Defense’s 2014 Annual Report to Congress, provides another example of inferring meaning.  It states that 
“China’s investments in advanced electronic warfare (EW) systems [NCW], counterspace weapons, and 
computer network operations (CNO) – combined with propaganda [IO] and denial through opacity – reflect the 
emphasis and priority China’s leaders place on building capability for information advantage” (US Department 
of Defense 2014).   
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This thesis has five primary delimitations and one limitation.  First, this research will not delve into 
the pre-existing debate over the definitions of ‘hacking’ and ‘cyber war’ as these are discussed at 
length by other authors and these words have already entered common use by officials and the 
media (see Raymond 1985; Stallman 2012; Weiss 2010).  Second, all Internet-connected computers 
and networks have the potential to be attacked, and an intruder can gain up to complete 
control of these systems.  The number of potential targets, types of attack, and tactics, are 
therefore enormous, and a complete list of theoretical possibilities is beyond the scope of this 
thesis.  Chapter 2 will seek to identify general trends, pivotal examples, and innovative 
applications of CNA.  Unlike CNE, however, it does not have a catalogue of alleged incidents as a 
guide.  As of 2014, few high-level state-sponsored attacks have occurred (reasons for this are 
provided in Chapter 2).  Third, this work’s research into IO is focused on its application towards 
foreign audiences, as opposed to domestic audiences, such as domestic censorship.  There are 
some important interconnections where one impacts on the other, and these are addressed 
accordingly.  IO also crosses into other areas of study, such as advertising, marketing, and 
psychology; nevertheless these surpass the extent of this research.  Fourth, NCW deals with 
military computers and networks, and attempts to link these systems together, or alternatively, 
attempts to hack into these systems.  This includes all command and control, communication, 
sensor, and weapon systems, across all domains of warfare in all branches of the armed forces.  
As a result, it encompasses an immense diversity of hardware and software technical 
specifications.  This thesis will focus on central concepts and strategy, rather than technical 
specifications.  Fifth, this wide range of computer network architectures, coupled with the 
details of many being designated as classified information, make it difficult to ascertain which 
networks share a connection with the Internet.  Evidence suggests that any battlefield networks 
which do share an Internet connection are in the process of being separated.  Finally, this 
research is limited by the availability of Chinese-language open source material.  Exhaustive 
efforts and consideration were given to the identification and translation of Mandarin language 
source material, yet researchers who are fluent in both English and Mandarin may discover valuable 
information not present here.  However, this seems unlikely given this research’s focus on 
prominent authors within the cyber warfare community, as well as globalisation and the Internet 
allowing information to spread, and governments and militaries setting a boundary to available 
information through the demarcation of classified material.  Despite these delimitations and 
limitation, this thesis addresses a serious gap in both cyber warfare studies and China’s strategic 
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doctrine.  China’s momentous emergence into the international sphere has been subject to intense 
scrutiny.  However, much needs to be done to understand the strategic context, the conceptual 
framework and historical evolution that have shaped its development of cyber warfare doctrine.   
 
 
Outline of the Thesis  
 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters.  Chapter Two examines the development of Chinese 
computer network operations, including the structure of government entities responsible.  Chinese 
theoretical work on CNO began in the mid to late 1980s.  The creation of the PLA’s first CNO unit 
took place as early as 2000, and as of 2014, the PLA is believed to possess at least 20 units.  China is 
also believed to possess approximately 33 CNO militia and 250 hacker groups with their formation 
having begun in the late 1990s.  Computer network attack and exploitation can enhance China’s 
ability to conduct asymmetric warfare and leapfrog in modernization.  At the same time, China is 
becoming increasingly reliant on Internet-connected computer networks, and attacks against China 
are rapidly increasing.  Chapter Three traces the foundation of Chinese hacker groups at the turn of 
the century.  These groups set the stage for Chinese computer network exploitation, which became 
dominant around 2002.  This chapter will explore over 100 isolated CNE incidents and 19 advanced 
persistent threats, targeting 71 countries, all of which are allegedly attributed to China.  CNE can 
provide substantial economic gains at a low cost, although, international backlash has risen since 
2010.  Chapter Four details China’s development of Information Operations.  These non-hacking 
Internet activities can influence actions in an attempt to attain “victory without war” (Thomas 2004, 
37).  IO uses censorship, media, propaganda, and PSYOPs, to shape opinions.  These suit China’s 
holistic approach to cyber warfare and Sun Zi’s views on deception, by attempting to control conduct, 
rather than resorting to the use of direct force.  This chapter also examines which government 
entities are responsible for overseeing Chinese IO.  Chapter Five investigates Chinese Net-Centric 
Warfare.  Central to this is establishing NCW’s connection to the synonymous terms of Revolution in 
Military Affairs and informationization, and demonstrating that NCW encompasses electronic 
warfare and anti-access area denial.  Each of these enhances understanding of the development of 
Chinese NCW.  The application of ICT to military operations is linking together command, equipment, 
and soldiers on the battlefield, under a system of systems, resulting in increased combat 
effectiveness and efficiency.  However, these non-Internet-connected computer networks are 
susceptible to hacking.  NCW is concerned not only with advances in technology, but also changes in 
doctrine, training, and organisation tailored to make optimal use of these technologies.  Chapter Six 
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examines the application of the three cyber warfare branches to the Taiwan issue.  It seeks to 
demonstrate how these branches are distinct, yet interconnected, and how they create synergy, 
which can aid China in achieving its goals.  Lastly, Chapter Seven concludes this research’s findings 
and states their implications. 
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Chapter Two 
 
Computer Network Operations 
 
Computer network operations (CNO) includes computer network attack, computer network 
exploitation, and computer network defence.  The two defining characteristics of CNO are (1) 
hacking into a computer or network, (2) via the Internet.  Computer network attack (CNA) includes 
attempts to disrupt, deny, degrade, deceive, or destroy; and it utilizes traditional hacker tools like 
viruses and worms5.  Examples of CNA include causing a computer to become inoperable, deleting or 
re-writing of files, and knocking a network or service offline.  Computer network exploitation (CNE), 
also known as cyber espionage or cyber reconnaissance, encompasses the theft of intellectual 
property and intelligence gathering.  CNE also includes mapping and identifying weaknesses in 
opponent networks, as well as establishing a covert presence in these networks, all of which can be 
used to aid CNA.  In many cases an intruder can go from exploitation to attack at will, as they utilize 
many of the same tools and skillsets.  Consequently, in addition to the outcome of an operation, the 
perceived intent of an intruder can be used to distinguish between a CNA and CNE incident.  CNE has 
been far more prevalent than CNA among alleged state-sponsored CNO.  It provides significant 
benefits, particularly for China the transfer of intellectual property, with minimal consequence in 
comparison to CNA.  Computer network defence (CND) is defending against attack or exploitation, 
including attempting to identify intruders, sometimes referred to as digital forensics.  CND debatably 
fits the criteria for Information Operations (IO), ‘using the Internet to one’s advantage without the 
use of hacking’ (see Chapter 4); however CND is more firmly rooted in CNO and is widely considered 
to be a component of CNO.  Conducting effective defence requires a deep understanding of attack 
and exploitation, and vice versa, therefore mastering any one of the three elements of CNO will yield 
knowledge on how to conduct the other two. 
                                                          
5 The terms virus and worm are often used interchangeably in the media; however they are different.  A 
computer virus is a malevolent piece of code which attaches itself to other programs and instructions on a 
computer.  Once these programs or instructions are run, the virus runs along with them, seeking out additional 
hosts where it can replicate and attach.  In addition to spreading itself, viruses can be designed to perform a 
variety of harmful actions, such as deleting files or creating glitches.  In 2006 and 2007, the Panda Burning 
Incense virus infected millions of computers in China.  It replaced the icon of infected applications with an 
image of a panda bear holding three incense sticks in prayer, or in some cases, this image was flashed on the 
computer screen.  The Panda Burning Incense virus also stole passwords and financial details from infected 
computers (Areddy 2010; Fletcher 2009; Guo, Gu, and Wu 2011; Henderson 2009; Lemon 2007).  A worm is 
similar to a virus; it can replicate, spread, and perform a variety of harmful actions; however, a worm does not 
need to attach itself to other programs.  Worms are self-contained programs, capable of continual action, 
without the need for a user to unwittingly start an infected program.  For this reason, worms tend to spread 
more quickly than viruses (Taylor, Fritsch, and Liederbach 2015, 29-30).  
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Beyond standard Internet-enabled networks, there are some variants which can be hacked into and 
are considered a part of CNO, yet they challenge the boundaries of CNO’s definition.  These include 
quasi-closed networks, networks which are partially, but not entirely, separated from the Internet.  
For example, military and intelligence closed networks such as the United States’ Nonsecure Internet 
Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet), Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet), and Joint 
Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS).  The term closed network, also known as a 
network air gap6, is applied loosely here as open source material is unclear on exactly how separate 
these networks are from the Internet.  These are highly secure networks; however they appear to be 
remotely accessible online (either directly or by intermediary connections), use much of the same 
infrastructure as the Internet, and are vulnerable to traditional hacking tools.  For example, US 
military forces have reportedly used civilian infrastructure to connect to NIPRNet and then used 
tunnelling protocol7 to connect from NIPRNet to SIPRNet (Wilson 2007).  Further, while these 
networks aid in military operations, they serve a much larger role than being a part of a weapon 
system.  China has also pursued research and development of a closed, or China-only, Internet for 
classified information, although its progress is unknown (Thomas 2004, 10-11).   
 
Industrial Control Systems (ICS), including Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) and Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, are also quasi-closed networks that fit most 
appropriately in the cyber warfare branch of CNO (HBGary 2011; Weiss 2010).  These computer 
networks are commonly associated with services such as electricity distribution, nuclear power, oil 
and gas pipelines, waste management, and water treatment.  The technical specifications for ICS 
hacking are different than that of traditional hacking, however it shares much more in common with 
CNO than it does with the military hardware of Net-Centric Warfare (NCW).  The Stuxnet worm 
discovered in 2010, which targeted uranium enrichment facilities in Iran, illustrates the incomplete 
isolation of ICS networks.  USB drives containing the Stuxnet worm were inserted into computers 
belonging to the allegedly closed networks.  After the networks became infected, the attackers were 
able to update remotely and exfiltrate data using computers located in foreign countries, computers 
which were not a part of the original closed networks, suggesting a capability of Internet 
connectivity prior to the infiltration.  A truly closed network would have no wireless transmission 
and share no physical connections to Internet infrastructure.  Further, while some of these networks 
are at least semi-closed off from the Internet, many are not and do not claim to be.  Beyond cyber 
                                                          
6 Air-gapped networks are physically separated from, and share no connections with, outside networks, 
including the Internet (Amoroso 2011, 63-64). 
7 A tunnelling protocol is a workaround which allows a user to access a typically incompatible network. 
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warfare, most states consider ICS and SCADA to be critical infrastructure.  Other critical 
infrastructure such as banking, transport, medical facilities, emergency services, and civilian 
communication are more firmly rooted in the Internet, and therefore fall under the CNO category 
when hacked.  For these reasons, it is appropriate and efficient to keep ICS together with the rest of 
critical infrastructure in cyber warfare categorization.  Other specialized networks with distinct 
configurations, hardware, or means of transmission, such as mobile phones, Point of Sale (POS) 
systems, and satellites, also fall under the CNO category when hacked and will be considered in this 
chapter.   
 
CNO suits multiple pre-existing Chinese doctrinal characteristics, and it provides advantageous 
means for advancing China’s goals.  One of these characteristics epitomized by CNO is the PLA’s 
emphasis on asymmetric warfare.   For example, China’s perceived top competitor and military 
superior, the United States, relies heavily on computer networks for government and military 
operations, and has a commercial sector and civilian population that are reliant on an unsecure 
computer infrastructure.  CNA and CNE have the benefits of plausible deniability, great impact at a 
relatively low cost, a low entry level8, high speed, the near removal of geographic distance and 
borders, stealth, and an underdeveloped international legal framework to combat against it.  The 
requirements for successful CNA are much lower than the requirements for successful CND.  A 
defender must identify and protect against all possible vulnerabilities, while an attacker needs to 
only find one vulnerability to cause damage.  Meanwhile, CNE follows Beijing’s predilection toward 
technology transfer and reverse engineering as a means of leapfrogging in modernization and 
international competitiveness (see Fritz 2008).  Online industrial espionage allows China the 
opportunity to skip generations of research and development efforts, reaching comparable levels in 
science and technology, and by association boosting economic and military might.  Economic gains 
strengthen China’s overall condition while in relative terms weakening that of its competitors, and it 
helps to ensure the stability and legitimacy of the ruling Communist party.  Cataloguing adversary 
weaknesses through online reconnaissance not only provides an asymmetric advantage in the event 
of a conflict, the threat it poses also acts as a deterrent and distraction while China catches up in 
                                                          
8 An individual with no formal training can cause significant damage to a state with only an off-the-shelf 
computer and an Internet connection.  For example, in 2001 and 2002 Gary (“Solo”) McKinnon probed US 
Army, Air Force, Navy, Department of Defence, and NASA computers causing $700,000 worth of damage, 
taking down a network of 2,000 computers, accessing classified data, and deleting and re-writing files (Boyd 
2008).  He accomplished this on his own from his home in London using commercially available software and a 
dial up connection.  McKinnon claims he was searching for proof that the United States is hiding information 
about UFOs and an anti-gravity propulsion system (Previously documented in Fritz 2008).  However, there are 
also highly advanced skills in hacking.  A state seeking to develop CNO as a military domain would need to be 
strongly competitive and take a comprehensive approach. 
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traditional military might.  Further, CNE can aid China in obtaining market dominance within the 
fields of Information and Communication Technology (ICT).  This would provide increased CND by 
removing foreign influence, and enhance CNA capability, such as allowing China to pre-install 
exploits9 in ICT products or expand ownership of Internet infrastructure.  Market dominance also 
relates to financial gain, which China has stated is intrinsically related to military capabilities and 
strategic interests.  China’s view of comprehensive national power, and concepts such as 
unrestricted warfare (discussed in Chapter 1), has shown a blurring of the lines between military and 
non-military spheres (Andress and Winterfeld 2011, 43-44; Gady 2015).  These correlate with CNO, 
as anyone connected to the Internet can now participate in a state-level conflict.  Additionally, non-
military computer networks have become appealing targets, because they are vital to a state’s 
ability to function, and their disruption or destruction would not directly involve harming civilians.  
Additional Chinese strategic inclinations which can work in harmony with CNO will be explored 
throughout this chapter’s subheadings of: organisational composition, computer network attack, 
computer network exploitation, and computer network defence.  Lastly, China’s attempts to 
influence the development of CNO-related international law will also be explored. 
 
 
CNO Organisational Composition 
 
In 2011, China’s Ministry of National Defense announced the creation of an “online blue army”, 
saying that it was in an early development stage, primarily defensive, and in response to the threat 
posed by other states’ development of CNO units (Guo, Gu, and Wu 2011).  The announcement 
garnered international attention; however multiple PLA-endorsed publications place the formation 
of the first Chinese state-sponsored CNO units approximately a decade prior, between the years 
2000 to 2003 (Thomas 2004, 59-62).  While the terminology used in some of these publications 
could be referring to NCW units rather than CNO, a report presented by PLA representatives at the 
10th National People’s Congress in 2003 specifically referred to the ability to conduct cyber warfare 
“on the Internet” (Thomas 2004, 61).  Chapter three of this thesis, The Development of Computer 
Network Exploitation, 1998-2014, also details over 100 alleged state-sponsored incidents dating back 
to 1999.  The seemingly overdue announcement of an online blue army could be propaganda, or a 
slight towards allegations of Chinese CNE, yet it is significant in establishing China’s publicly 
                                                          
9 A security exploit is a prepared application that takes advantage of a known weakness. It is a piece of 
software, data, or commands that utilize a bug, glitch, or vulnerability to cause an unintended or unanticipated 
behaviour to occur on computer software, hardware, or electronic devices. This can allow the attacker to take 
control of the computer, permitting its use for other tactics (Fritz 2008). 
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endorsed baseline for the development of CNO.  The online blue army was comprised of 30 
operators, based in Guangdong province, and possessed a budget of approximately 1.5 million US 
dollars (Beech 2011; Lewis 2011).10  Further, China’s 2013 edition of The Science of Military Strategy 
acknowledges the existence of defensive and offensive CNO units within the PLA (Gady 2015; Tiezzi 
2015).  Western government agencies, Internet security firms, and think tanks place the number of 
Chinese state-sponsored CNO units at approximately 20, spread across all seven PLA Military Regions 
(MRs), and with personnel ranging from hundreds to thousands per unit (Clayton 2012; Mandiant 
2013; Riley and Dune 2012; Segal 2012).  Moreover, these figures are restricted to PLA units and do 
not include other government agencies which may be conducting CNO, hacker groups with 
government ties, militias, or the readiness of China’s general population to conduct online “people’s 
war” (discussed in chapter 1 of this thesis).   
 
A wide range of Chinese entities appear to play a role in state-sponsored CNO.  For example, the 
Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of State Security have been “authorized by the military 
to carry out network warfare operations”, and a group within the Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology was “tasked with breaking computer codes of foreign companies and 
governments” (Gady 2015; Henderson 2007a; Tiezzi 2015).  However, the General Staff 
Department’s (GSD’s) Third and Fourth departments are allegedly China’s primary organs for 
conducting CNO (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2015; Krekel, Adams, and Bakos 2012; 
Mandiant 2013; Stokes, Lin, and Hsiao 2011).  The Fourth Department (4PLA), which has traditionally 
dealt with electronic warfare, is allegedly responsible for CNA, while the Third Department (3PLA), 
which has traditionally dealt with signals intelligence, is allegedly responsible for CNE and CND (see 
Diagram 3).  While these departments appear to play a primary role in CNO, they are not the only 
actors, and it might represent a continually developing attempt to centralize authority over China’s 
cyber warfare capability (China to centralize military command to improve operations 2014; Tol, 
Gunzinger, Krepinevich, and Thomas 2010).  Of these two departments, the 3PLA reportedly 
delegates operations to its technical reconnaissance bureaus (TRB) spread across the mainland 
(Mandiant 2013; USCC Annual Report 2009).  Each of China’s four armed service branches – the PLA 
Ground Force, the PLA Navy (PLAN), the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), and the Second Artillery Corps – 
along with the People’s Armed Police (PAP), also appear to conduct some level of in-house CNO 
                                                          
10 A Northrop Grumman research report commissioned by the US-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission disputes the blue army’s identification as a cyber warfare unit, particularly its offensive capability 
(Krekel, Adams, and Bakos 2012).  Although the same report states that the group is used for online 
confrontation exercises and training, which could help develop or enable an offensive ability.  These 
statements appear to be a response to media reports which exaggerated China’s acknowledgment of modest 
and defensive unit, rather than a challenge to its stated purpose or significance. 
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activity to support their specific needs.  Further, their research and development, including war 
games, have an impact on overall Chinese CNO doctrine (China to conduct ‘digital technology’ 
military exercise next month: report 2013; Information Office of the State Council of the People's 
Republic of China 2013).  Additionally, the Second Department of the GSD, which is responsible for 
military intelligence, and key government agencies such as the Ministry of State Security and the 
Ministry of Public Security, would benefit from a CNO capability and appear to at least act in a 
supporting role, such as providing input on target selection (USCC Annual Report 2012).  This 
complex and changing structure for coordination is comparable to the United States’ difficulties in 
establishing a leading organisation for CNO amidst multiple competing actors.11  Streamlining 
computer network operations was among President Xi Jinping’s agenda when he presided over the 
first meeting of China’s Internet security and infomationization12 leading group in 2014 (China's New 
Small Leading Group on Cybersecurity and Internet Management 2014; Xi Jinping leads Internet 
security group 2014).  Further, President Xi specifically advocated “taking inspiration” from similar 
attempts at improving CNO organisational structure taking place within the United States and Japan 
(Panda 2014). 
 
Militias and hacker groups also factor into Chinese CNO planning (International Institute for Strategic 
Studies 2015).  According to articles published by the Liberation Army Daily, Chinese cyber warfare 
theorists advocated the formation of militia proficient in CNO as early as 1997 (Thomas 2004, 7, 9).  
                                                          
11 Despite the creation of the United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) in 2009, there were concerns 
that it would be overshadowed by the Department of Defense or National Security Agency.  Further, 
USCYBERCOM focuses on the .mil domains, while the Department of Homeland Security deals with .gov 
domains.  A primary target of CNO, the .com domains, is not comprehensively covered by either organisation.  
Additionally, the debate over a streamlined structure is not over, and some have called for cyber warfare 
(including CNO) to be given its own military branch, despite overlapping interests among all military branches 
(see Conti and Surdu 2009; Lynn 2009; Monroe 2009).  
12 Internet security refers to CNO and Information Operations (IO), while informationization typically refers to 
NCW.  This leading group may have been addressing all three branches; however, given the context of official 
statements, it appears that the term ‘informationization’ is being used differently here.  Here it is referring to 
using computer networks to streamline and modernize government and civilian operations.  The primary 
function of these changes does not appear militaristic in nature, and they would likely be Internet-connected, 
making it fit the definitions of CNO and IO.  Meanwhile, the majority of references Chinese officials make in 
regards to informationization remain non-Internet connected and militaristic in function; therefore NCW 
remains a valid synonym elsewhere.  In 2015, news reports began referring to this same leading group by the 
title “Central Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs”, perhaps in an effort to clarify its function (see Creemers 
2015; Rawlinson 2015; Tham 2015).  The Office of the Central Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs is a dual 
nameplate for the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), which itself was formerly named the State 
Internet Information Office (SIIO) (see Chang 2015; Cheung 2015; Cyberspace Administration of China launches 
official website 2015; Segal 2014).  These more recent reports place the organisation’s role more exclusively in 
the IO branch of cyber warfare.  This not only reflects a complex and changing organisational structure, but 
also the close relationship between computer network defence and IO.  Defensive policies on domestic use 
implemented by this organisation would be legal under Chinese law, and therefore would not meet the 
hacking criteria of CNO.  Nevertheless, this organisation remains relevant to the discussion of CNO 
organisational difficulties in this instance. 
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China National Defense News reported that CNO militia became a reality in 1999 and 2000, with 
units operating in Datong, Xiamen, Xian, and the Echeng District (Thomas 2004, 9-10).  Personnel are 
pooled from the information technology industry and academia, and they maintain their separate 
careers while acting as a type of reserve force (Thomas 2007, 129).  In 2005, the PLA General 
Political Department reported the creation of 290 cyber militia in the Chengdu military region alone 
(Krekel, Adams, and Bakos 2012).  However, this figure did not delineate between CNO, NCW, and IO 
militia, of which the monitoring, censorship, and propaganda of IO would seem to require the most 
people and the least technical expertise.  A 2008 study by Verisgn’s iDefense security intelligence 
services, estimated that there were 33 CNO-specific cyber militia in operation country-wide (USCC 
Annual Report 2009).  In addition to these militia aiding China’s CNO capability and readiness, they 
also appear to actively engage in CNE.  China’s 2013 National Defense White Paper, stated that 
China’s armed forces seek to enhance “integrated civilian-military development” and “reserve force 
building” (Information Office 2013).  China also possesses an estimated 250 hacker groups, who can 
develop cyber weapons and advance methods of CNO, serve as a recruitment pool, provide a 
supporting role in operations, or act on behalf of the government while providing plausible 
deniability (China’s Proliferation Practices, and the Development of Its Cyber and Space Warfare 
Capabilities 2008; USCC Annual Report 2008; USCC Annual Report 2009).13   
 
Additional collaboration by entities, individuals, and the general population as a whole further 
complicate the organisational structure of China’s CNO capability.  Key institutes, including those 
directly endorsed by the PLA, such as the Academy of Military Sciences and the National Defense 
University, as well as civilian universities with special military associations and benefits, promote the 
advancement of CNO research and the training of potential recruits (see Krekel, Adams, and Bakos 
2012; Stokes, Lin, and Hsiao 2011; Thomas 2004, 18-24, 64-65).  Government funding mechanisms, 
including the 863 and 973 programs, also foster the development of CNO-relevant research, such as 
encryption and “data mining techniques” (USCC Annual Report 2012).  Independent Chinese 
students and business people with access to key individuals or networks abroad, and entities like 
border control (customs) and telecommunications firms, may be enlisted on a temporary basis to 
enhance specific CNO operations (USCC Annual Report 2012; USCC Annual Report 2014).  Chinese 
companies, such as state owned enterprises, might even take it upon themselves to conduct online 
industrial espionage, in order to meet government expectations and improve their standing with 
government officials.  Lastly, China possesses the world’s largest online population and could use 
this to its advantage in online people’s war.  Unlike prior iterations of people’s war, CNO provides 
                                                          
13 See Chapter 3 for further detail on the history, and alleged government support, of hacker groups. 
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China with the ability to take action globally, not just in physical defence of the homeland (Thomas 
2004, 7, 137).  It also diminishes the risk of physical harm associated with traditional warfare, 
thereby reducing hesitation to participate.  Further, it suits China’s overall nationalistic sentiment, 
favours the urban (more connected) population, and does not necessarily require specialized 
computer skills.  Group leaders could disseminate software online which helps automate the attack 
process, including target lists and malicious scripts.  In this way, China would be relying more on the 
people’s computing power than their technical expertise. 
 
 
Computer Network Attack 
 
An online intruder can obtain full control over a victim’s computer, so at its maximum computer 
network attack (CNA) is capable of any harmful action that a user could do to their own computer 
via the keyboard.  Despite great concern over CNA displayed by governments and the media, there 
are few allegations of state-sponsored CNA in open source material, particularly in comparison to 
the large quantity of alleged state-sponsored computer network exploitation.  Even in the case of 
the 2007 cyber attacks against Estonia and the 2008 cyber attacks surrounding the Russo-Georgian 
War, for which Russia was accused, the assailants did not cause the dramatic destruction of 
computer networks.  Instead the perpetrators relied on low-level attacks such as DDoS14 and web 
page defacements15 (see Fritz 2008).  This could be due to states not wanting to reveal their 
capability until it is needed, such as in a time of war with a superior or peer-level adversary; or it 
could be the result of an attack carrying greater perceived consequences than exploitation.  For 
example, using CNA could escalate a cyber arms race; or the aggressor state may be heavily reliant 
on computer networks themselves and fear setting a precedent that would reduce the hesitation of 
other states to conduct CNA against them.  Additionally, the benefits of conducting CNA may not be 
worth the risk of hindering continued intelligence gathering and intellectual property theft obtained 
through online exploitation.  In this sense CNA could be comparable to anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons.  
The United States and Russia (formerly the Soviet Union) have had ASAT capability since the 1970s, 
and China has had it since 2007; however, none of these states have deployed them in combat 
                                                          
14 A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack occurs when thousands of computers attempt to access a 
website at the same time with the intent of overloading network servers.  This is similar to thousands of 
humans attempting to use a building’s exit at the same time.  The entryway is a chokepoint and cannot handle 
such high volumes of traffic in a short period of time, rendering the website (or exit) inoperable. 
15 Web page defacement is comparable to electronic graffiti, and it is integrated directly into the website 
design (not for example, the comment section).  These are typically images and text messages, but they can 
also include audio and video.  They are commonly offensive and are meant to send a message, evoke emotions, 
or demoralize an opponent (Taylor, Fritsch, and Liederbach 2015, 29).  
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(Brookes 2007; Puffer 1985).  For the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, using 
an ASAT could have escalated to nuclear war, and it would put at risk all of the benefits obtained 
from properly functioning satellites, including the intelligence gained from satellite imagery.  Despite 
limited international laws preventing the use of ASATs, as is the case with cyber weapons, the 
perceived blowback acted as a sufficient deterrent.  This does not mean, however, that the cost-
benefit analysis could not change during heightened circumstances or that states would not 
continue to develop and maintain an active capability. 
 
The 2013 National Defense White Paper states that China’s policies of active defence, “not attacking 
unless attacked”, and a resolute determination and capability to “counterattack if attacked”, apply 
to cyber space (Information Office 2013).  While on the surface these appear defensive in nature, 
the determination of terminology – such as an act of aggression, imminent threat, threat to national 
security, or state secrets – remains ambiguous, and could lead to actions that would be viewed by 
other states as an act of war or a pre-emptive strike.  Some PLA-affiliated cyber warfare theorists 
and Western analysts believe that China’s initial targets in a cyber war would be the “critical nodes 
and control centers” which link the “political, economic, and military installations of a country (as 
well as society in general)” (Thomas 2004, 6-7).  These nodes are also responsible for enabling a 
state to make effective decisions and coordinate actions.  China believes the United States set a 
precedent for such an attack in the 1991 Gulf War by allegedly using online computer viruses to 
destroy Iraq’s air defence system; although Western states hold a different account of this event 
(Guo, Gu, and Wu 2011; Mulvenon 1999).  Critical nodes which could be struck are not restricted to 
military infrastructure and could include vital financial or societal networks which would have a 
debilitating effect.  Chinese cyber warfare literature often describes this as “acupuncture war”, “key-
point strikes”, or targeting an information-reliant state’s “Achilles’ heel” (Andress and Winterfeld 
2011, 43; Cliff 2011; USCC Annual Report 2008).  This type of attack is meant to paralyse an 
opponent through a swift and surprising strike, comparable to pressure points used in the martial 
arts, or the concept of an assassin’s mace.  Assassin’s mace, or shashoujian, is used in Chinese 
military writings to describe a weapon or tactic “which can deliver decisive blows in carefully 
calculated surprise moves and change the balance of power” (USCC Annual Report 2002; Krepinevich 
2010).  Similar concepts can be seen throughout China’s history, from Sun Zi’s (tr. 1963) The Art of 
War to Mao Zedong’s (tr. 2000) On Guerrilla Warfare.  An assassin’s mace enhances its strength by 
ignoring pre-established rules of conduct.  It has many similarities to asymmetric warfare, such as 
being a novel way to deal with a more powerful adversary, but it differs in that it is a decisive 
weapon, aimed at incapacitating an enemy, “suddenly and totally” (Navrozov 2005).  China 
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possesses several asymmetric, highly devastating weapons, such as a limited but modernising 
nuclear triad capacity, China’s ASAT capability, and an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) capability.  
However each of these has considerable drawbacks.1617  For example, human rights and 
environmental concerns have largely relegated nuclear weapons to the role of deterrent and 
introduced limited warfare.  By using CNA, China could theoretically achieve the asymmetric 
destructive power of ASAT or EMP weapons while bypassing many of their drawbacks.  Being swift in 
such a cyber attack is not only effective, it may be a requirement for success.  If an opponent has 
time to prepare, they could take defensive measures, such as disconnecting critical systems from the 
Internet (USCC Annual Report 2008).  This need to strike early in a conflict, could sway military 
commanders to take pre-emptive action.  Embedded backdoors (discussed further in the Computer 
Network Exploitation subsection below) would enable a swift retaliatory response against critical 
systems, and it fits the policy of active defence as a means of being prepared to counterattack. 
 
All computers and networks that are connected to the Internet can become targets, and an attacker 
can gain up to total control of these systems.  Therefore, theoretical examples of potential targets, 
types of attack, and tactics are vast.  For example, targets which are of plausible value include 
corporations, energy distribution, financial institutions, government agencies, news organisations, 
                                                          
16 It is unlikely that China would use an ASAT to disrupt US space based assets.  To disrupt US satellite 
dominance would require a large scale sky clearing operation, because the United States has constellations of 
satellites with multiple redundancy.  For example, the US Global Positioning System (GPS) provides tactical 
communication and precision navigation, making it a desirable target – however, GPS maintains a constellation 
of 31 satellites in orbit, providing 6 satellites in view from any position on earth at any time. GPS only requires 
4 satellites to operate at full capacity, and 3 for reduced accuracy. When one is destroyed, others can be 
manoeuvred to fill holes in the network, and not all of these satellites are within striking range at any given 
time.  This means a sky clearing operation would take a significant amount of time, thereby revealing Beijing’s 
intention, allowing the US to retaliate and manoeuvre its other satellites out of harm’s way.  It would also 
cause international dispute due to the resulting space debris.  Additionally, there is no guarantee an attempt 
would be successful, as each launch requires precise targeting, and China’s ASAT has only been fully tested 
once.  It is more likely China would attempt to knock out the corresponding relay stations on Earth by using a 
cyber attack.  Chinese tacticians have focused on neutralising the uplinks and downlinks of the space-based 
systems through diverse forms of cyber attack including simple DDoS attack. This gives the advantages of 
deniability and low cost.  It would remove distance from the equation, allowing multiple targets to be taken 
out simultaneously regardless of location, and it would minimize international condemnation and/or 
involvement. 
17 China could destroy a vast amount of US electronics, including computers, cars, phones, and the power grid, 
using EMP weaponry. This is something of which all nuclear armed states are capable by means of high 
altitude nuclear explosions, taking as few as three to blanket the continental US (Electromagnetic Pulse 2005). 
Open source materials have shown the US, China, France, and Russia all using an EMP burst as a surprise first 
strike in war games (China’s Proliferation Practices 2008; Liang and Xiangsui 1999; Winn 2008). However, it is 
unlikely China would use such brute-force tactics. Using a high altitude atomic burst would cause international 
outrage as it damages the planetary environment, and it indiscriminately disrupts everything in its blast radius.  
Alternatively, shutting down the US power grid, production lines, water utilities, telecommunications, or 
modes of transportation are all possible through cyber attack, and it would provide the benefit of increased 
anonymity. [An earlier version of this assessment appeared in How China will use cyber warfare to leapfrog in 
military competitiveness; it has been revised for the purpose of this thesis (see Fritz 2008).] 
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transportation departments, universities, and many more – all of which are broad categories in 
themselves composed of numerous valuable targets which would require varying combinations, 
tactics, and outcomes.  An attack can damage or destroy computers, such as remotely updating the 
Basic Input/Output System (BIOS) firmware with corrupt or defective data – the data which is 
necessary for booting a computer (Ingersoll 2013).  Other methods of attack can temporarily deny a 
computer’s use through harassment, such as DDoS, continually turning monitors off, or altering 
keyboard and mouse functions.  Data on a computer can also be damaged, while leaving the 
hardware operable, such as deleting or encrypting valuable files (Taylor, Fritsch, and Liederbach 
2015, 29).  This wide range of potential targets and CNA-based effects yields a plethora of 
theoretical possibilities.  States do not release detailed cyber contingency plans, because it would 
spoil their effectiveness and create conflict.  Further, researchers attempting to catalogue all 
possibilities and devise the optimal plan of attack for various scenarios could risk being viewed as a 
threat to domestic or foreign state security.  For these reasons – scarce use of CNA by states up to 
the present, the large range of credible possibilities, and limited open source research on the topic –
a comprehensive examination of this aspect of Chinese CNA is beyond the scope of this thesis.  This 
chapter will, however, attempt to reveal general trends, key examples, and some novel applications. 
 
While surgical strikes may be preferable in CNA, China would likely cultivate a scattershot approach 
as well.  Both of these possess benefits, and the two could be used in combination.  The diversity 
and quantity of computer networks would appear to necessitate careful target selection.  For 
example, a state attempting to impact the outcome of a war might receive little benefit from 
attacking dispersed individuals, banks, companies, or websites.  These systems are diverse and 
redundant, which would seem to require significant resources to identify and exploit the 
vulnerabilities in a large enough quantity to have an effective impact.  Embedded backdoors could 
be useful in this regard as a preparation for attack, although even this would benefit from targeting 
key organisations, or software and hardware that is in wide circulation, to increase effectiveness.  
However, given the apparent ease of CNE, and the large number of targets China has already 
allegedly exploited (see Chapter 3), it is possible that they could plant latent kill switches across a 
wide range of targets in sufficient quantity to be effective.  They could also employ online people’s 
war to this end, for which China has the world’s largest number of Internet users.  Mobilizing China’s 
population might not even be necessary to conduct such a large scale operation.  China could use 
botnets18 to conduct such attacks.  While attacks like DDoS and web-page defacements are often 
                                                          
18 A botnet is a large collection of computers that are under illicit remote control and can be banded together.  
Infected computers, known as bots or zombies, can be spread across the globe.  The botnet controller, or bot 
herder, issues commands through a command and control (C2) server.  This way, if a C2 server is detected and 
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considered low-level attacks in terms of sophistication, they can still yield significant impact, 
including economic damage (Taylor, Fritsch, and Liederbach 2015, 29-31).  For example, if China 
decided to take aggressive moves to settle maritime disputes surrounding the Paracel, Spratly, or 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, such as establishing a stronger foothold in these regions, DDoS attacks 
could provide a timely disruption or distraction to deter international intervention, while also 
providing plausible deniability.  The impact of this type of attack is comparable to a blizzard or flood; 
there is disruption and damage, but a city or state will likely recover in a relatively short time frame.  
This type of CNA could also serve as a coercive tool, or punishment apparatus, to encourage abiding 
by Beijing’s wishes, particularly among its regional neighbours; and it could be used to draw two 
enemy states into conflict with each other.  In a full scale war, China could use DDoS and web page 
defacements to weaken an opponent’s morale and the population’s willingness to support 
government agendas, or it could disrupt communications and the functioning of society.  In a 
technique similar to human shields, the attacks could be routed through the networks of foreign 
hospitals and schools to hinder retaliatory strikes which could stop the attack.  With the ability to 
obtain remote control of computers, China could even use an opponent’s computers to attack the 
opponent.  Lastly, a host of opportunities exists for combing these attacks with conventional warfare 
to create a synergy.  For example, emergency response communications and transportation systems 
could be disrupted, and disinformation, such as misdirection, could be planted, thereby hindering 
the disaster relief effort and herding people together to maximize the destruction caused by 
conventional weapons.  A holistic approach to the development of CNA is to China’s benefit, and this 
appears to be taking place through China’s support of militias, quasi-support of hacker groups, and 
references to online people’s war.   
 
One specialized category of networks, which would likely fall under the scattershot CNA approach, is 
mobile phones.  Ownership of smart phones, which commonly feature Internet connectivity, 
surpassed one billion users in 2012 (IDC 2014; Reisinger 2012).  As with standard computers, their 
rapid growth has given rise to new vulnerabilities.  China itself reported 702,800 mobile phone 
malware19 infections in 2013 (APCERT Annual Report 2011).  With mobile phone malware an 
attacker can disable a phone, delete data, dial incriminating or embarrassing phone numbers, 
replace the icon and wallpaper images, secretly enlist the phone into a botnet, send costly text 
messages or phone calls (billed to the victim), and send harassing messages (including to the victim 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
shut down, the bot herder can begin issuing commands from a different C2 server.  The bot herder can also 
‘drop’ and store weapons payloads onto these servers for the bots to retrieve.  End-users are often unaware 
that their computer is being used as a bot (Amoroso 2011, 6-9).  
19 Short for malicious software, malware is a blanket term for harmful hacking tools (Lawrence and Riley 2013; 
Taylor, Fritsch, and Liederbach 2015. 30). 
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and those listed in the victim’s address book).  Mobile spyware also exists, although eavesdropping 
and stealing data belong to exploitation rather than attack.  Mobile phones can be infected through 
application (app) downloads, email attachments sent to the phone, Multimedia Messaging Service 
(MMS), or standard computer-based methods when the phone is connected to the Internet or a 
personal computer.  They can also be infected via Bluetooth wireless technology.  For example, 
phones infected with the 2005 Commwarrior worm attempt to spread the worm by connecting with 
nearby Bluetooth enabled phones.  The target user must accept the incoming download to become 
infected; however, if they decline, the message will continue to instantly pop up until the user either 
accepts the download or moves out of the wireless range of the sender (Hypponen 2006).  Again, 
China could use these types of CNA to demoralize an opponent and create civil unrest, or to reduce 
an opponent’s ability to communicate and coordinate actions.  Furthermore, it could be used to 
erode consumer confidence in non-Chinese products. 
 
Despite the apparent development of rudimentary, large scale, CNA that would target more 
indiscriminately, authoritative PLA writings on CNA appear more focused on acupuncture style 
warfare and targeting critical nodes.  Interestingly, some of these critical nodes possess unique 
architecture and means of communicating with the Internet, such as wireless connections and quasi-
closed networks.  Among these are cloud computing, Point of Sale software and hardware, and a 
large number of satellite networks.  For example, cloud computing possesses a distinct, yet online, 
architecture and large amounts of data concentrated at a single source.  Cloud computing is 
designed to store some of an individual’s information and applications on remote servers rather 
than on the individual’s computer.  This allows the individual to access these resources from any 
computer by connecting to the server; it also allows for shared resources which can reduce the 
operational costs of organisations (Mell and Grance 2011; Ragland, McReynolds, Southerland, and 
Mulvenon 2013).  However, the majority of security concerns associated with this form of computer 
network primarily relate to computer network exploitation, and defence against exploitation, not 
attack.  Examples include concerns of data theft, or concerns that companies basing their cloud 
computing operations in China could be coerced through China’s legal apparatus to reveal network 
vulnerabilities and trade secrets.  The attack aspects of cloud computing do not appear distinct from 
those found in common Internet architecture.  The attraction of cloud computing in terms of cost 
savings could lead to increased concentrations of data being located in clouds, thereby making them 
critical nodes and appealing targets.  This is ironic, given that cloud computing is meant to enhance 
an individual’s computer security through backup data in the cloud in the event that their computer 
is attacked.  By being part of a larger group, they become a more attractive target, because more 
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damage could be inflicted.  Similarly for CNE, it is comparable to robbing a bank, rather than robbing 
individuals. 
 
Another variant network which could be targeted by CNA is Point of Sale (POS) systems.  These 
systems use wireless communication and Internet connections in portions of their network.  The 
reasons for this are efficiency, productivity, and cost.  Retail stores may need to communicate with 
the corporate network, vendors, and “external credit card processors” to validate transactions 
(Trend Micro 2014).  POS software and hardware also suffers from a lack of vendor diversity and 
poor implementation of security features (see Fritz 2008, 66-67; Raz 2013).  Stores which use these 
wares are critical nodes, as they can provide an attacker with large amounts of data traffic from one 
source, particularly if access to the larger corporate network can be obtained.  Between 2005 and 
2007, a group of 11 people managed to steal 45 million users’ bank and credit card details, resulting 
in a loss of more than $256 million.  Their unprecedented feat was accomplished by parking outside 
of TJX retail stores and hacking into the store’s wireless network.  Once the account and pin 
numbers were obtained, the group was able to imprint this information onto blank bank and credit 
cards, including the magnetic stripe.  These cards were then sold online or used to withdraw cash 
from ATMs.  They would go to ATM machines near midnight, so that they could withdraw the 
maximum daily limit from each card, and then after midnight, withdraw a new day’s maximum daily 
limit.  The group’s mastermind, Albert (“soupnazi”) Gonzalez, was working for the US secret service 
at the time of this crime; he had been recruited for his computer skills that were demonstrated in 
prior criminal activity for which he was apprehended (CBS 60 Minutes 2009; Verni 2010; Vijayan 
2007).20  Attacks targeting POS transactions, such as another breach in 2013 which stole bank and 
credit card account details from 40 million Target Corporation customers, are on the rise (McCoy 
2013).  While this would appear to appeal more to criminal organisations in search of profit, the 
societal disruption and cost to business competitors could appeal to a state.  In particular, targeting 
the sale and distribution of a critical commodity such as petroleum could cause advantageous 
disruption during a time of war.  Further, the tools and methods which allow access to POS software 
and hardware could be used to disable networks rather than steal from them. 
 
A third type of network with unique architecture, which could be targeted in CNA, is satellite 
networks.  Several satellite providers utilize wireless communication in portions of their Internet-
                                                          
20 Another individual, Jonathan (“c0mrade”) James, committed suicide while under investigation for 
connection to the TJX hacker ring (Poulsen 2009).  He had previously been charged with penetrating NASA 
computer networks, where he downloaded $1.7 million worth of software used to control the International 
Space Station’s life support (Harrison 2000).   
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connected networks, including radio and microwave signals used for uplinks and downlinks.  
Satellites are vital to sustaining the current balance in the global economy, society, and advanced 
militaries.  As such, states are increasingly recognizing satellites as critical infrastructure.  They 
provide a significant role in climate and natural disaster monitoring, communication, early warning 
systems, global broadcasting, meteorology, navigation, precision strikes, reconnaissance, remote 
sensing, surveillance, and the advancement of science and technology.  Satellite services also have a 
supporting role in “mobile and cellular communication, telemedicine, cargo tracking, point-of-sale 
transactions, and Internet access”21 (GAO Critical Infrastructure Protection Commercial Satellite 
Security Should Be More Fully Addressed 2002).  The global commercial space industry alone has 
“estimated annual revenues in excess of $200-billion” (Space Security Index 2012).  As of December 
2012, there were an estimated 1046 operational satellites belonging to 47 states in addition to 
various international entities and collaborations (UCS Satellite Database 2012).  Beyond states, 1,100 
firms in 53 countries use outer space as part of their operations (Robertson 2011).  One type of 
satellite infrastructure, the very small aperture terminal (VSAT), is commonly used for bank 
transactions between headquarters and branches, Internet access in remote locations (including 
Intranet, local area networks, video conferencing, virtual private networks, and VOIP), mobile or 
fixed maritime communications (for example, a ship or oil rig), POS transactions, and Industrial 
Control Systems.  A significant disruption to satellite services would have damaging effects on 
society.  In addition to Internet websites and mobile apps that reveal particular frequencies used by 
individual satellites, scanning software exists that can automate the process for potential hackers 
(Laurie 2009).  The four primary types of satellite hacking are Jam, Eavesdrop, Hijack, and Control.  
Attempts to increase security through encryption, hardening, and redundancy all carry an increase in 
cost and a reduction in efficiency which commercial satellite providers may not see as worth the risk 
reduction.  A 2004 study published by the US President’s National Security Telecommunications 
Advisory Committee “emphasized that the key threats to the commercial satellite fleet are those 
faced by ground facilities from computer hacking” (Space Security Index 2012).  A reliance on 
satellites can be viewed as a soft spot which could be exploited.  For example, authoritative “Chinese 
military writings advocate attacks on space-to ground communications links and ground-based 
satellite control facilities in the event of a conflict” (USCC Annual Report 2011).22  
 
                                                          
21 Some satellite providers offer Internet access as a for-sale service.  However, this is not a requisite for 
satellites to be considered Internet-connected.  Many satellite networks use Internet connectivity as a part of 
their operations, but they do not offer it as a customer service. 
22 For a comprehensive examination of satellite hacking, including architecture design and timeline of known 
incidents, see Fritz 2013a. 
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Critical infrastructure, including the quasi-closed networks of ICS, are also vital nodes which would 
fall under China’s acupuncture war.  These include chemical plants, emergency services, energy grids, 
communications, production lines, transportation systems, waste treatment, and water utilities.  
Such attacks could cripple the flow of goods, cause panic, instigate civil unrest, create food shortages, 
and shut down business.  Non-state actors have proven that the capability of such an attack is 
plausible.  For example, cyber attacks which have been conducted against these types of key 
infrastructure include: the disruption of emergency response by embedding malicious code into e-
mail; disrupting air traffic control communication, including the ability “to activate runway lights on 
approach”; using a worm to corrupt the computer control systems of a nuclear power plant in Ohio; 
and using a Trojan horse23 to gain control of “the world’s largest natural gas pipeline network” 
(DCSINT 2005; Lourdeau 2004; Wilson 2003; Wilson 2008; Maynor and Graham 2006).  In 2000, Vitek 
Boden used radio transmissions to remotely trigger the release of nearly a million litres of sewage 
into the public waterways of Queensland, Australia (Abrams and Weiss 2008; Barker 2002).  Power 
outages in Brazil in 2005 and 2007, which affected millions of customers, were attributed by some 
sources to cyber attacks (CBS 60 Minutes 2009; Lewis 2010).  There have also been some alleged 
state-sponsored attacks targeting critical infrastructure.  Despite widespread reporting by analysts 
and the media that the Stuxnet worm was ‘the first cyber weapon’, the United States allegedly 
inserted a Trojan horse into computer systems being sold to the Soviet Union, which in 1982 caused 
an explosion in the Trans-Siberian Pipeline24.  Further, the United States was allegedly engaged in 
multiple programs during the 1980s to embed backdoors into computer products for enhancing CNA 
and CNE (Markoff 2009; Safire 2004; Weiss 2007).  In 2007, Israel was also accused of using pre-
installed backdoors, in this case to remotely disable Syrian radar systems (Adee 2008).  As noted 
elsewhere in this thesis, North Korea and Russia have both been accused of conducting low level 
CNA, such as DDoS and web page defacements on multiple occasions, and in 2012, Iran was accused 
of attacking the Saudi Aramco petroleum and natural gas company.  The attack on Saudi Aramco 
used a virus to erase data on internal networks, such as “documents, spreadsheets, e-mails, [and] 
files” and leave behind “an image of a burning American flag” (Perlroth 2012). 
 
The United States and Western countries are particularly vulnerable as much of the communication, 
manufacturing, water, transportation, and energy infrastructure is owned by the private sector, as 
opposed to China and Russia where infrastructure is predominantly in the hands of the government 
                                                          
23 A Trojan horse, or Trojan, is a self-contained program which masquerades as a beneficial program while 
secretly performing harmful functions.  They can contain varying packages of malicious tools (Taylor, Fritsch, 
and Liederbach 2015, 29).  
24 It is uncertain if these computers were connected to the Internet, or if the modern Internet existed at this 
time; however, it points towards a much earlier development stage of computer network attack than Stuxnet. 
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(Greenemeier 2007).  US government and defence installations are heavily funded for security, 
whereas the private sector is not.  Initially, the US power grid control systems were on closed 
networks (not connected to the internet); however as organisations grew, and so did the internet, it 
became more cost effective to tie them together.  In particular, with deregulation it became more 
important for offsite maintenance and information sharing.  The Internet became essential for 
operations, meaning they would need two separate systems for operation, one connected and one 
not. Through the decision-making process companies decided it was cheaper to have only the one 
that was connected, but focus on keeping it secure.  Over time security became lax, and no network 
that is connected to the Internet can be entirely secure.  Many of these systems do not support 
authentication, encryption, or basic validation protocols; of those that do support them, most run 
with security features disabled (Maynor and Graham 2006).  Further, power companies may buy and 
trade power amongst themselves, so loopholes designed to check available capacity have provided 
another entry point (Winkler 2007).  In addition to Internet connections, ICS may be compromised 
through outdated modems used for maintenance purposes, wireless access points, roaming 
notebooks, and embedded pre-installed exploits in software and hardware.  For example, spear 
phishing25 targeted at individuals who have access to a closed network, could lead to the installation 
and spread of a virus on an open network.  This virus could then be carelessly transported on 
removable data storage between the open and closed network.  The widespread use of data storage 
devices, such as USB flash (thumb) drives, cameras, mobile phones, mp3 players, and portable 
gaming devices, makes their presence in sensitive locations appear innocuous.  The vulnerability of 
the private sector’s computer networks, due to a lack of understanding or a lack of incentive, 
provides China (or other cyber-capable groups) with the opportunity to cripple US infrastructure.  In 
some cases reports of the vulnerability of ICS may be alarmist,26 and media portrayal 
sensationalised,27 to support particular agendas; however given the known instances of CNA 
                                                          
25 Spear phishing is a targeted email scam which attempts to gain unauthorized access to a target’s computer.  
The emails, which may appear to be legitimate and from a known source, contain a hyperlink or attachment 
which, if clicked on, will infect the computer.  Common attachment file types used in spear phishing include 
Word and PowerPoint documents, PDF documents, and image files. 
26 Governments are aware of the threat CNA poses to ICS, and they have been taking steps to increase 
personnel screening, inspections, inter-agency communication, emergency response capability, scrutiny of 
sensitive hi-tech parts produced abroad, and overall computer network defence.  ICS systems may be more 
robust than some reports have indicated.  Moreover, these systems are designed to be distributed, diverse, 
redundant, and self-healing, in part because weather systems and natural disasters pose a continual threat of 
disruption.  A cyber attack against ICS systems may require a sustained assault against multiple targets to have 
a significant effect.  Additionally, it is not entirely automated as humans are retained for monitoring. 
27 Television programs and Hollywood films, such as Die Hard 4.0, Hackers, and War Games, which were set in 
the present day, give the impression that an intruder can enter any network with a few simple key strokes and 
the phrase “I’m in”.  Further they create the illusion that an intruder can jump between multiple databases 
and compile information instantaneously, as if banking details, building blueprints, facial recognition software, 
medical records, missile launch codes, mobile phone tracking, personal history, surveillance cameras, 
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targeting critical infrastructure, coupled with widespread allegations of state-sponsored probing of 
these networks, it appears to be a credible threat.  In the case of the energy grid, striking a small 
number of key nodes could create a cascading failure.28  Further, a state would have considerably 
more resources to devote to CNA development than the non-state actors who have already 
conducted such attacks.  Lastly, the target of such an attack could be any state, not only cyber-
advanced states, which raises its feasibility as an attack option. 
 
The final specialized network and critical node to be examined in this subsection, which will help to 
round out the scope and complexity of potential CNA, is the United States’ Nonsecure Internet 
Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet).  Cyber warfare analysts suggest that this may be a prime target 
in the event of a conflict between China and the United States (Mulvenon 2013).  NIPRNet contains 
unclassified, yet sensitive, information pertaining to the US government and military which are 
critical in times of peace and war.  This information includes,  
 
all DoD bill payments; the daily calendars for admirals and generals; troop and cargo 
movements; aircraft locations and movements; aerial refuelling missions; medical records 
for military personnel and their dependents; soldier and officer evaluation reports; unit 
deployment information; and all e-mails among Department of Defense and military 
personal digital assistant communications devices (USCC Annual Report 2008). 
 
This quasi-closed network maintains connections to the Internet for ease of use and enhanced 
productivity, including providing access to those in remote locations.  China has been accused of 
accessing and altering data on NIPRNet in 2006 and 2007, including implanting malware in the 
network which could have been used in an attack (Krekel 2009; Tkacik 2008).  One of the functions 
of NIPRNet is the coordination of force deployment, including non-combat aspects, such as the 
transport of supplies and supporting personnel which are essential to operations.  In times of an 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
television and radio broadcasts, traffic lights, transportation systems, utility systems, and other elements are 
all operating on the same network with an easy to use navigation and interface (see Badham 1983; Black 2013; 
Carlin 1997; Oshii 1995; Robinson 1992; Softley 1995; Whedon 2015; Wiseman 2007).  While each of these 
could theoretically be hacked, they represent a wide range of constantly changing and diverse systems.  Even a 
state, with all of its resources, would be unlikely to accomplish such a feat in one city, let alone country-wide, 
or globally.  Focusing on critical nodes would be crucial, as would mapping of systems beforehand, cataloguing 
known exploits, and maintaining a pre-strike presence within networks.  Smaller, less technologically advanced, 
states might provide an easier target, yet at the same time, they would have less networks to attempt 
exploitation on.  Such exaggerated portrayals can also have the opposite effect, causing policy makers and the 
public to dismiss a credible threat.  
28 Striking hubs, critical links, or the largest suppliers of energy distribution could cause other systems in the 
network to collapse.  For example, by knocking out the largest suppliers, other nodes will attempt to 
compensate for the loss and may in turn overload. 
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impending war with a distant opponent, such as the Iraq War in 2003, the United States begins 
operations with a large build-up or deployment phase prior to engagement, actions which are widely 
reported on in the international news.  If China decided to reclaim Taiwan in a surprise move, it 
could target NIPRNet to delay US involvement, and potentially obtain Taiwanese surrender before 
the United States could fully respond.29  The network could be sabotaged, or made temporarily 
unavailable through a DDoS attack, or important data could be deleted.  More subtly, China could 
alter data on the network to disrupt logistics.  For example, equipment, supplies, and personnel 
could be sent to the wrong locations, and coordinates or supply lists could be tampered with 
(China’s Proliferation Practices 2008; Lewis 1994).  Using CNA to target NIPRNet could avoid direct 
confrontation and provide plausible deniability. 
 
 
Computer Network Exploitation 
 
While Chapter 3, The Development of Computer Network Exploitation, 1998-2014, provides a 
comprehensive examination of alleged Chinese CNE incidents, it is relevant to discuss it here, as it is 
part of CNO.  The specific incidents are sufficiently extensive and instructive to merit their own 
chapter. 
 
Computer network exploitation (CNE) refers to the clandestine theft of information through 
Internet-connected hacking; and it is synonymous with the terms cyber espionage and cyber 
reconnaissance.  The online theft of intellectual property allows China to leapfrog in research and 
development across all sectors.  Not only does this theft allow China to advance its own capabilities, 
it also erodes the power of victim states.  Companies, militaries and governments might invest 
heavily in time and money to produce products, but lose the reward of a competitive edge when 
those products are stolen.  Furthermore, money and efficiency are lost through attempting to 
improve computer security against CNE.  In another form of information theft, CNE can eavesdrop 
on activist activity, business deals, enemy weaknesses, impending news, government intentions and 
sentiment, and military developments and capability.   Unlike traditional espionage, CNE is capable 
of global reach at high speed (USCC Annual Report 2007).  Intruders can also operate anonymously, 
and at a relatively low cost, from the safety of their own country.   
 
                                                          
29 The People’s Republic of China maintains that Taiwan belongs to it following the end of the Chinese Civil 
War in 1949, while the United States maintains it is obligated to act in Taiwan’s defence under the Taiwan 
Relations Act of 1979. 
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The following template is allegedly a common method used by China to conduct CNE (see HBGary 
2011; Lawrence and Riley 2013; Mandiant 2013; Stokes and Hsiao 2012; USCC Annual Report 2009).  
First, the Internet is used legally to identify and research individuals and organisations which may 
possess information that is useful to China.  A spear phishing campaign is then conducted against 
these individuals using information gathered from company websites and social media.  The 
aggressor attempts to tailor the email content to the target, so it appears as if it is arriving from a 
legitimate source.30  The bait message might include upcoming meetings, products, and events, or 
associate and friend names, as subject matter.  The email address used to send the message can also 
be crafted to appear innocuous; for example, selecting an email address, from a free email service 
provider, that closely resembles the local and domain components of the target organisation’s 
employee-only addresses.  Malicious attachments and links can also be disguised, such as changing 
the file icons, hiding file extensions, or using misleading display text for a link rather than displaying 
the full URL.  Clicking on the link or attachment within the deceptive message can run a harmful 
program (if it is an executable file) or take advantage of a wide range of exploits, including zero-day 
exploits,31 to obtain varying levels of unauthorized access to the computer.  This access can be used 
to enhance additional spear phishing against further targets within the network or organisation.  For 
instance, by combing through the email account of a compromised target, the intruder can learn the 
common structure of internal messages, the victim’s contact list, and current topics; and the 
intruder can begin sending malicious mail from the victim’s address, thus increasing its perceived 
legitimacy.  Moreover, they may have access to all of the files on that computer, or access to the 
local area network (LAN), which can yield additional information, including passwords for other 
accounts and services the victim uses.  Among the tools which can be installed in the initial infection 
is a remote access tool (RAT),32 which can allow the intruder total control over the infected 
computer.  With complete, or even partial control, the intruder can install additional payloads33 
                                                          
30 This is often referred to as social engineering.  It is a human interaction element to hacking, comparable to a 
con artist, and it is a prized trait within hacking culture (see Abagnale 2000; Mitnick 2002; Raz 2013).  
31 Zero-day exploits are exploits which are not yet known to the public or IT companies.  Once an exploit is 
known, it might be patched (repaired or blocked) and no longer of use to the hacker.  For this reason, hackers 
catalogue these vulnerabilities and keep them secret until they are ready to use or sell them. 
32 There are many legitimate uses for remote access, such as network administrators helping users with 
computer problems; however it can also be used by hackers to obtain unfettered access to a victim’s computer 
from anywhere on the globe. 
33 A payload is the portion of malware which performs damaging effects.  The name can also refer to the type 
of damage it causes.  A payload can be thought of as the arsenal, or weapons load, of malware.  It is 
sometimes used interchangeably with the terms toolkit and rootkit, although a rootkit requires Administrator 
access and is particularly hidden, or buried, within the system. 
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beyond the initial infection, such as a keylogger34 or alternative backdoors for remote access.  The 
initial breach may be eventually detected and repaired, so it is important to establish secondary 
entry points before access is cut off. 
 
Adding to the common template of alleged Chinese CNE, the commands being sent to control 
computers that have been infected by spear phishing are routed through intermediary computers, 
often in foreign countries, to combat detection and identification.  For instance, China may have 
control of compromised computers in Japan and Taiwan35 and use these as the command and 
control (C2) computers for conducting CNE against the United States.  Relaying both the instructions 
and stolen data through an intermediary aids anonymity, because the victim would see the intrusion 
as coming from these intermediaries.  Typically, a computer can only identify the IP address36 of 
computers attempting to connect with it, not the IP address of third parties which may be issuing 
that order.  In other words, each computer can only see the next link in the chain.  The aggressor can 
see in both directions, because they have taken control of the intermediary, which the victim has not.  
This can be illustrated through the aforementioned countries: even if the United States were to 
collaborate with Japan and Taiwan to determine that the intermediary was controlled by computers 
in China, China could claim that its computers were also under remote control and stymie further 
investigation efforts.  Spear phishing is not the only entry point of alleged Chinese CNE.  Other entry 
points include password cracking, scanning for vulnerabilities,37 and watering hole attacks;38 
however, spear phishing is one of the most frequent methods (Stokes and Hsiao 2012).  Intruders 
                                                          
34 A keylogger is software which records all of the keystrokes made on the victim’s computer.  Among the 
information this can yield are user passwords.  Tangible, hardware-based, keyloggers can also be covertly 
attached to concealed USB ports or cable connections for later retrieval. 
35 Using Taiwan as a proxy to attack US targets has some added benefits, such as creating friction between the 
US and Taiwan, and causing US officials to choose their words carefully when assessing the situation given the 
One-China policy (Elgin and Epstein 2008).  For example, stating that China was responsible for a CNE incident 
(routed through Taiwan) could be construed as an admission that Taiwan is a part of China. 
36 An IP address is a numerical identification assigned to devices participating in a computer network utilizing 
the Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) for communication between nodes.  In essence, each computer has its own 
unique IP address.   
37 Vulnerability scanners may be used to identify known weaknesses. One such scanner known as a port 
scanner automates the process of finding weaknesses of computers on a network. These check to see which 
ports on a specified computer are ‘open’, available to access, and sometimes will detect what program or 
service is listening on that port (Fritz 2008).  Further, port scanners can identify Trojan horses installed on a 
computer by other individuals, which allow remote access.  This allows the intruder to use the backdoor 
already installed by another unknown intruder (Taylor, Fritsch, and Liederbach 2015, 156).   
38 A watering hole attack is a technique whereby the assailant booby traps a website which is popular among a 
specific group.  For example, if the assailant wants access to a specific organisation’s network, they can 
attempt to determine which websites are popular among employees, or possibly a website which is regularly 
used to aid their work.  The website, or web page, is then altered to infect visiting IP addresses, and the 
assailant waits for its targets to visit the corrupted website on their own “like a lion will lie in wait to ambush 
prey at a watering hole” (Gragido 2012).  This can achieve the same effect as spear phishing, without needing 
to trick a user into clicking on a harmful link. 
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use this initial access to move laterally in a network and escalate privileges.  Once a network has 
been breached, it is scanned, literally and figuratively, for data of value.  This data is often moved to 
staging areas within the compromised network, where it is compressed into zip or rar file formats 
and encrypted for fast and secure export.  By transporting the valuable data to a staging area, the 
intruder can reduce their “operational footprint”, spend less time in sensitive areas which may be 
closely monitored, and blend in with normal LAN and Internet traffic activity (USCC Annual Report 
2009).  Alternatively, exfiltrating data outside of business hours in the host country can aid detection 
avoidance as there would be fewer personnel present to notice large flows of traffic.  This is 
assuming the modems remain powered on during non-business hours.  Compromised computers, on 
the other hand, can be remotely programmed to turn on at a specified time by the intruder. 
 
Some CNE activities which test the boundaries of its definition include mapping systems for 
vulnerabilities and setting up for computer network attack.  In many cases an intruder can switch 
from exploitation to attack at will, since both largely rely on the same tools and skillsets, and both 
offer limited or total remote control of a victim’s computer; it is up to the intruder to decide the 
purpose for which control was obtained (US Department of Defense 2014).  Therefore, networks 
which have been penetrated in exploitation, from energy distribution to financial services and 
hospitals to transportation systems, can be viewed in a way comparable to ‘radar lock-on’; the 
intruder had a ‘clear shot’ but chose not to fire.  However, once an attack is made, it is unlikely that 
an intruder can retreat to exploitation, because they will have revealed their presence and possibly 
damaged the system in a way which no longer permits the collection of information.  An attack 
carries greater consequences, as evidenced by China’s tentative agreement that the law of armed 
conflict applies to the cyber realm, and evidenced by the sparse amount of state-sponsored CNA 
allegations compared to the vast amount of state-sponsored CNE allegations.  For China, which in 
many ways remains a developing country, Western countries are lucrative CNE targets.  If China 
were to use CNA, it could risk upsetting the benefits it can gain from CNE, and it could face 
retaliatory attacks.  While China may have less to lose in tit-for-tat intellectual property theft, it does 
have a great deal to lose in terms of the destruction of computer networks.  This does not mean that 
conducting CNE is without consequences for China either.  In addition to risking international 
condemnation and escalation of tensions within and outside of the cyber realm, China also risks 
setting a precedent for CNE.  While it remains a developing country, China’s rapid advancements 
have seen it become a leader in many categories; including the world’s second largest economy, the 
third nation to conduct independent human spaceflight, and the fifth nation to obtain nuclear 
weapon capability.  China’s views on the morality of intellectual property theft may change, if it 
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becomes a primary target of other developing countries.  As an example, Brazil could greatly benefit 
from the trade secrets of China’s space program or telecommunication companies. 
 
A final component of CNE is the use of embedded backdoors.  These are pre-installed exploits in 
hardware, particularly microchips, although the term also applies to software, such as “implanting 
malicious code” during the manufacturing process, which “could be remotely activated on command” 
(USCC Annual Report 2008).  In the case of China, these are sometimes referred to as Manchurian 
chips or Trojan dragons.  Embedded backdoors can also be used for CNA; however their presence 
alone does not necessarily reveal intent.  Concerns over China’s potential use of embedded 
backdoors appears to have gained prominence in mass media around 2008, and particular scrutiny 
was placed on the Chinese telecommunications company Huawei in 2012 (CBS 60 Minutes 2009; 
Tkacik 2008; USCC Annual Report 2012).  Yet, accusations against Huawei date back to 2003, and the 
concept of embedding backdoors is not new to Chinese CNO strategists (McDonald and McGuirk 
2012; Rogers 2012).  In a 1988 lecture at the Chinese National Defense University, Dr. Shen 
Weiguang, a former PLA officer, State Council member, and prolific author on information warfare 
(IW) theory stated: 
 
Virus-infected microchips can be put in weapon systems; an arms manufacturer can be 
asked to write a virus into software; or a biological weapon can be embedded into the 
computer system of an enemy nation and then activated as needed.  Thus, war preparation 
takes on another form.  Preparation for a military invasion can include hiding self-
destructing microchips in systems destined for export (Thomas 2004, 45). 
 
To this end, China may seek to establish market dominance in the production of information and 
communication technology (ICT) software and hardware.  If China could unseat Microsoft as the 
industry standard in software, it could install backdoors, latent viruses, or remotely triggered ex-
filtration devices.  In this case CNE could create a positive feedback loop.  CNE could help enable 
China to obtain market dominance through industrial espionage, and once market dominance is 
obtained, it could enable greater CNE capabilities through embedded backdoors.  Moreover, market 
dominance would boost China’s economy, and it could aid Chinese CND by limiting other countries’ 
ability to use pre-installed exploits.  Lastly, China could use its economic might to obtain greater 
ownership of submarine cable infrastructure.  This would allow further access to cyber 
reconnaissance or the option of shutting down portions of Internet connectivity during times of 
conflict (Glanz and Markoff 2011; Of Cables and Conspiracies 2008; Whitney 2008).   
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Computer Network Defence 
 
All computers which are connected to the Internet are susceptible to attack and exploitation.  There 
is no guaranteed defence – other than unplugging from the Internet, which may defeat the 
computer’s intended purpose – there are only ways to mitigate risk.  The Internet plays a critical role 
in China’s economy, society, and modernization goals; and therefore it is a strategic asset which 
must be protected.  In 2012, 676 million devices were used to connect to the Internet by China’s 538 
million Internet users (USCC Annual Report 2012).  Given that China has the world’s largest Internet 
population, in terms of volume China has the most targets to defend.  PRC President Xi Jinping 
referred to information technology as a “double-edged sword” (Pace 2013).  On the one hand it 
offers a new means of prosperity, and on the other it creates new security vulnerabilities.  The more 
society becomes reliant on technology, the greater the cyber security risk; yet to maximize the 
benefits technology offers, including profit, requires a full commitment.  For example, it would be 
inefficient to maintain all of the old paper-based record keeping and transaction infrastructure as a 
failsafe for new electronic systems.  A reluctance to embrace technology and globalization can be 
detrimental, as demonstrated in Chinese history.  The naval expeditions of Zheng He during China’s 
early Ming dynasty had secured China’s position as a great power; however a change in leadership 
and a turn towards xenophobic policies led to a decline in Chinese power.  In particular, lagging 
naval technology played a role in China’s Century of Humiliation, and China is now attempting to 
regain a top tier naval power status.  China must embrace the Internet to achieve its goals, despite 
the new risks it places on state security, social stability, and sovereignty,     
 
In 2008, industries associated with the Internet accounted for 1.6 percent of China's GDP, and 10 
percent of its global trade (The Internet in China 2010).  Unlike industrial manufacturing, this 
industry meets China’s goals of reducing carbon emissions and producing goods higher on the 
technological ladder.  Further, Internet-related industries provide a means for boosting soft power39 
and the spread of Chinese culture through online animation, apps, gaming, memes, music, and video.  
China is seeking to develop world recognized brand names in hardware, software, and services, 
comparable to what the United States has done with companies like Apple, Google, Facebook, 
Microsoft, and Yahoo.  Beyond attempts to reach a global audience, the Internet has become 
                                                          
39 Soft power is the ability to obtain foreign support through appealing culture, policies, and values, rather 
than through the use of force, payments, or threats (Nye 2004). 
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integral in Chinese society.  According to the Information Office of the State Council of the People's 
Republic of China, in 2009, 14 million Chinese people used the Internet to organise trips, 15 million 
searched for employment opportunities, 35 million participated in securities trading, 100 million 
purchased goods online, and 230 million sought information through search engines.  Further, in 
2009 there were 45,000 government websites alone, and 80 percent of online users relied on the 
Internet as their primary source of news (The Internet in China 2010).  China’s Twelfth Five Year Plan 
(2011-2015) calls for the enhancement of broadband access penetration, cloud computing, 
electronic payments, and mobile communication; the latter two being facilitated in part by Internet 
connectivity and shown in the CNA subsection of this chapter to be vulnerable nodes.  Further, the 
Twelfth Five Year Plan calls for the construction of digital and wireless cities, an employment 
information database, and intelligent power grids; along with the convergence of the Internet, radio, 
telephone, and television.  China is also attempting to increase operational efficiency by promoting 
the use and interconnection of computer networks in all aspects of business and government, the 
distribution of goods and raw materials, the health care system, and real estate supervision and 
standardization (China's Twelfth Five Year Plan 2011).  All of these point towards increasing reliance 
on the Internet in China, which elevates the importance of computer network defence.    
 
Along with the dramatic growth of the Internet in China, there has been a dramatic growth in 
Internet-related crime targeting China; however government and media reporting on this issue 
remains vague in open source documents.  For example, following international criticism of alleged 
Chinese CNE in 2007, the Vice Minister of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) 
of the PRC, stated that China has also been a “victim of massive and shocking losses of state and 
military secrets via the Internet” (Leyden 2007).  Moreover, in response to a high profile and 
detailed report released by the cybersecurity firm Mandiant in 2013, the director of the National 
Computer Network Emergency Response Technical Team / Coordination Center of China (CNCERT or 
CNCERT/CC), Huang Chengqing, denounced Mandiant’s claims and stated that China has “mountains 
of data” if it wished to accuse the United States (China has 'mountains of data' about U.S. cyber 
attacks: official 2013).  CNCERT does produce weekly and annual cyber security statistical data which 
provides a fuller picture of China’s CND situation, albeit with some uncertainties.  The 2013 CNCERT 
annual report claims that CNCERT is a non-governmental organisation, yet previous CNCERT annual 
reports claim it is “under the leadership of MIIT” and provides support to government departments 
(APCERT Annual Report 2011; CNCERT/CC Annual Report 2006).  Further, CNCERT’s reported data on 
the number of victims of computer network attack and exploitation includes foreign organisations 
operating in mainland China.  For example, the ‘Top 10 Phishing Victim’s’ for 2009 are all foreign 
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organisations, many of which have been reported elsewhere as victims of Chinese state-sponsored 
CNE (see Chapter 3) (APCERT Annual Report 2009).  Director Huang asserted that foreign allegations 
of Chinese state-sponsored CNE are unconstructive, and some cases could have been solved if the 
victims had presented their intrusion-related information to CNCERT (China has 'mountains of data’ 
2013).  Given the unclear ties of CNCERT and the Chinese government, this could be the equivalent 
of sharing what is known about the intrusion with the intruder, and then being added to statistical 
data as a Chinese victim.  Adding to the vague nature of CNCERT reports, there is no detail given on 
collection methods, level of attribution, or the difference between category titles, such as backdoor, 
malware, phishing, and vulnerability, which would seem to have significant overlap.  Despite these 
limitations, the CNCERT reports are official open source documents supported by the PRC, and they 
form a part of the broader, multi-nation, Asia Pacific Computer Emergency Response Team, so there 
does appear to be some accountability and quasi international endorsement.   
 
CNCERT received 4,390 incident reports in 2007, 10,433 in 2010, and 31,700 in 2013 (CNCERT/CC 
Annual Report 2007; CNCERT/CC Annual Report 2010; CNCERT/CC Annual Report 2013).  The 
primary means of exploitation or attack during these years were spear phishing, web page 
defacement, webpage embedded malicious code (possibly watering hole attack), and the non-
descript terms vulnerability and malicious code.40  Beyond the incidents that were reported to 
CNERT in 2013, CNCERT itself tracked 29,100 overseas C2 servers, 30,200 “phishing sites” targeting 
mainland China, and 47,300 Chinese IP addresses that were under illicit remote control.41  In all 
three of these types of malicious activity – C2 servers, phishing, and remote access – the United 
States is alleged to be the largest non-Chinese perpetrator, as is consistent with previous CNCERT 
annual reports.  Other countries cited in multiple CNCERT annual reports as the source of malicious 
activity are India, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.  Additionally in 2013, 24,000 web pages were 
defaced, including 2,430 government websites.  This is a decrease from the 34,845 in 2010 and 
61,228 in 2007; however, web page defacements are becoming increasingly frequent when viewed 
over a longer period of time.   Internet-enabled mobile phones suffered 6,249 malware infections in 
2011; 163,000 in 2012; and 702,800 in 2013.  CNCERT began reporting on mobile infections in 2010, 
                                                          
40 “Spam mail” is listed as the second most reported type of incident in 2007, which brings into question 
CNCERT’s definition of the word ‘incident’.  This could be due to CNCERT difficulties in providing an English 
translation. 
41 The 2013 CNCERT/CC Annual Report also reports 11.4 million IP addresses in mainland China as being 
“infected with [a] Trojan or [belonging to a] Botnet”.  This might be an adjusted cumulative total, rather than 
an annual increase.  However the language used is unclear, and it appears to contradict figures given 
elsewhere in the report.  For example, being a part of a botnet implies malicious remote control, and being 
infected with a Trojan could result in malicious remote control, yet only 47,300 IP addresses are listed as such.  
It is possible these computers were infected, but not utilized.  CNCERT’s 2010 and 2007 annual reports list 15.9 
million and 4.6 million Trojan or Botnet infections in their respective years. 
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citing more than three million mobile infections in that year.  The sharp decline in 2011 could be due 
to increased protection or a change in mobile phone design, or it could represent a change in the 
process of monitoring and reporting infections.  Despite the sharp decline in 2011, mobile infections 
have been steadily increasing since then, and the large number of infections in all four years 
represents a significant vulnerability which requires defence.  Sporadic reporting of CNA and CNE 
statistics from Chinese news outlets and government agencies vary slightly from the CNCERT reports, 
yet concur with the overall trends – annual attacks, infections, and intrusions are in the tens of 
thousands, they are increasing, and a large percentage originate from foreign countries, particularly 
the United States (China’s cyber security under severe threat: report 2013; China says hit by 500,000 
cyberattacks in 2010 2011; China says U.S. routinely hacks Defense Ministry websites 2013; Li 2011; 
USCC Annual Report 2012).  According to the report China’s 2010 Corporate Security Threats, 
released by the Internet security company Beijing Rising Information Technology, classified Chinese 
networks were targeted by CNA and CNE more than 10 million times in 2010 (Henderson 2011).  
Intruders attempted to use removable media, including mobile phones, as entry points into the 
classified, and possibly air-gapped, networks.  The London-based market intelligence company, 
Economist Intelligence Unit, ranks China’s computer network defence ability as “13th out of the G-20 
countries” (USCC Annual Report 2012). 
 
As illustrated by the select computer network attack examples earlier in this chapter, non-state 
actors can cause an immense amount of damage to a state, stealing information, deleting and 
changing files, transferring capital, and destroying programs or entire networks.  Gary McKinnon was 
a foreign solo hacker, Vitek Boden was a domestic insider, and the TJX incident was conducted by a 
combination hacker group and criminal organisation.  As another example, Aum Shinrikyo42 
represents a cult and terrorist organisation.  The rapid advancements in technology and 
globalization have given individuals the capability to cause massive damage with nothing more than 
an off-the-shelf computer and an internet connection.  Non-state actors using computer network 
operations can threaten everything from business and government to military and critical 
infrastructure.  According to Joe Weiss, an industrial control systems specialist and author of 
Protecting Industrial Control Systems from Electronic Threats, China has suffered at least three 
incidents targeting critical infrastructure, none of which were attributed to state-sponsorship and 
                                                          
42 The Aum Shinrikyo cult, responsible for the 1995 Sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway system, was 
discovered in 2000 to have also developed a software program capable of tracking police vehicles.  Further, 
the cult had a role in the development of software used by “80 Japanese firms and 10 government agencies” 
leading to concerns that they may have installed backdoors to facilitate cyber attacks (DCSINT 2005).  In 
addition to showing what CNA is capable of, this is also a cause for concern for China who must also defend 
against cults and terrorist activity, such as the Falun Gong or the 2014 Kunming railway station attack in which 
31 people were killed and 141 were injured (Yamei 2014). 
46 
 
one of which involved insiders.  The first concerned Ertan Hydro Station’s control system which 
“received unexpected signals”.  This was followed by a near system collapse when “it reduced 
generation 900 MW within 7 seconds”.  Only through disconnecting the hydro station’s control 
system from the Internet could the situation be salvaged.  The second instance of critical 
infrastructure being targeted was the installation of “logic bombs”43 by disaffected employees “on 
more than 140 disturbance recorders causing malfunctions”.  The perpetrators were arrested.  The 
third episode involved “viruses [that] were found in three high-voltage direct current (HVDC) 
converter stations (Longquan, Zhengping, and Ercheng) that transfer a total 6000 MW from the 
Three Gorges Dam” (Weiss 2010, 144).  In the civilian realm, China is renowned for its use of pirated 
software, which often contains preinstalled malware and lacks “important security updates” (Wilson 
2007).  As noted in the CNCERT annual reports, and further detailed in Chapter 3, China has suffered 
numerous web-page defacements and DDoS attacks from hacker groups (Kan 2013).  Among these 
were attacks in 2012 which were attributed to the group Anonymous (Anonymous says it hacked 
Chinese government sites 2012; Anonymous says it will hack more Chinese sites 2012).  Anonymous 
is a large and diffuse group, which has been blamed for attacking a wide range of targets for diverse, 
and at times conflicting, motives.  Given Anonymous’ combination of ambiguity and notoriety, they 
(along with others) could serve as a cover for state-sponsored CNA against China. 
 
There are an estimated 120 states developing cyber warfare capabilities with at least 10 possessing 
an advanced offensive capability (Brodkin 2007; Hopkins 2011; McAfee 2009; Paget 2013).  Indeed, 
the international push for developing CNO capabilities has come to resemble what might be termed 
a ‘cyber arms race’.  It has been set into play through a combination of volatile global conditions, 
including the perception of a China Threat,44 concerns over US hegemony,45 and an aggressively 
resurgent Russia.46  China’s 2013 National Defence White Paper directly acknowledges this 
competition, stating that great powers are “vigorously developing” their CNO capability in order to 
                                                          
43 A logic bomb is a harmful computer application which will activate if set conditions are met.  For example, 
deleting an employee’s name from a payroll database (signifying their termination) could be set as the trigger 
to activate the harmful application. 
44 US threat perceptions of China, also referred to as the ‘China threat theory’ by PRC scholars, has attracted a 
wide academic literature (see Broomfield 2003; Dellios and Ferguson 2013; Tiezzi 2014). 
45 Events which fuelled concern over US hegemony in the early 21st Century included wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, aggressive policies under the Bush administration (2001-2009), the increased use of unmanned 
combat aerial vehicles, and the Obama administration’s (2009-2017) rebalancing, or pivot, toward the Asia-
Pacific (see Channer 2014; Clinton 2011; Miller 2011; USCC Annual Report 2014).   
46 Russia’s use of CNO predates China and includes alleged involvement in the 2007 cyber attacks against 
Estonia and the 2008 cyber attacks surrounding the Russo-Georgian War (see Fritz 2008).  Russian military 
intervention in the Ukraine in 2014, including the annexation of Crimea and alleged support of separatist 
fighters who shot down Malaysia Airlines Flight 17; coupled with an increased military presence which includes 
renewed bomber runs, has led some analysts to question if Russian relations are returning to a Cold War 
status (see Leftly 2014; Pollard 2014; Williams 2014) 
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preserve “strategic superiorities” (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of 
China 2013).  As evidence of this, the United States and Israel have been accused internationally of 
developing the Stuxnet worm which targeted uranium enrichment facilities in Iran (Baldor 2013).  
Further, the United States’ commitment to CNO was illustrated in 2013 with the proposed 
Distinguished Warfare Medal, which would have honoured extraordinary achievement in cyber 
warfare or combat drone operations (Dwyer 2013; Shanker 2013).47  Despite budget cuts in many US 
military programs in 2014, the cyber operations budget increased by 21 percent to $4.7 billion 
(Hoffman 2014).  Foreign states wishing to use CNO against the United States (or others) may 
recognise the international focus being placed on alleged Chinese CNE and use that to their 
advantage.  They could use RATs to create botnets and C2 nodes in China, then use these computers 
to conduct reconnaissance and attack in other countries, leaving China to take the blame.  This was 
demonstrated in the cyber attacks during the Russo-Georgian War of 2008.  When Georgian officials 
attempted to block all Internet traffic coming from Russia, the attackers rerouted their attack 
through China (Clarke and Knake 2010, 19).  Further, denouncements of alleged Chinese CNE may 
indicate that countries are developing retaliatory responses, and allegations of Chinese incursions 
could be used to bolster support for increasing CNO foreign budgets.  These allegations in 
themselves are something which China must defend against, as it may affect China’s economy by 
making investors cautious and export controls/legal bureaucracy more stringent.  Similar to CNA and 
CNE being routed through China in an attempt to incriminate them, CNA and CNE against China can 
be routed through multiple countries to obscure the aggressor’s identity – a tactic which China has 
been frequently accused of.  On January 12th, 2010, China’s top search engine, Baidu, was attacked.  
Internet users attempting to access Baidu were redirected48 to a webpage which displayed the 
Iranian flag and the message “This site has been hacked by the Iranian Cyber Army" (Branigan 2010).  
Several factors led to speculation that the United States was the true culprit:  (1) it was unclear why 
Iranian hackers would target China, especially given their reciprocal support in energy deals and UN 
voting power; (2) the attack occurred on the same day in which Google publicly accused China of 
hacking into its computer networks;49 and (3) the United States also had motive to frame Iran, in 
particular retribution for Iran’s Internet censorship which blocked news and social media websites, 
including Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, during the 2009-2010 Iranian election protests.   
 
                                                          
47 The Distinguished Warfare Medal was placed under review and production was halted; however the concept 
continues to be developed, and the prominence of cyber and drone warfare in US strategy has not diminished. 
48 This type of attack is known as DNS cache poisoning.  Incorrect data is illegally entered into a server’s 
Domain Name System (DNS) cache, so that it returns the wrong address for queries. 
49 This was a high profile incident, known as Operation Aurora, and it is detailed in Chapter 3. 
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Classified documents leaked by former National Security Agency (NSA) employee Edward Snowden 
revealed US CNE targeting China.  Organisations targeted over a four year period included Pacnet, a 
global telecommunications provider and owner of the region’s largest fibre-optic submarine cable 
network, Tsinghua University in Beijing, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, and the text messages 
of multiple mobile phone service providers.  Both universities targeted serve a dual role as Internet 
traffic hubs, or Chinese “network backbones”, making all four targets exchange points “through 
which large quantities of data pass” (Lam 2013).  Since 2007, the NSA has also allegedly targeted 
Chinese banks, government officials, the Ministry of Commerce, and the telecommunication giant 
Huawei, in an operation codenamed Shotgiant (Sanger and Perlroth 2014; Targeting Huawei: NSA 
Spied on Chinese Government and Networking Firm).  Beyond the damage caused by the transfer of 
intelligence, these incidents create a financial cost for China as they attempt to investigate the 
breach, halt its continuation, and prevent future incidents.  It also results in a loss of efficiency as 
former operating procedures can longer be viewed as secure. 
 
Despite mistrust and competition among states, CND offers some avenues for international 
cooperation, such as combating spam and select botnets.  Non-state actors, particularly criminal and 
terrorist organisations, using CNO to enhance their activities are also a mutual concern.  China’s 
Golden Shield content control mechanism (see Chapter 4 for further detail) is derided by Western 
states, yet it possesses some security features which are desirable to Western states such as 
controlling hacktivist activity.  The 1999 Seattle WTO protests, the 2010 G-20 Toronto summit 
protests, and the United States’ PRISM surveillance program point towards some overlapping 
interests.  Moreover, through CNCERT, China is an operational member of the 18-nation Asia Pacific 
Computer Emergency Response Team (CNCERT/CC Annual Report 2013).  China has information 
security agreements with ASEAN and SCO, and it has sent representatives “to more than 40 
countries” to research “Internet development and administration” (The Internet in China 2010).  
Further, China has participated in the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), the Interpol 
Asia-South Pacific Working Party on Information Technology Crime, and the Sino-British Internet 
Round Table.  In conjunction with the United States, China participated in the China-US Joint Liaison 
Group, the US-China Internet Industry Forum, and joint cyber war games organised through the 
think tanks the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the China Institute of 
Contemporary International Relations (Hopkins 2012).  Lastly, China has continually pushed for UN 
oversight of Internet administration; although this may be because it favours China’s long-term 
interests rather than a collective good.    
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China can use domestic and international law to bolster its computer network defence efforts.  For 
example, China’s authoritarian control and centralized structure, such as State Owned Enterprises, 
could help in mandating computer-related security standards (Greenemeier 2007).  Western states 
struggle with convincing the commercial and private sectors to boost CND as they often do not see 
the risk posed by CNO as being worth the additional cost.  Further, government monitoring might be 
viewed as a violation of citizens’ privacy and face strong opposition in the West (Clarke 2013).  China 
has pursued several laws which require foreign companies seeking to operate, sell products, or 
register products in China to submit their proprietary information for inspection and approval 
(Heickerö 2012, 79; Ragland, McReynolds, Southerland, and Mulvenon 2013; USCC Annual Report 
2010; USCC Annual Report 2011).  On the surface this allows China to ensure the security of 
information technology, such as freedom from embedded backdoors, however it also has deeper 
implications.  By enabling access to trade secrets, China can examine products for exploit 
vulnerabilities and reverse engineer foreign products.  Reverse engineered products could 
conceivably be sold at a competitively reduced cost given the amount of money saved on research 
and development and the financial backing of the state (USCC Annual Report 2012).  Additionally, 
companies that refuse to abide by China’s regulations are not allowed to do business in China.  The 
appeal of access to the Chinese market and the reduced production costs of operating within China 
provide incentives for foreign companies to abide by undesirable rules; even though these short-
term profits may erode their long-term competitive lead (China’s Military Modernization and Its 
Impact on the United States and the Asia-Pacific 2007).   
 
For China, which is seeking to develop technology indigenously and boost the sales of domestic-
made products within the country, this becomes a win-win situation – either foreign companies are 
blocked from the Chinese market because they do not meet China’s conditions, or foreign 
companies allow access to proprietary information and are eventually driven out through a loss of 
competitive edge (Marsal 2008).  As an example, video game consoles, defined as “computer 
entertainment system[s]”, were banned in China from 2000 to 2013.  The prohibition on video game 
consoles, such as Nintendo, PlayStation, and Xbox, was attributed to concerns over its effects on 
children, despite a thriving personal computer gaming market.  In the build up to a possible lift of 
the ban, producers of video game consoles who wished to conduct business in China were required 
to submit their products and supporting specifications in order to pass safety standards and obtain 
approval.  As one example of possible reverse engineering, the Chinese computer company Lenovo 
released “a motion sensing device” in 2012, called an “exercise and entertainment machine”, which 
appeared to be a copy of Microsoft’s Xbox peripheral Kinect (Kelly and Lee 2012).  This was not the 
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first time China was alleged to have used legal and financial prowess to disadvantage Microsoft.  
Beginning in 2003 and continuing in subsequent years, China’s National Development and Reform 
Commission, formerly known as the State Development Planning Commission, persuaded Microsoft 
to allow access to its operating systems’ source code, as well as, provide education and training on 
manipulating the functionality of Microsoft software (Clendenin 2010; Li 2003; The State 
Development & Planning Commission 2002).  Multiple sources, including a leaked 2009 diplomatic 
cable, indicate that this has provided China with an advanced CNE capability, particularly given that 
over 90 percent of personal computers globally use Windows operating systems (Desktop Operating 
System Market Share 2014; US embassy cables 2010; Tkacik 2007). 
 
One of the difficulties with CNA and CNE is determining an appropriate response.  If a state’s 
communications centre is attacked by a missile, it is considered an act of war. But what is the 
response to a cyber attack on that same installation, with the same debilitating effect?  In 2013, 
China made news headlines by agreeing for the first time that the law of armed conflict applies to 
cyber space; however, this was not as significant as it may appear.  China was one of 15 states to 
agree on the contents of a UN report on Developments in the Field of Information and 
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security.  Among the 34 non-binding articles in 
the report was the statement that the Charter of the United Nations is “applicable and essential” to 
the information communications technology environment (Group of Governmental Experts 2013).  
While not stated directly in the report, the law of armed conflict is tied to the Charter of the United 
Nations.  The law of armed conflict is itself open to interpretation, and Chinese officials do not 
appear to have made any public statement endorsing this position, while in the past they have 
stated their opposition (USCC Annual Report 2013).  While the weight of this UN report is in question, 
it is important to note another article it contained which is particularly relevant to Chinese CNO: 
States must meet their international obligations regarding internationally wrongful acts 
attributable to them. States must not use proxies to commit internationally wrongful acts. 
States should seek to ensure that their territories are not used by non-State actors for 
unlawful use of ICTs (Group of Governmental Experts 2013). 
 
In addition to the difficulties of identifying the source of a cyber attack and determining an 
appropriate response, the absence of an international legal framework to deal with such an attack, 
makes it exceedingly problematic. 
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Conclusion 
 
The Internet-connected hacking of computer network operations (CNO) furthers China’s trends of 
asymmetric warfare and technology transfer as a means of leapfrogging in modernization.  China 
acknowledged the creation of an online blue army in 2011 composed of 30 operators, although 
Chinese source material not intended for a Western audience places the creation of China’s first 
CNO unit between the years 2000 and 2003.  China is believed to possess at least 20 units, as of 2014, 
with personnel numbering in the hundreds or thousands per unit.  The General Staff Department is 
allegedly China’s primary organisation for conducting CNO, with its Third Department being 
responsible for exploitation and defence, and the Fourth Department being responsible for attack.  
While these are the primary organs for China’s CNO, multiple entities maintain an auxiliary or 
independent role.  These include technical reconnaissance bureaus, the four armed service branches, 
multiple government agencies, universities, militias, and hacker groups.  As of 2008, China appeared 
to have 33 CNO militia and approximately 250 hacker groups, both having their origins in the late 
1990s. 
 
Computer network attack (CNA) is capable of destroying or damaging hardware; disrupting or 
denying service; and altering or damaging data through a variety of entry points, methods, and tools.  
All Internet-connected computers are capable of being penetrated, and an intruder is capable of 
obtaining up to full control of a computer.  These factors combined mean there is an enormous 
range of possible targets, tactics, and outcomes.  Beyond standard computer network architecture, 
some systems which are susceptible to CNA possess distinct means of transmission, such as cloud 
computing, industrial control systems, mobile phones, Point of Sale software, quasi-closed networks, 
and satellites.  Critical infrastructure is a key target, as it appears Chinese CNA theory is geared 
towards striking critical nodes (nodes whose destruction or disruption would cause a great impact) 
in acupuncture-style warfare.  To date, there are few state-sponsored CNA incidents in comparison 
to exploitation incidents.  This could be the result of states wanting to hide their capabilities until 
they are necessary to achieve an imperative, or it could be that thus far the cost-benefit analysis has 
acted as a sufficient deterrent.  Despite the relatively low number of incidents, there have been 
some, and non-state actors have further shown the scope and complexity of what is possible 
through CNA.  Non-state actors have disrupted air traffic control, emergency response, energy grids, 
a gas pipeline, a nuclear power plant, and sewage systems.  States have been accused of using CNA 
to destroy a gas pipeline, damage nuclear facilities, disrupt an oil and gas company, and disable 
radar systems.  Additionally, DDoS and web page defacements have been a frequent tactic among 
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states.  While China appears focused on key point strikes, they have also been developing a 
scattershot approach through hacker groups, militias, and online people’s war.  Combining these 
two approaches, along with conventional strikes, can create a synergy. 
 
Computer network exploitation (CNE) encompasses the theft of data, intelligence gathering, 
embedded backdoors, and mapping systems for attack.  The theft of intellectual property is 
particularly useful for China, as it can skip generations in research and development, boost economic 
might, and modernize the country and military.  Understandably though, Beijing is facing increasing 
international condemnation for such alleged activity.  Its alleged use of embedded backdoors has 
also alarmed the international community.  Despite strong denials of such conduct, Chinese 
information warfare theorists have been discussing “virus-infected” and remotely activated “self-
destructing” microchips as early as 1988 (Thomas 2004, 45).  The following chapter, The 
Development of Computer Network Exploitation, 1998-2014, will expound on these topics.   
 
The PRC is becoming increasingly reliant on the Internet, and consequently, creating new 
vulnerabilities.  As of 2012, China had 538 million Internet users; and China’s Twelfth Five Year Plan 
calls for increased integration of the Internet and computer networks into business, government, 
military, and society as a whole.  This modernization includes advancements in electronic payments 
and mobile phones, the creation of wireless cities and intelligent power grids, and the convergence 
of all communication medium.  Meanwhile, computer attack and exploitation incidents targeting 
China have numbered in the tens of thousands annually and are rapidly increasing.  In 2013 alone, 
CNCERT reported approximately 24,000 web page defacements, 30,000 watering hole websites 
targeting China, 47,000 Chinese IP addresses compromised by RATs, and 700,000 mobile phone 
malware infections.  This chapter has also revealed at least three instances of China’s critical 
infrastructure being attacked by non-state actors and four organisations which serve as traffic hubs 
being targeted by the United States.  Further, there are an estimated 120 states developing CNO 
capabilities amid what could be viewed as a cyber arms race.  China’s negative reputation 
concerning CNE allegations could make China a primary target for these developing capabilities, 
either directly or as a proxy to strike other states.  Additionally, all of the asymmetric benefits that 
CNO provides China as a tool for attack and exploitation – including plausible deniability, relatively 
low cost and entry level, and relatively few consequences – also apply to those who wish to target 
China.  Lastly, China is attempting to influence CNO-related international law to strengthen its 
position.  Among these is a trend of imposing access to the trade secrets of companies wanting to 
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conduct business in China.  This allows the People’s Republic to identify exploits, reverse engineer 
products, and repel foreign competition.   
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Chapter Three 
 
The Development of Computer Network Exploitation, 1998-2014 
 
This chapter will examine the development of Chinese computer network exploitation (CNE) ranging 
from individual incidents, recurrent targets, and advanced persistent threats (APTs) to hacker groups 
and state sponsored groups.  Incidents will primarily be examined in order of occurrence, or for APT, 
the earliest known activity.  This does not always correspond to the date the information was 
released.  For instance Mandiant’s report, APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units, was 
released in 2013, but the CNE campaign it revealed began in 2006, so it is discussed in the 2002-2006 
section.  Additionally, supporting information is used throughout to aid in the formation of cohesive 
stories, which will reveal more about Chinese CNE than a strict timeline could.  Therefore this 
chapter is largely, but not entirely, chronological in organisation.  The period from 1998 to 2002 was 
dominated by the formation of hacker groups, and included a number of large scale cyber conflicts.  
These groups set the foundation for the widespread CNE which followed from 2000 to 2014.  In total, 
this chapter details more than 100 alleged Chinese CNE incidents and 19 APT which targeted 71 
countries (see Appendix 1).   
 
Significant APT, or campaigns, examined in this chapter include Nortel (2000-2009), Byzantine (2002-
2013), Titan Rain (2002-2006), NetTraveler (2004-2013), Avocado (2005-2008), APT1 (2006-2013), 
Shady Rat (2006-2011), Sykipot (2006-2013), Axiom (2008-2014), Night Dragon (2009), GhostNet 
(2009), Operation Aurora (2009), Hidden Lynx (2009-2013), the Shadow network (2010), Ke3chang 
(2010-2013), Nitro (2011), Luckycat (2011), Icefog (2011), and Lurid Downloader (2012).50  The 
investigation into APT1 was unique in that it also revealed an alleged CNE group, PLA Unit 61398, 
including details of personnel and facilities, rather than broadly attributing the CNE to the Chinese 
government as a whole (Mandiant 2013).  This unit has also been known by the names Comment 
Crew, Comment Group, Comment Panda, Shanghai Group, and by the name of another APT they 
conducted known as Shady Rat.  A separate group operating out of Shanghai, known as Putter Panda 
or MSUploader, has been identified as PLA Unit 61486, although it has not been ascribed to one of 
the specific APT operations listed above.  Another group conducting CNE for China is the Beijing 
Group, which has been determined to be synonymous with the Elderwood Gang and Sneaky Panda, 
and was responsible for Operation Aurora (Clayton 2012).  A fourth unnamed group operating out of 
                                                          
50 APT and malware are commonly named after recurring words or phrases found within the code or 
infrastructure of the aggressor. 
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Chengdu, PLA Unit 78006, may be responsible for the Shadow network, or less clear, Byzantine 
(Stokes, Lin, and Hsiao 2011).  These groups’ identities are the most firmly established in open 
source material, yet they represent only four of the estimated 20 Chinese state sponsored CNE 
groups (see Appendix 2 for more) (Clayton 2012; Mandiant 2013; Riley and Dune 2012; Segal 2012).  
Beyond isolated incidents, APTs, and the groups conducting them, there are recurrent targets and 
themes, such as CNE targeting the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) or 
information on the F-35 aircraft, and embedded back doors in products, also known as Manchurian 
Chips or Trojan Dragons.  These are discussed as collections of incidents when appropriate; however 
they are not as cohesive as a campaign or attributed to a specific group.  Some defence contractors, 
government agencies, and corporations have been frequent targets; yet intrusions into their 
networks does not necessarily represent a single continued and coordinated effort, and they could 
be on the target list of multiple Chinese CNE groups.   
 
Despite the media’s focus on the later CNE incidents (within this chapter’s timeline of 2000-2014) 
being attributed to China, such as penetrations into Google revealed in 2010, or the Mandiant report 
released in 2013, evidence suggests that China had been conducting sustained and widespread CNE 
throughout the decade 2000-2010.  Allegations often stop short of directly stating the Chinese 
government or military was responsible, yet it is strongly implied and then typically followed by a 
caveat on the difficulties of attribution in cyberspace.51  There are several reasons for this.  Online 
anonymity, the ability to route traffic through multiple computers around the globe, and the ability 
to remotely control computers do pose attribution problems.  Further, governments and companies 
do not want to damage relations with China, in large part due to the economic benefits of their 
relationship, yet they must also protect national security and intellectual property.  There are also 
legal ramifications to accusations which must be considered, and revealing too much information on 
detection methods could place that capability’s continued use at risk or allow other states to obtain 
an equal capability.  The following collection of elements are often used to infer the role of the ruling 
Communist Party of China (CPC) in CNE.   
 
(1) Motive in target selection.  As an example, information relating to contract bids, government 
policy agendas, military operational procedures, political activist communications, or the seismic 
surveys of oil companies are unlikely targets for non-state actors.   For hackers, they lack the 
attention grabbing appeal of other targets, and for criminal organisations, they do not easily 
translate into profit.  Hacktivists or terrorist organisations might have an interest in this data, yet it 
                                                          
51 For all incidents discussed within this chapter China is either directly stated as being responsible, or it is 
strongly implied, by the source. 
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does not seem directly applicable to achieving their goals, and it is unlikely to be worth the resources 
and risk in comparison to other targets.  As another example, highly technical information relating to 
engineering, science, and technology requires vetting that is beyond the capability of many non-
state actors (Krekel, Adams, and Bakos 2012).  This list is not comprehensive; the key point is that 
motive in target selection is one factor in inferring attribution.  In the case of APT1, targets included 
“at least four of the seven strategic emerging industries that China identified in its 12th Five Year 
Plan” (Mandiant 2013).  In some cases the same group that is eavesdropping on Chinese dissidents 
will also target aerospace technology; a dual motive that points toward China (Perlroth 2013; USCC 
Annual Report 2009).  
 
(2) Operational logistics.  Operations which require a large amount of funding, resources, and staff 
point toward state sponsorship.  Many of the incidents described in this chapter, particularly the APT, 
were large scale undertakings involving hundreds of command and control (C2) computers and 
hundreds of targets.  The ability to automate this collection process is limited in part by a need for 
continual monitoring and adaptability in order to avoid detection, maintain access, and locate key 
information.  Development of malware could possibly be purchased, yet the spear phishing and 
watering hole attacks common in Chinese CNE often involve individually tailored social engineering.  
In some cases Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and malware are also tailored to specific targets, 
taking place within the larger campaign (Novetta 2014).  Combing through the large amounts of data 
collected in order to obtain benefit from it would also be time consuming.  An APT targeting 
technical information across multiple industries could require experts from each of those industries, 
and possibly linguists, to know what to look for and to understand what is retrieved (USCC Annual 
Report 2009).  Operations which run for multiple years also point towards the need for a large 
amount of funding and staff, and in some cases intruders have even been noted to be operating on a 
regular work schedule, weekdays from 9am to 5pm Beijing time (Clayton 2012; Demick 2013; 
McAfee 2011). 
 
(3) Final destination of stolen information.  Digital trails which end in China provide an additional 
element of confidence when assigning attribution.  Due to the ability to route traffic through 
multiple computers and remotely control computers, the identity of the person conducting CNE may 
not be known for certain.  However, when CNE is traced back to IP addresses and servers in China, 
this does not remove the possibility that they are in fact the last link in the chain.  In some cases 
these addresses can be further linked to PLA institutes, members, and units.  In other cases insiders 
are also a part of CNE operations.  The arrest of Chinese nationals attempting to return to China with 
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stolen property furthers the connection that the electronic component of their operation was also 
based in China.   
 
(4) Registration and online discussion.  Some of the domains and email addresses used to conduct 
CNE can be traced back to the person who registered them.  For example, an email address used to 
register a domain or conduct spear phishing might also be carelessly used by the same individual 
elsewhere online, such as when websites require an email address to post comments or create a 
profile.  Searching for instances of dual registration has been used to reveal connections between 
CNE incidents and city locations, city records, hacker groups, malware development, phone numbers, 
resumes, state sponsored groups, and university affiliations (CrowdStrike Intelligence Report 2014; 
Information Warfare Monitor 2010; Mandiant 2013)  These can strengthen confidence in attributing 
the individual to malicious activity and strengthen confidence in attributing China as the final 
destination of stolen information.  For example, an IP address used to conduct CNE and associated 
with someone who discusses malware development in blogs and forums seems less likely to be an 
unknowing relay station and more likely to be the perpetrator (Demick 2013; Henderson 2007b).     
 
(5) Mandarin language.  The use of Mandarin language within the programming and control of 
malware and C2 infrastructure is another indicator of possible Chinese attribution.  For example, 97 
percent of the “remote desktop sessions” observed in APT1 were conducted while using a Chinese 
(Simplified) keyboard layout (Mandiant 2013).  Despite the ability for malicious code to be revealed 
online and subsequently used by any actor around the globe, the use of some malware families in 
itself remains a possible indicator of attribution.   Due to language barriers, benefits of early access, 
and a need for developing malware indigenously, the deployment of some malware families remain 
largely contained to their place of origin (Henderson 2007a, 15).  This could also be due to 
established operating procedure and cultural preferences of the groups involved. 
 
(6) Visible use of stolen information.  In some cases which will be discussed later in this chapter, 
stolen information is visible in Chinese products.  Examples include code from Cisco, CyberSitter, and 
Sinovel; automobile designs; and components of the F-35 and F-22 aircraft.  These go beyond 
similarities in products to distinct artefacts, or watermarks, belonging to the original company.  
China, or Chinese companies, may not have sponsored the theft, yet they did come into its 
possession and are therefore providing support at least in an indirect way (USCC Annual Report 
2009).  Less visible, yet a cause for suspicion, are insights which appear to have been gained through 
CNE prior to international government discussions and contract bids.   
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The incidents described within this chapter demonstrate extensive CNE with substantial impact 
across all major industries.  A total of 71 countries are noted as having been the targets of Chinese 
CNE, however the majority of these incidents are focused on the United States of America.  This 
could be due to a higher rate of US reporting, a higher number of desirable targets within the United 
States, and/or greater ease in accessing English language documents.  Even within the United States 
there is a perceived “persistent underreporting of events” (USCC Annual Report 2010).  In addition 
to not wanting to damage relations with China, companies are reluctant to disclose intrusions 
because it could damage consumer and investor confidence, and personnel withhold information 
out of fear of being held responsible for a breach.  The incidents in this chapter are also restricted to 
unclassified material.  Given these limitations of language, underreporting, and open source material, 
it is possible that this only represents a small portion of all Chinese CNE conducted over the 17 year 
period of 1998-2014.  The 2013 US IP Report stated that the United States lost approximately $300 
billion per year through the theft of intellectual property over computer networks with 50 to 80 
percent of the total originating from China (USCC Annual Report 2013). The director of the National 
Security Agency (NSA) and commander of US Cyber Command, General Keith Alexander referred to 
it as “the greatest transfer of wealth in human history” (The IP Commission Report 2013).  Despite 
US CNE, such as the acknowledged PRISM surveillance program, Washington states that the PRC is 
unique in its targeting of commercial intellectual property rather than strictly intelligence and 
military targets (Dilanian 2012; Roundtable: US-China Cybersecurity Issues 2013).  Further, CNE can 
be a stepping stone for computer network attack (CNA), either by mapping systems and their 
weaknesses or by loitering within networks and setting up the capability to attack if it is needed.  
Therefore computer networks which have been targeted by CNE, including commercial entities, 
could become CNA targets in a time of conflict.   
 
 
Rise of Hacker Groups, 1998-2002 
 
Alongside an increase in People’s Liberation Army (PLA) literature discussing computer network 
operations (CNO), and the rapid increase of Internet access within China, solidified hacker groups 
began to emerge around 1998.  Between 1998 and 2002, these hacker groups were involved in large 
scale cyber riots with Indonesia, Japan, Taiwan, and the United States, which were comparable to 
the more often cited, yet later occurring, Estonian cyber conflict of 2007.  The hacker groups’ activity 
during these conflicts was primarily CNA, not CNE.  However, it forms the beginning of Chinese CNO 
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and establishes the groundwork, including anonymity, capability, and talent pool, for Chinese CNE 
which became dominant around 2002.  Some of these hackers have gone on to careers with the 
government or Information Technology security companies within China, and they have inspired a 
new generation to learn hacking skills.  Further, these hacker groups continue on as a supplemental 
tool for state sponsored CNE by providing malware development, plausible deniability for some 
actions, and serving as a militia.  Chinese hackers appear distinctive in their strong nationalist 
sentiment, although to some degree “very strict internal guidelines” and “support of the 
government” had to be maintained to prevent them from being censored or shut down (Henderson 
2007a, 10).  They are not averse to seeking individual fame and profit, yet nationalism remains a 
strong characteristic overall.   
 
In times of economic trouble, Southeast Asia’s wealthy Chinese diaspora have historically been 
treated as a ‘scapegoat’ (Chua 2004, 2-6, 23).  Indonesia was no exception.  The most recent 
instance of this occurred during the May 1998 ‘Riots of Indonesia’.  These riots grew out of economic 
and political dissatisfaction with the prevailing New Order regime of President Suharto and occurred 
in the immediate aftermath of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis which was particularly damaging for 
Indonesia (Collins 2002; Franciska 2014).  Out of the turmoil of 1998 emerged Indonesia’s political 
reformation (reformasi), but not before rioters turned on the Chinese community, blaming it for 
monopolizing the wealth of the nation.  The destruction of ethnic Chinese lives and property was a 
catalyst for bringing together “relatively independent cells” of hackers within China (Henderson 
2007a, 16; Honker Union of China to launch network attacks against Japan is a rumor 2010).  Some 
of the larger cells included China Eagle Union and The Green Army.  They formed the Chinese Hacker 
Emergency Conference Center for communication and coordination and began linking to each 
other’s web pages forming a larger network.  This loose connection of groups utilizing redundant 
communication and resources, including Internet Relay Chat (IRC), is comparable to the group 
Anonymous (see Fritz 2008, 35-37).  Their actions against Indonesia included DoS attacks, email 
bombs, password cracking, and web page defacements.  Key events in 1999 which sparked 
additional cyber conflicts were the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and Taiwanese 
president Lee Teng-hui’s proposal for a state-to-state relationship with China (Krekel 2009; Honker 
Union of China 2010; Thomas 2004, 27-28; USCC Annual Report 2009).  Two key hacker groups 
emerged in 2000, the Red Hacker Alliance, also known as the Honker Union of China, and Javaphile, 
both of which have connections to CNE incidents discussed later in this chapter (Henderson 2007a, 
3-5).  Cyber conflict with Taiwan continued in 2000 after the pro-independence candidate Chen Shui-
bian was elected president, and a new cyber conflict with Japan began over a court case which 
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represented a denial of the Nanjing massacre.52  Hostilities with Japan continued in 2001 following a 
string of incidents perceived as slights to China: Japan’s response to a traffic accident involving brake 
failure of a Mitsubishi automobile, poor treatment of Chinese passengers on a Japan Airlines flight, 
the approval of Japanese history textbooks which removed mention of World War II atrocities, and a 
visit by Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to the Yasukuni shrine in Tokyo that 
commemorates Japan’s war dead, including convicted war criminals (Henderson 2007a, 38-41). 
These cyber attacks were not one-sided; Japanese and Taiwanese hackers also targeted Chinese 
websites. 
 
Another China-US cyber conflict erupted in 2001 following the collision of a US reconnaissance/spy 
plane and a PLA Navy F-8 fighter jet, in which the Chinese pilot died (Brenner 2007; Thomas 2004, 55; 
USCC Annual Report 2009).  This event is known as the Hainan Island incident, or EP-3 incident; 
although these titles are not always in reference to the CNA which occurred as a result.  Patriotic 
Chinese hackers defaced dozens of US military and computer industry websites, as well as the White 
House website.  Patriotic US hackers responded with inflammatory web page defacements, 
comment spamming, and the posting of photoshopped pictures.  In what may represent an 
escalation and change of tactics, the EP-3 incident coincided with the release of the Code Red and 
Code Red II worms.  At the time these were the most successful worms in Internet history, causing 
nearly $2 billion in damages and infecting over 600,000 computers.  The worms, which may have 
originated from a university in Guangdong, southern China, attacked computers running Microsoft’s 
IIS web server and exploited a buffer overflow (United States General Accounting Office 2001).  
Home computers were largely unaffected; however any attempt at infection caused them to crash.  
The worms created decreases in internet speed, knocked websites and networks offline, and 
defaced websites with the phrase “Hacked by Chinese!” - although Chinese involvement was never 
confirmed.  Code Red II had a slightly different payload that could open a backdoor, leaving the 
computers vulnerable to further exploitation, and may represent an additional shift in tactics from 
CNA to CNE (Rhodes 2001, Schwartz 2007; Cost of 'Code Red' Rising 2001).  These worms were 
followed by the release of the Code Blue worm, which was allegedly a response by US hackers.  It 
sought out systems infected by Code Red and reprogrammed them to launch attacks against targets 
in China.  In particular, it launched DDoS attacks against the Chinese security firm NS Focus (Onley 
and Wait 2006; Delio 2001).   
 
                                                          
52 The court case concerned a former imperial Japanese soldier, Azuma Shiro, who admitted to war crimes 
against China.  Shiro’s appeal against the court’s denial of the validity of his account failed according to a ruling 
by the Japanese Supreme Court in 2000 (Nanjing massacre diary author Azuma Shiro died 2006; Wu 2006). 
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The EP-3 incident is also a key event, because it shows a rough method by which the party-state can 
control hacker activity, and in conjunction, its endorsement of hacker activity.  Initially government 
officials were silent or encouraged hacker activity during the EP-3 incident.  Later, as the cyber 
conflict escalated and a diplomatic solution was sought for the incident’s non-cyber aspects, the CPC 
released statements through the People’s Daily, the Beijing Broadcasting Institute, and others, 
including direct statements through government organisations such as the Public Security Ministry’s 
Internet Safety Bureau stating that the actions of Chinese hackers were illegal (Henderson 2007a; 
China’s Proliferation Practices 2008; Krekel 2009).  In addition, text messages, emails, and phone 
calls were placed to influential hacker group leaders who then passed the message to stop down to 
their members.  The PLA’s connection to hacker groups and hacking incidents during this period 
could be greater than is commonly stated.  A documentary on cyber security broadcast on China 
Central Television 7 (CCTV-7), the government’s military and agriculture channel, showed what 
appeared to be PLA officers using point and click software to conduct a DDoS attack “against a Falun 
Gong-related website hosted on a network at the University of Alabama” in the US (USCC Annual 
Report 2011).  The footage shown is believed to have taken place in 2001. 
 
Attacks by Chinese hacker groups have continued.  In 2014, hundreds of Vietnamese websites were 
knocked offline or defaced following disputes over sovereignty in the South China Sea (Chinese 
hackers attack 745 Vietnam websites in a week: report 2014; Martin 2011).  China is estimated to 
have 250 hacker groups “that are tolerated and may even be encouraged by the government” as an 
aggressive non-state actor that supports the government’s agenda and provides plausible deniability 
(USCC Annual Report 2008; China’s Proliferation Practices 2008).  The utility of Chinese hacker 
groups may be further enhanced in a time of conflict when they could serve as a reserve militia and 
engage in online people’s war.  However, what is important to the development of CNE is that this 
serves as the beginning of China’s entrance into CNO.  Some of these early hackers have progressed 
to careers in information security and the PLA.  As hackers begin to age and complete university 
degrees, the promise of a stable and legal career that accords with their interests and ideology 
provides an incentive for seeking government employment.  The first isolated incident of alleged 
Chinese state-sponsored CNE occurred in 1999, when intruders seeking information on US nuclear 
weapons downloaded data from the Los Alamos National Laboratory (Gertz 2000).  A significant shift 
from quasi-endorsed hacker groups to a focus on alleged state-sponsored CNE conducted by fully 
trained and employed soldiers occurred around 2002.  The first open source Chinese APT was a 
series of coordinated intrusions between 2000 and 2009 that targeted the Canadian-headquartered 
multinational telecommunications firm, Nortel Networks Limited, which later filed for bankruptcy.  
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Using stolen passwords the intruders “downloaded technical papers, research-and-development 
reports, business plans, employee emails and other documents” (Gorman 2012, Nortel hit by 
suspected Chinese cyberattacks for a decade 2012).   
 
 
Emergence of Exploitation, 2002-2006 
 
The first widely reported CNE campaign,53 believed to be conducted on behalf of the CPC, occurred 
roughly between 2002 and 2006 and is known by the US codename Titan Rain (Grow and Hosenball 
2011; USCC 2008).  Sources vary on the start and end dates of Titan Rain, and multiple reports of 
computer intrusions during this period are not labelled as Titan Rain yet they fit the profile of this 
coordinated effort.  Titan Rain targeted US aerospace, defence, and government installations 
including the Army Information Systems Engineering Command, Boeing, the Bureau of Industry and 
Security, the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, Lockheed Martin, the 
Missile Defense Agency, NASA, the National Nuclear Security Administration, the Naval Ocean 
Systems Center, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, Redstone Arsenal, Sandia National Laboratories, and 
the State Department (Almeida 2006; China’s Proliferation Practices 2008; Leyden 2007; Tkacik 
2007).  The information gathered included “aerospace documents with hundreds of detailed 
schematics about propulsion systems, solar panelling and fuel tanks for the Mars Reconnaissance 
Orbiter”, specifications for the “aviation-mission-planning system for Army helicopters”, plus 
“Falconview 3.2, the flight-planning software used by the Army and Air Force” (Thornburgh 2005).  
Among the alleged Chinese intrusions which might be a part of Titan Rain are “294 successful 
hackings into the US Department of Defense computers” in 2003 and penetration of “about 150 
Homeland Security Department computers” in 2006 (Committee on Foreign Affairs 2011).  
Unsurprisingly, penetrations into US government networks in 2006, and concern over embedded 
backdoors, meant that the State Department would no longer source its computers from the 
Chinese computer manufacturer Lenovo (Tkacik 2008).  In some cases, such as the Department of 
Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security, entire networks had to be taken offline and the 
computers needed to be replaced in order to ensure their integrity (USCC Annual Report 2006).  
China is said to have “downloaded 10 to 20 terabytes of data”, possibly from the Nonsecure Internet 
Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet) alone, and beyond theft of data, there was concern that China 
could alter data on networks (Krekel 2009; Tkacik 2008; USCC Annual Report 2008).  The United 
                                                          
53 The Nortel campaign began in 2000, but it was revealed in 2012.  Similarly the Byzantine campaign began in 
approximately 2002, but was not made public until much later.  Byzantine also has an unclear connection to a 
different APT campaign beginning in 2006, hence it will be explored later in this chapter. 
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Kingdom also reported penetration of computer networks under the Titan Rain campaign (Espiner 
2005; Norton-Taylor 2007).   
 
Incidents which are less likely to have been a part of the Titan Rain campaign include the use of 
repeated zero-day exploits against the US Department of Defense.  These intrusions were traced to 
the Chinese hacker group Network Crack Program Hacker (NCPH) who were reported to have 
indirect ties with and occasional sponsorship from the PLA (Saporito and Lewis 2013).  However 
NCPH was operating out of Chengdu, central China.  While this could correspond to PLA Unit 78006, 
Titan Rain operators were reported to be based in the southern city of Guangzhou (Stokes, Lin, and 
Hsiao 2011; Tkacik 2008).  Any connection would likely have been a supplementary one, possibly in 
malware development.  In another incident, the National Journal alleged that the Northeast blackout 
of 2003, which affected 55 million customers in the US and Canada, was caused by Chinese intruders 
(Committee on Foreign Affairs 2011; Harris 2008).  This contradicts official US statements that the 
blackout was caused by a software bug.  Further, if the National Journal’s account is accepted as true, 
it is unclear if this was intentional CNA or CNE that had an unintentional consequence.  Despite 
being an unverified incident, it is notable because it added to the China Threat perception and is an 
early example of concern over critical infrastructure that became more prevalent in later years.  
Additionally in 2003, the Huawei Shenzhen Technology Company (Huawei) was accused of “stealing 
corporate secrets from US counterpart Cisco Systems and wholesale pirating of Cisco's software" 
(Tkacik 2008; USCC Annual Report 2012).  Over the next decade Huawei would be accused on 
multiple occasions of working on behalf of China’s CNE activities.   
 
Separate from Titan Rain, an APT campaign known as NetTraveler began in 2004 and continued 
through 2013.  With over “350 high profile victims in 40 countries”, it targeted defence contractors, 
embassies, government institutions, oil industry companies, private companies, scientific research 
institutes, Tibetan and Uyghur activists, and universities (Kaspersky Lab 2013a).  The year 2004 also 
marked the release of a new, allegedly Chinese, worm.  The Myfip worm stole pdf files, with later 
variants targeting Microsoft Word documents, schematics, and circuit board layouts.  Among the 
victims were “Bank of America, BJ’s Wholesale Club, and Lexis-Nexis” (Brenner 2005). The worm not 
only stole intellectual property, such as product designs, but also took customer lists and databases.  
In the same year, “Taiwan's Ministry of Finance, the Kuomintang Party, the Democratic Progressive 
Party (DPP) and the Ministry of National Defense’s (MND) Military News Agency” were subjected to 
network intrusions (Taiwan opposition party accuses China of hacking 2011).  This was followed in 
2005 with the Taiwan National Security Council being targeted by spear phishing that attempted to 
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install backdoors in their network.  Huawei also made news again in 2005 after India turned down “a 
planned $60 million” infrastructure investment due to “intelligence agency concerns” (Tkacik 2008).  
A new development in Chinese CNE appeared in the following year, 2005, and would be repeated in 
subsequent years.  This was the combination of CNE and human espionage, or insiders.  Having a 
physical presence at the target location can help bridge some of the gaps in CNE, such as aiding 
social engineering, locating targets and entry points, or causing the initial breach, like installing a 
backdoor or turning off a security feature, which can then be exploited further remotely.  Examples 
from Belgium, France, and Sweden revealed the targeting of “various levels of European industry”, 
“car-parts maker Valeo”, and “unpublished and unpatented research”, respectively (Luard 2005).   
 
Between approximately 2005 and 2008, a sustained CNE campaign that originated from China 
targeted the computer systems of NASA.  These intrusions and attempts to halt them were given the 
US codename Avocado.  Based on open source material, it is difficult to give an exact timeframe for 
Avocado.  The Titan Rain intrusions included NASA, yet articles discussing Avocado include incidents 
which occurred during Titan Rain’s timeframe, such as intrusions into the Marshall Space Flight 
Center in 2002 and Ames Research Center in 2004 where a technician was forced to disconnect “the 
facility's supercomputers to limit the loss of secure data” (Elgin and Epstein 2008).  Further, alleged 
intrusions by China into NASA’s computer networks did not cease in 2008.  One possibility is that 
classified material is able to assign specific PLA units who were behind the intrusions and hence 
distinguish between intrusions based on the intruder rather than the date and target.  Other 
possibilities are differences in exploitation tools and targeted data, which are not detailed in open 
source material.  Regardless, the codename Avocado continually appears, and the allegation of 
intrusions under that codename remain.  Within this timeframe significant data breaches occurred 
at multiple NASA facilities including the Goddard Space Flight Center, Johnson Space Center, and 
Kennedy Space Center.  Methods for gaining access included the familiar socially engineered spear 
phishing targeting key personnel.  Data stolen included “budget and financial information” and 
“operational details of the Space Shuttle including performance and engine data”; however the 
duration and extent of the breach suggest the losses may be greater and more specific than revealed 
(Elgin and Epstein 2008; Krekel 2009).  Attempts to restore the integrity of compromised networks 
included the replacement of some computers.   
 
Alleged Chinese CNE in 2006 continued to target the US government, defence institutes, Taiwan, and 
commercial intellectual property.  “Eight [US] Congressmen and seven congressional committees”, 
including “a vocal critic of China’s human rights record” had their computer systems compromised 
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(USCC Annual Report 2009; Krekel 2009).  Intrusions into the networks of Fort Hood, National 
Defense University, and the Naval War College caused “$20 to $30 million in damage to each 
system”, loss of data, and interruption of services including websites and email (Krekel 2009; 
Committee on Foreign Affairs 2011).  Taiwan also continued to be targeted with the Ministry of 
National Defense (MND) and the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) being compromised by spear 
phishing.  “Account login credentials” were also stolen “from Chunghwa Telecom’s Web mail system, 
the MND’s telecommunications provider” (Krekel 2009).  In addition to the theft of data, MND and 
AIT networks were used to spread misinformation.  In total, 13 zero-day exploits “within Microsoft 
applications” were used against Taiwan in 2006, and the Taiwan coast guard administration 
discovered a hidden program that was sending shipping schedules “to an e-mail address in China” 
(Tkacik 2008).  The combined use of CNE and insiders also continued in 2006 with the theft and 
attempted transfer of “4,000 Ford documents” to a “Chinese automotive company” (ONCIX 2011).   
 
 
Dedicated CNE Groups, 2006-2010 
 
A series of APTs attributed to PLA Unit 61398 began around 2006.  PLA Unit 61398 has at times been 
referred to as APT1, Byzantine Anchor, Byzantine Candor, Byzantine Foothold, Byzantine Hades, the 
Comment Crew, the Comment Group, Comment Panda, Shady Rat, and the Shanghai Group.  One 
reason for these multiple names is that there is not always a distinction between an APT’s title and 
the group conducting it.  One CNE group might be responsible for multiple APT.  Additionally, 
multiple names are the result of a lack of transparency (reliance on open source material) and a lack 
of coordination between those investigating incidents.  For example, the intelligence community 
may use different names than IT security firms, and an organisation discovering an APT may not be 
able to make a connection to earlier incidents, thus believing it is a new campaign or a new group 
warranting a new title (Clayton 2012).  Further, the Byzantine monikers appear to refer to different 
phases of one APT, and this collection of APT phase titles double as a group title.  Of all of the names 
associated with PLA Unit 61398, the Byzantine monikers are the least frequently cited as being 
connected to the rest (Lee 2013; Riley and Dune 2012).  If Byzantine’s inclusion was more clearly 
verified this group’s activities could be changed to have a 2002 starting date in accordance with US 
diplomatic cables leaked by WikiLeaks (Grow and Hosenball 2011).  Additional conflicting 
information furthers justification for their separation.  For example, some reports connect Byzantine 
to the GhostNet and the Shadow network APTs (discussed later in this chapter), with possible 
connections to the hacker group Javaphile and a base of operations in Chengdu (Glanz and Markoff 
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2010).  Chengdu correlates with PLA Unit 78006 and the Shadow network; however it does not 
correlate with GhostNet, and the majority of sources clearly place Shanghai as the base of 
operations for all of these titles except Byzantine monikers (Stokes, Lin, and Hsiao 2011; Information 
Warfare Monitor 2010; Mandiant 2013).  It is possible that CNE groups provide occasional assistance 
to one another in APT campaigns, which could result in this type of overlapping attribution.  For 
these reasons, Byzantine will be explored in proximity to examination of PLA Unit 61398 within this 
chapter but it will be treated as a distinct group/APT.   
 
Byzantine (2002-2013) used the familiar technique of spear phishing to trick computer users into 
clicking on malware laden hyperlinks or attachments which would then allow the intruders to begin 
burrowing into the computer systems.  German intelligence officials stated that Byzantine was 
targeting everything from “military, economic, science and technology, commercial, diplomatic, and 
research and development” data, with an increase in activity “preceding events like the German 
government’s meetings with the Chinese government” (Glanz and Markoff 2010).  France also 
accused China of being behind Byzantine CNE which targeted government officials and included the 
ability to turn on webcams and microphones for eavesdropping (Grow and Hosenball 2011).  The 
European Union Council was also infiltrated, possibly in the quest for information on the European 
financial crisis and the Greek government’s debt crisis.  Some additional targets included law firms 
dealing with cases that were against, or affected, China; and major oil companies’ “seismic maps 
charting oil reserves” or information regarding drilling in PRC-claimed territory (Riley and Dune 
2012).   
 
The most conclusive open source document tying PLA Unit 61398 to a CNE campaign was the 2013 
Mandiant report, APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units (McGarry 2013; USCC Annual 
Report 2013).  This report directly states that APT1, the Comment Crew, and the Comment Group 
are PLA Unit 61398; it indirectly states that Comment Panda and the Shanghai group are as well, and 
it states that Shady Rat is possibly connected.  It is alleged that since 2006 this group stole “hundreds 
of terabytes from 141 organizations” located in 15 countries “spanning 20 major industries”, 
including aerospace, energy, engineering services, financial services, information technology, high-
tech electronics, satellites and telecommunication, and transportation (Mandiant 2013).  Through 
these intrusions, the group gained access to “broad categories of intellectual property, including 
technology blueprints, proprietary manufacturing processes, test results, business plans, pricing 
documents, partnership agreements, and e-mails and contact lists from victim organizations’ 
leadership” (Mandiant 2013).  While many of the command and control servers were shut down or 
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blocked after the release of Mandiant’s 2013 report, PLA Unit 61398 is likely to be continuing CNE 
operations.  Multiple sources corroborate Mandiant’s assertion that Operation Shady Rat might have 
been conducted by the same group responsible for APT1 (Alperovitch 2011; Riley and Dune 2012; 
USCC Annual Report 2011).  Operation Shady Rat was an APT, uncovered by computer software 
security company McAfee, which occurred throughout the period 2006 to 2011.  It involved 
intrusions into at least 71 organizations located in 13 countries, which included businesses, defense 
contractors, government agencies, the ASEAN Secretariat, the International Olympic Committee, and 
the United Nations.  Separately, intrusions seeking information on the presidential campaigns in 
2008 of both Barack Obama and John McCain may also be linked to PLA Unit 61398 (Riley and Dune 
2012).  It is probable that other incidents noted below also belong to this group, or one of the other 
estimated 20 state-sponsored CNE groups.  There is no open source evidence, however, to support a 
connection; so they will be treated as isolated state-sponsored incidents or new APT.   
 
The year 2006 was also the beginning of a sustained campaign, or malware family, called Sykipot 
(Dutcher 2013).  Like Titan Rain and Avocado, it is not attributable to a specific PLA unit.  From 2006 
to 2013 Sykipot “targeted defense contractors, telecommunications firms, computer-hardware 
makers, chemical companies, and energy utilities, as well as government agencies” in the UK and US 
(Lemos 2011).  Later exploitation attempts attributed to Sykipot include targeting the smart card 
identification used by the US Department of Defense and attempting to “gather intelligence about 
the [US] civil aviation sector” (Constantin 2012).   
 
Similar to NASA and the Avocado campaign, there are some targets which are of continual interest 
to Chinese CNE.  The Joint Strike Fighter program, or F-35 Lighting II, is one such target, and the first 
occurrence noted here was in 2007.  While it has not been assigned a code name or APT title and it 
could represent sustained yet isolated incidents, the focus given to it by Chinese CNE warrants 
placing these incidents together for clarity.  The approximately 900 subcontractors of the F-35 
fighter program have been frequent targets of Chinese CNE; however the incidents noted here are 
specifically referring to the F-35 as a target (USCC Annual Report 2012).  In 2007 and 2008, intruders 
were able “to successfully exfiltrate several terabytes of data related to [F-35] design and electronics 
systems” (USCC Annual Report 2009).  In 2009, “six to eight F-35 subcontractors were totally 
compromised”, and between 2009 and 2011 the aircraft’s manufacturers – Lockheed Martin in 
conjunction with Northrop Grumman and BAE Systems – were repeatedly targeted (USCC Annual 
Report 2012).  Additionally in 2009, eavesdropping on online conference calls allowed intruders to 
listen in on meetings where F-35 systems were being discussed, and in particular the “secure 
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communications and antenna systems” may have been stolen (Reed 2012).  A series of weapons 
systems that were compromised in 2013 included the F-35, and the F-35 was one of the primary 
targets detailed in the 2014 indictment of Su Bin, both of which will be detailed further in their 
respective timeframe below (Martinez, Meek, Ross and Ferran 2013; Su Bin Complaint of Hacking for 
China 2014; Su Bin Indictment for Hacking for China 2014, and US Attorney’s Office 2014).  Some 
officials have claimed that the secrets stolen by China were sensitive but not classified, and that a 
full blueprint of the aircraft has not been obtained by China.  However; even small components can 
reveal weaknesses or cause delays and cost increases in F-35 deployment.  Further, photographs 
appearing on Chinese military forums suggest that some of these systems have been integrated into 
the development of China’s fifth-generation fighter aircraft prototype, the Chengdu J-20.  Some 
analysts have speculated that photographs of an upgraded version of the J-20 in 2014 reveal a “new 
electro-optical targeting system under its nose” derived from the F-35, along with concealed engine 
nozzles and a different “radar absorbing coating” (Gertz 2014).  These assessments are comparable 
to photographs revealed in 2012 which draw conclusions based on similarities between the cockpit 
and heads up display design of the J-20 and the US F-22 Raptor (Gertz 2014).  
 
US government agencies and defence contractors continued to be targeted in 2007.  Intrusions into 
the Office of the US Secretary of Defense forced a network of 1,500 computers to be temporarily 
taken offline (Committee on Foreign Affairs 2011; Krekel 2009; USCC Annual Report 2009).  The US 
State Department suffered “large-scale network break-ins”, the Department of Homeland Security 
had 150 computers infected, and the White House convened a task force to determine if the use of 
mobile devices such as the Blackberry needed to be restricted within the administration due to CNE 
concerns (Tkacik 2008).  A further undisclosed incident spurred a US investigation which revealed a 
brand of computers produced by China’s Lenovo company contained “beaconing activity” (USCC 
Annual Report 2012).  Continuing on from Titan Rain, there were new allegations that China had 
penetrated the US NIPRNet, including the development of software to disable NIPRNet during a time 
of conflict.  One 2007 estimate suggested that Chinese hackers acquired 750,000 zombie computers 
in the US alone; these could be used to conduct a DoS attack or act as relay and C2 stations for CNE 
(Waterman 2007).  Chinese spear phishing continued throughout this year, targeting over 1,000 
people employed at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory for science and technology, and Huawei 
again came under suspicion when it attempted to purchase 3com, a US company “which supplies the 
US government with security software, routers, and servers” (Krekel 2009; Tkacik 2008).  The US-
China Economic and Security Review Commission concluded that in 2007, “the 10 most prominent 
U.S. defense contractors, including Raytheon, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Northrop Grumman, 
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were victims of cyber espionage” (USCC Annual Report 2008).  Moreover, an alleged Chinese state-
sponsored CNE group known as Putter Panda, or MSUpdater, began operations in 2007 targeting the 
satellite and aerospace industries.  Security technology company CrowdStrike has linked this group 
to PLA Unit 61486 (CrowdStrike Intelligence Report 2014; Novetta 2014).  Chinese CNE had become 
so frequent and aggressive that US President George W. Bush raised the subject to Chinese 
President Hu Jintao at the APEC summit in 2007 (Reid 2007).   
 
On separate occasions China was publicly accused of hacking into government facilities by officials in 
Canada, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, and the UK.  China was named as the primary concern for 
Canada’s counter-intelligence program, while the German Chancellery, Ministry of Economics and 
Technology, and Ministry for Education and Research were reported to have been infected by 
trojans hidden in “Microsoft Word and PowerPoint documents” (Krekel 2009; Tkacik 2008).  German 
officials stated that 60 percent of CNE targeting Germany originated in China.  A separate survey of 
625 manufacturers in Japan conducted by the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry also 
concluded that approximately 60 percent of CNE originated from China, with 35 percent of those 
surveyed having “reported some form of technology loss” (ONCIX 2011).  In the same year, the New 
Zealand Security Intelligence Service cautiously blamed China for intrusions into its country’s 
computer networks (Tung 2007).  Furthermore, UK government agencies were targeted, including 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and the House of Commons was shut down after intrusions 
which apparently sought information related to Chinese human rights issues (Norton-Taylor 2007).  
MI5, the UK’s domestic counter-intelligence and security agency, issued “a confidential alert to 300 
chief executives, accountants, legal firms and security chiefs warning of cyber attacks and electronic 
espionage sponsored by Chinese state organizations” (Krekel 2009).   
 
Foreign allegations of Chinese CNE continued in 2008 with Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, India, 
and South Korea joining the list.  India attracted a near daily occurrence of Chinese CNE targeting its 
government agencies, including the Ministry of External Affairs, as well as the private sector (Krekel 
2009; US Department of Defense 2009). South Korea reported losses of $82 billion in 2008 due to 
“foreign economic espionage” with 50 percent attributed to China (ONCIX 2011).  Blurring the line 
between CNA and CNE, French embassies in Beijing, London, Ottawa, and Washington suffered web 
page defacements following French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s meeting with the Dalai Lama (Krekel 
2009).  This also obscures the distinction between hacker groups within China and state sponsorship.  
The US Department of Defense, defense contractors, think tanks, and the White House continued to 
be infiltrated by Chinese CNE in 2008 (Krekel 2009; Waterman 2008).  As noted in 2003, the National 
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Journal alleged two instances where Chinese CNE or CNA caused a US blackout.  The second instance 
was a blackout in Florida in 2008 that affected three million customers (Harris 2008; USCC Annual 
Report 2009).  The National Journal report contradicts various other explanations reported as the 
cause of the blackout and attributes it to being accidentally triggered by Chinese CNE attempting to 
map the system.   
 
The United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) became the target of an unnamed APT 
campaign in 2008, or possibly it has simply been a target in multiple CNE incidents, continuing 
through 2014 (Mulvenon 1999).  TRANSCOM provides air, land, and sea transportation for the 
Department of Defense in times of war and peace, and acts as a transportation supplement to the 
US military.  Intrusions into TRANSCOM networks, and those of its subcontractors, between 2008 
and 2011 stole credentials, documents, emails, encryption passwords, flight details, user passwords, 
and computer code (Committee on Armed Services United States Senate 2014).  In 2012, a 
commercial ship contracted by TRANSCOM had multiple on-board systems compromised, and a 
yearlong investigation that concluded in 2013 revealed 20 successful intrusions into TRANSCOM 
attributed to China (Committee on Armed Services United States Senate 2014) 
 
Additional CNE concerns raised in 2008 include an investigation into the possible theft of 
information contained on the laptop of US Secretary of Commerce Carlos Gutierrez during an official 
visit to China, and “a leaked FBI briefing” which revealed concerns that China may have been 
embedding backdoors in Chinese-made “uncontrolled or counterfeit CSISCO computer routers” 
commonly used by “classified US government and military computers” (Committee on Foreign 
Affairs 2011; US Department of Defense 2009).  This coincided with a series of incidents during the 
same year which relate to back door and supply chain security.  In addition to the State Department 
ban in 2006 and the beaconing activity noted in 2007, Lenovo was accused of shipping software that 
contained malware in 2008.  Furthermore, a digital picture frame manufactured in China was 
discovered to contain malware that could infect a computer when it was plugged into a USB port to 
receive pictures.  Point of sale software or hardware manufactured in China and used in European 
retail stores was also discovered in 2008 to be transmitting the account and PIN information of 
transactions, using mobile phone networks, to “a suspected criminal syndicate with operations in 
Pakistan” (USCC Annual Report 2012).  Seeking profit from individual bank accounts and the 
destination of the stolen data do not fit the profile of Chinese CNE; however it does raise concerns 
over the integrity of Chinese supply chains and the capability of expanding operations.   
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A new Chinese state sponsored APT named Axiom began in 2008.  This APT was revealed in 2014 by 
a consortium of IT security companies including Cisco, FireEye, F-Secure, Microsoft, and Symantec.  
Axiom caused over 43,000 infections and conducting CNE against a wide range of targets including 
“Fortune 500 companies, journalists, environmental groups, pro-democracy groups, software 
companies, academic institutions, and government agencies worldwide” (Novetta 2014).  Of these 
infections, 180 contained Axiom’s top tier suite of malware suggesting that these were high value 
targets or possessed higher levels of defence.  A 2009 APT known as Operation Aurora, sometimes 
referred to as Hydraq after a trojan horse it used, may have been conducted by the same CNE group 
that was responsible for Axiom.  Google elevated the Operation Aurora incident to high profile 
status by issuing public statements, closing its Beijing office, and relocating its Chinese operations to 
Hong Kong.  Google stated that this move was a result of no longer being willing to censor Internet 
search results; however it was more likely the result of the CNE conducted under Operation Aurora.  
Spear phishing was used as one means of gaining initial access, and the intruders used information 
found on social media, such as the Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter accounts of key employees, to 
craft their messages (HBGary 2010; USCC Annual Report 2010).  Google reportedly had source code 
stolen, and human rights activists who used Google’s Gmail email service were targeted.  It was later 
revealed that the intruders were also searching for the names of Chinese spies, of whom the US 
government may have been aware, and who Google may have been tracking on behalf of the US 
government (USCC Annual Report 2013).  While Operation Aurora is commonly associated with 
Google, there were more than 20 companies targeted, including Adobe Systems, Dow Chemical, 
Juniper Networks, Morgan Stanley, Northrup Grumman, Rackspace, Symantec, and Yahoo (Baldor 
2013; HBGary 2010; USCC Annual Report 2010).   
 
The CNE group which may be responsible for both Axiom and Operation Aurora has also been known 
by the names the Beijing Group, Elderwood Gang, and Sneaky Panda (O’Gorman and McDonald 
2012).  This group is believed to be one of China’s top two CNE groups alongside PLA Unit 61398, 
and is by some accounts more sophisticated than PLA Unit 61398 (Lawrence and Riley 2013; Novetta 
2014; Stokes and Hsiao 2012).  The Beijing Group may also be synonymous with a group that has 
been operating from at least 2009-2013, known as Hidden Lynx (Doherty, Gegeny, Spasojevic, and 
Baltazar 2013; Novetta 2014).  Hidden Lynx has been responsible for a number of CNE incidents and 
possible campaigns including the targeting of Bit9, an information security company, and a watering 
hole operation called VOHO that infected approximately 4,000 computers (Novetta 2014).  This 
group does not target a single sector, seeking out a wide range of commercial, defence, and 
government information, however they have displayed a particular focus on financial services.  
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Adding further to the list of synonyms, Operations DeputyDog and Ephemeral Hydra which will be 
noted in 2013, have been linked to this same Beijing based CNE group. 
 
At least two other Chinese CNE campaigns occurred in 2009: GhostNet and Night Dragon.  GhostNet 
included “a network of over 1,295 infected hosts in 103 countries”; intruders were capable of total 
control of compromised computers, including downloading data and turning on “microphones and 
web cameras” (Information Warfare Monitor 2009).  Among the computer networks compromised 
were those of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Secretariat; the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC); the Asian Development Bank; the Dalai Lama’s exile 
centers in India, London and New York City; embassies; international organizations; ministries of 
foreign affairs; news media; NGOs; and an unclassified computer located at NATO headquarters.  A 
separate campaign in 2009, codenamed Night Dragon, was uncovered in 2011.  It targeted the 
energy sector which is of strategic importance to China’s continued economic development.  
Specifically, it focused on “global oil, energy, and petrochemical companies… harvesting sensitive 
competitive proprietary operations and project-financing information with regard to oil and gas field 
bids and operations” (McAfee 2011; USCC Annual Report 2011).  Prior to McAfee’s report on Night 
Dragon a number of incidents targeting oil and gas were reported in 2009.  If these incidents are a 
part of the same campaign, then Night Dragon also targeted the telecommunication and financial 
services sectors, and attempted to map the US energy grid, possibly leaving behind programs that 
would enable the intruder to disable services on demand (USCC Annual Report 2009; Gorman 2009).  
China’s capability in this regard is enhanced by the universal designs of SCADA and ICS systems.  The 
systems used by US critical infrastructure are available worldwide, including in China, and utilize the 
same architecture, default vendor passwords, source code, and training (Weiss 2010, 57, 212).  
 
There were numerous isolated incidents of Chinese CNE targeting multiple countries in 2009.  These 
include the Australian Prime Minister’s email and mobile phones, the German Foreign Office, laptops 
stolen from German business travellers visiting China, the Philippines’ Department of Foreign Affairs, 
the Intranet of South Korea’s Finance Ministry, and the office of a US senator (Krekel 2009; ONCIX 
2011; USCC Annual Report 2009).  The trend of combining insiders and CNE, noted in 2005 and 2006 
incidents, continued in 2009.  Three Chinese citizens employed in foreign companies used their 
positions to electronically steal sensitive data and attempted to use it to obtain jobs with 
competitors in China.  These include product data downloaded to 170 CDs from a German company, 
“information on organic light-emitting diodes” transferred via email and USB flash drive from the 
DuPont corporation, and  “160 secret formulas for paints and coatings” valued at $20 million 
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transferred to a removable storage device from the Valspar Corporation (ONCIX 2011; Riley and 
Dune 2012).  
 
Further complicating the picture of what constitutes development of China’s CNE, a series of cyber 
attacks occurred around the Fourth of July in 2009.  Having coincided with the US Independence Day 
there was speculation that the attacks were symbolic.  DDoS attacks targeted 14 US government 
websites, including the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Transportation, Federal 
Trade Commission, Secret Service, and Treasury Department.  Multiple South Korean websites were 
also targeted, including the Defense Ministry, National Assembly, and Presidential website (Fox 
2009).  These attacks were attributed to North Korea, yet they remain relevant to the development 
of Chinese CNE in the same way that hacker groups in China remain relevant to Chinese CNE.  
China’s involvement is not fully understood, and it adds another layer of anonymity, if China wished 
to use it as a proxy.  According to Clarke and Knake, North Korea operates four CNO units with “600 
to 1,000 KPA cyber warfare agents acting in cells in the PRC”.  Unit 110 is suspected of carrying out 
the Fourth of July cyber attacks, and it has at times allegedly operated out of four rented floors in 
the Shanghai Hotel in Dandong, China, along North Korea’s border.  Reasons for operating out of 
China include increased Internet access, increased access to advanced technology, and possibly 
increased access to Chinese CNO expertise (Clarke and Knake 2010, 27-28). 
 
 
Increasing Backlash, 2010-2014 
 
The Shadow network and Ke3chang were two APT that began in 2010.  The Information Warfare 
Monitor revealed the Shadow network in its 2010 report, Shadows in the Cloud: Investigating Cyber 
Espionage 2.0.  This report represents a continuation of the Monitor’s research which revealed the 
GhostNet APT in 2009; however, it is also a stand-alone departure.  This is in part due to many of the 
IP addresses and methods of exploitation used by GhostNet being shut down or blocked following 
the publication of their 2009 report, Tracking GhostNet: Investigating a Cyber Espionage Network.  
Additionally, the Information Warfare Monitor changed its method of analysis and this time was able 
to analyse the exfiltrated data to make a stronger connection to Chinese state-sponsorship.  For 
these reasons it is unclear if its Shadows in the Cloud report is exposing new aspects of the GhostNet 
campaign or an entirely new campaign which it has named the Shadow network.  The Shadow 
network compromised multiple computers within the entire spectrum of government networks, 
those of the business community, and academia within 31 countries, including India’s and Pakistan’s 
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embassies in Washington, the Office of the Dalai Lama, and the United Nations (Information Warfare 
Monitor 2010).  According to the 2010 USCC Annual Report, the perpetrators used “popular free 
web services – such as Twitter, Google Groups, Blogspot, Baidu Blogs, blog.com, and Yahoo! Email 
accounts – as part of the command-and-control infrastructure for their exploits”.  These websites 
are readily available, provide redundancy, and are less likely to appear malicious to “firewalls [or] 
network administrators” (USCC Annual Report 2010).  In the same year, US IT security company 
FireEye released information about a separate alleged Chinese APT called Ke3chang.  Its targets 
represent a broad set of sectors ranging from aerospace and energy, to government and consulting 
services (Villeneuve, Bennett, Moran, Haq, Scott, and Geers 2014).  Topics used in Ke3chang’s spear 
phishing efforts were no less diverse, having included the London Olympics and the French first lady.  
The campaign gained increased attention in 2013 after targeting European ministries with malicious 
emails claiming to contain information that the United States was about to intervene in Syria 
(Wakefield 2013).   
 
US allegations of isolated Chinese CNE continued in 2010.  Two of these incidents allegedly show 
China’s ability to manipulate the flow of traffic on the Internet.  In one case China’s Golden Shield 
censorship was extended to Internet users in the United States for a period of several days, and in 
another case a large portion of international Internet traffic was unnecessarily routed through 
Chinese gateways which could presumably enhance data theft or blocking (USCC Annual Report 
2010).  In further NASA developments, the US Office of Inspector General investigated several data 
breaches at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, leading to the “detention of a 
Chinese national” who compromised, according to the investigation’s findings, “seven NASA systems, 
many containing export-restricted technical data” (Martin 2012).  Furthermore, a wide range of US 
companies reported in 2010 that “client lists, merger and acquisition data, company information on 
pricing, and financial data were being extracted from company networks” (ONCIX 2011). 
 
In another legal development, Solid Oak Software Inc. filed a $2.2 billion lawsuit against the Chinese 
government, two Chinese software companies, and a number of well-known computer 
manufacturers after discovering pirated contents from its Cybersitter software.  Cybersitter was 
designed to allow parents, schools, and businesses to block access to specific websites, filter items, 
and record activity (Dilanian 2012; Branigan 2010).  The stolen source code, blacklists, and even a 
Cybersitter Bulletin were found within Chinese software, including Green Dam Youth Escort, that 
was sold to 57 million Chinese customers.  Green Dam Youth Export was also found to be using 
components of OpenCV, a library of programming functions, in violation of its license agreement 
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(Wolchok, Yao, and Halderman 2009).  Further, the Green Dam software was discovered to contain 
security vulnerabilities that could allow an intruder to take control of the computer, such as 
uploading malicious payloads through the update feature or by exploiting how it interacts with 
visited web pages.  This is particularly relevant given that the Green Dam software was initially 
mandated by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) to be a required pre-
installation on, or included with, all personal computers made in China or sold to China.  Additionally 
in 2010, two individuals were charged with the theft of $40 million worth of hybrid technology from 
the automobile manufacturer General Motors.  The couple were accused of using a combination of 
traditional and electronic espionage, and attempting to sell the stolen data to the Chinese state-
owned Chery Automobile Co, Ltd. (Heickerö, 2012, 80). 
 
Other alleged Chinese CNE incidents in 2010 include infiltrating the email account of an Associated 
Press employee, targeting a Taiwanese prosecutor who was handling a number of high profile cases 
involving China, and the exploitation of 150 computers at the French Finance Ministry targeting 
information relating to the G-20 (Baldor 2013; China says hit by 500,000 cyberattacks in 2010 2011; 
ONCIX 2011).  Further, Canada’s Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC), Finance 
Department, Treasury Board, and Bay Street law firms were targeted.  The Bay Street law firms were 
involved in an attempted hostile takeover bid of the Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan by BHP 
Billiton estimated at $38 billion (Nortel hit by suspected Chinese 2012).  Lastly, the United Kingdom’s 
Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure issued a warning to UK companies about Chinese 
espionage methods, “including giving gifts of cameras and memory sticks equipped with cyber 
implants at trade fairs and exhibitions” (ONCIX 2011). 
 
Familiar targets of Chinese CNE spanning business, government, and military were again infiltrated 
in 2011.  Google revealed that it had uncovered a widespread spear phishing operation originating 
from China that was targeting activists, journalists, government officials, and military personnel 
(China calls US culprit in global 'Internet war' 2011; China says hit 2011).  Once an email account was 
compromised that account’s contact list was targeted in additional spear phishing (USCC Annual 
Report 2011).  Intrusions into the computers of the US Chamber of Commerce revealed in the 
following year may be linked to this operation (USCC Annual Report 2012).  NASA reported that it 
suffered “47 APT attacks, 13 of which successfully compromised Agency computers”, including total 
control of key computers at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (Martin 2012).  Among the data stolen 
were the user credentials of 150 employees which could be used to further penetrate these 
networks (USCC Annual Report 2012).  Additionally, US Internet traffic was rerouted through 
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Chinese gateways, similar to the Internet traffic manipulation examined in 2010, and the Australian 
Prime Minister was again targeted, this time along with the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs 
and Minister for Defence (USCC Annual Report 2011; China says hit 2011).  Lockheed Martin, the 
primary developer of the F-35, had some of its networks penetrated, and it is believed that the 
intruders were able to gain access by using data stolen from RSA Security, a division of the EMC 
Corporation.  RSA Security developed the SecurID authentication tokens used by Lockheed Martin 
and others employed in the US defence industry for remote access to some of their networks (China 
under suspicion in US for Lockheed hacking 2011; Hosenball and Eckert 2011; Segal 2012; USCC 
Annual Report 2011).  Additionally, US and Canadian natural gas producers were again targeted in 
2010, and the Diablo Canyon nuclear facility was compromised.  The group believed to be 
responsible for these intrusions into the energy sector also targeted law firms involved with “anti-
dumping and unfair trade cases against China”, including the producers of solar cells (Riley and Dune 
2012). 
 
Continuing in 2011, China was said to have preyed upon some 760 organisations by exploiting the 
computer networks of iBAHN.  iBHAN provided digital information and entertainment in the 
hospitality industry (USCC Annual Report 2012).  Infiltrating these systems could enable 
eavesdropping on Internet communications and activity, provide avenues for compromising 
personal computers, and to some extent track the whereabouts of hotel guests comparable to 
Britain’s Royal Concierge program54 (Poitras, Rosenbach, and Stark 2013).  Statistics compiled by 
CloudFare, a website performance and security company, revealed a 56 percent reduction in 
malicious activity on the Internet during the October First National Day, a public holiday in the PRC, 
suggesting that state-sponsored CNE employees had the day off from their work (USCC Annual 
Report 2012).  An unnamed CEO in the Australian mining industry expressed concerns over Chinese 
CNE, and an unnamed British businessman warned universities that Chinese students studying in the 
UK were stealing science and technology research and implanting malicious software into university 
computer networks so they can maintain access following their departure (ONCIX 2011).  Chinese 
agents posing online as a US Navy admiral deceived senior military and government officials in the 
UK to add them as Facebook friends; this increases the probability of them opening a malicious link 
or file, or inadvertently passing information which could be useful in spear phishing (Protalinski 
2012).  Additional computer networks alleged to be compromised by China in 2011 include the 
                                                          
54 The Royal Concierge Program is an alleged computer system, operated by Britain’s Government 
Communications Headquarters, which tracks the hotel bookings of foreign diplomats at approximately 350 
high-end hotels around the world.  This information, including advanced warning of a diplomat’s arrival, could 
increase the ability of British intelligence agents to conduct further CNE, human intelligence, surveillance, and 
wiretaps (Paterson 2013; Poitras, Rosenbach, and Stark 2013).  
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International Monetary Fund (IMF); Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party; and French 
manufacturer Turbomeca, which develops engines for aircraft, helicopters, and missiles 
(Government 'may have hacked IMF' 2011; China says hit 2011; Committee on Foreign Affairs 2011). 
 
Three new Chinese-linked APTs occurred in 2011 – Nitro, Luckycat, and Icefog.  Nitro’s targets 
included 48 chemical and advanced materials companies, whose “design documents, formulas, and 
manufacturing processes” represented the type of intellectual property being sought (Chien and 
O’Gorman 2011; Arthur 2011).  In possible connection with this campaign, Chinese CNE in 2011 
targeted Canadian legal firms that had intelligence on prospective agreements in the chemical 
industry (USCC Annual Report 2012).  While Nitro is noted primarily for targeting the chemical sector 
in 2011, it did diversify its activities in that year to cover both human rights organisations and the 
automotive industry (Chien and O’Gorman 2011).  The Luckycat campaign was primarily focused on 
India, Japan, and Tibetan activists.  Luckycat compromised at least 233 computers and sought 
information on aerospace, energy, engineering, military research, shipping, and Tibetan activists 
(Luckycat Redux 2012; USCC Annual Report 2012).  Icefog primarily targeted high-technology, 
government, media organizations, the military, shipping, and telecommunications in Japan and 
South Korea (Kaspersky Lab 2013b).  
 
In 2012, there was continued concern over the possibility of China embedding backdoors, kill 
switches, and eavesdropping capability into critical infrastructure.  Researchers discovered security 
flaws that allowed remote control of select ZTE mobile phones and Huwaei routers (USCC Annual 
Report 2012).  These concerns, and possible links to the Chinese government, were further 
highlighted in a detailed report issued by the US House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
(Rogers 2012).  Further, acting on advice from the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) 
the Australia government barred Huawei from bidding on construction contracts for its National 
Broadband Network (McDonald and McGuirk 2012).  Beyond these two Chinese telecommunication 
companies, Microsoft reported that one in five computers it bought from China carried malware 
(USCC Annual Report 2012).  The discovery of counterfeit parts being used in military equipment 
also raised concerns over embedded backdoors, because it compromises the integrity of supply 
chains.  The US Senate Armed Services Committee found counterfeit parts in multiple weapons 
systems including the RQ-4 Global Hawk UAV (Levin and McCain 2012).  A separate investigation in 
2012 by the US Government Accountability Office attempted to purchase parts for the F-15 fighter, 
the MV-22 Osprey assault support aircraft, and two nuclear submarines.  An independent testing 
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laboratory found that the parts that came from China, 16 in all, were all determined counterfeit 
(Reed 2012).   
 
Multiple countries accused China of using CNE against a wide range of targets in 2012.  India’s air-
gapped Eastern Naval Command was compromised through the use of removable media (like flash 
drives), the Philippine’s suffered a string of incidents following confrontation with China in the South 
China Sea, and Taiwan’s National Security Bureau reported that “27,000 discrete pieces of 
information” were stolen through Chinese CNE over the previous seven years (USCC Annual Report 
2012; Passeri 2012).  Jonathan Evans, the director general of MI5, and Major General Jonathan Shaw, 
the head of cyber security at the UK Ministry of Defence, separately issued public statements to the 
government and businesses that warned of Chinese CNE (Esposito 2012; Jowitt 2013).  Japan’s 
largest defence contractor, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, was also compromised, and Japanese 
investigators linked CNE targeting Japanese legislature to the PLA (USCC Annual Report 2012).  Also 
in 2012, the security software company Trend Micro revealed the Lurid Downloader APT, also known 
as Enfal.  The malware and C2 infrastructure it used has some loose connections to Ghostnet, the 
Shadow network, and Byzantine; however it remains a distinct APT.  Lurid Downloader targeted 
1,465 computers in 61 countries (Villeneuve and Sancho 2011).   This comprised at least 47 victim 
organisations primarily targeting the embassies, ministries, and space industry within the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) of the former Soviet Union.  Separately in 2012, The 
Verizon RISK Team analysed 621 instances of data theft from multiple, primarily Western, countries.  
Of these, 19 percent were determined to be state sponsored, and of those 96 percent were 
attributed to China (USCC Annual Report 2013). 
 
China was further accused of exploiting the computer networks of the European Aeronautic Defence 
and Space Company (EADS) and the German corporation ThyssenKrupp (EADS, ThyssenKrupp 
attacked by Chinese hackers: report 2013; Jowitt 2013).  The Airbus Group, formerly known as EADS, 
is an aerospace and defence corporation that produces a wide range of aircraft.  The Airbus Group 
was also a partner in the Eurofighter Typhoon consortium, and has connections to the development 
of drones, missiles, and satellites.  ThyssenKrupp is one of the world’s largest steel producers and 
develops components for the automotive industry and industrial services.  In the same year German 
pharmaceutical company Bayer was also compromised.  The Federal Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution (BfV), Germany's domestic intelligence agency, reported “close to 1,100 digital attacks 
on the German government by foreign intelligence agencies” with the majority being traced to China 
(Digital Spying Burdens German-Chinese Relations 2013).  Presumably the BfV’s use of the word 
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“attacks” includes CNE.  Of particular significance, this figure only represents 2012, and it does not 
include intrusions into non-government networks.   
 
The Defense Science Board (DSB), a committee which advises the US Department of Defense, issued 
a classified report on Chinese CNE in 2012, the details of which were leaked the following year.  
According to this report 24 US weapons systems were compromised, including the Aegis Ballistic 
Missile Defense System, Black Hawk helicopter, F/A-18 Hornet, Global Hawk UAV, Littoral Combat 
Ship, patriot missile defense system, F-35, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, and V-22 
Osprey (Hoffman 2013; Martinez, Meek, Ross and Ferran 2013; USCC Annual Report 2013).  
Additional US victims of alleged Chinese CNE in 2012 include the Department of Defense’s Common 
Access Cards, the nuclear research sector, ships deployed at sea, and the White House Military 
Office (USCC Annual Report 2012; White House says cyberattack thwarted 2012).  Moreover, public 
servants in foreign affairs and academic staff at universities were targeted in a watering hole attack 
which used the Council on Foreign Relations website; and a metallurgical company lost $1 billion 
worth of technology that represented 20 years of dedicated work (Weitzenkorn 2013; USCC Annual 
Report 2012).  Media organisations proved prime targets in late 2012.  The New York Times, the Wall 
Street Journal, and the Washington Post were targeted by Chinese CNE following their investigative 
reporting on the wealth of Premier Wen Jiabao’s family (USCC Annual Report 2013).  Similarly, 
Bloomberg News was targeted after reporting on the wealth of President Xi Jinping’s family.  These 
incidents represent a combination of CNE and Information Operations (discussed in chapter 4), as 
the motive appears to be heavily influenced by a desire to control China’s image (Perlroth 2013).  
Further, Boxun.com was hit with DoS attacks following coverage of the Bo Xilai scandal (USCC Annual 
Report 2012).  Boxun.com is a Chinese news website, partially owned and operated in the US, which 
reports on issues that are politically sensitive in China.  CNE of media organisations continued into 
early 2013 with Facebook and Twitter also becoming targets (Arthur 2014; Reid 2013). 
  
The year 2013 marked a shift in tone for the US Department of Defense’s Annual Report to Congress: 
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China.  For the first time the 
report stated that intrusions “appear to be attributable directly to the Chinese government and 
military”, rather than implying such with caveats on the difficulty of attribution (US Department of 
Defense 2013).  High ranking US officials, including Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, Defense 
Secretary Leon Panetta, and President Barack Obama, raised their concerns over Chinese CNE 
publicly and directly with their Chinese counterparts (Baldor 2013; Pace 2013).  The summit between 
President Xi Jinping and Barrack Obama held at the Sunnylands Retreat in Rancho Mirage California 
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was noted for its proximity to Silicon Valley.  This, along with President Xi Jinping’s prior meeting 
with Microsoft founder Bill Gates, appeared to signify an information technology theme to the 
summit.  NASA also increased pressure on China relating to CNE concerns by revoking the remote 
access privileges of Chinese contractors and introducing a “moratorium on granting any new access 
to NASA facilities for individuals from China…” (Klotz 2013).  These actions were preceded by the 
arrest of Chinese national Bo Jiang, a former NASA contractor, who was accused of attempting to 
return to China with stolen NASA information technology.  Later in the same year, the US passed a 
law which prohibits NASA, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Justice, and the 
National Science Foundation from acquiring any information technology system “produced, 
manufactured or assembled” by a PRC “owned, operated or subsidized” entity – unless there is prior 
approval and analysis by the FBI (Flaherty 2013).  Further, the US Department of Justice charged 
three individuals from China’s Sinovel Wind Group, a wind turbine manufacturer, with the electronic 
theft of software source code and reverse engineering of technology belonging to American 
Superconductor (AMSC) (USCC Annual Report 2013).  Huawei’s role in Chinese CNE, and the use of 
traditional espionage to supplement CNE, came under renewed scrutiny following the mysterious 
death of US Citizen Shane Todd (Bonner and Spolar 2013).  Dr Todd was conducting semiconductor 
research in Singapore for the Institute for Micro Electronics in collaboration with Huawei 
Technologies. 
 
Another significant increase in pressure on China over alleged CNE was the release of Mandiant’s 
report on APT1 which directly tied PLA Unit 61398 to the CNE activity.  While the report was 
released in 2013, the events it details began in 2006, so it is discussed in more detail above.  
Coinciding with its release and the international attention it received, a new alleged Chinese spear 
phishing campaign targeted Japanese journalists.  The emails used a malicious attachment which 
purported to be the Mandiant report (Raff 2013).  Japanese organisations were further targeted in 
2013 by a campaign known as Operation DeputyDog, which utilized zero day exploits and malware 
payloads, and was later linked to a watering hole exploit named Ephemeral Hydra (Moran and 
Villeneuve 2013; Moran, Vashisht, Scott, and Haq 2013).  Both of these incidents have been linked to 
the Beijing Group that was responsible for a number of APT including Operation Aurora and Axiom.  
Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense also released a report in 2013 condemning Chinese CNE, claiming that 
China has been conducting “CNE against Taiwan for more than a decade” and possesses “a cyber 
army of more than 100,000 people” (Hsiao 2013).  Additionally, Australia accused China of stealing 
the classified blueprints of ASIO’s new headquarters, and using CNE to target the Australian Bureau 
of Statistics, Department of Defence, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Department of Prime 
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Minister and Cabinet, and Reserve Bank of Australia (China blamed after ASIO blueprints stolen in 
major cyber attack on Canberra HQ 2013).  Lastly, an attempted BIOS attack, and penetration into a 
Trend Micro honeypot designed to appear as a US water plant, further illustrate the capability to 
transition between CNE and CNA (USCC Annual Report 2013; Ingersoll 2013). 
 
The increased rhetoric and pressure placed on Chinese CNE continued in 2014.  The US Department 
of Defense’s 2014 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 
People’s Republic of China again stated that some CNE appears “to be attributable directly to the 
Chinese government and military” (US Department of Defense 2014).  Moreover, the US indicted 
five Chinese military members in connection with APT1 CNE “directed at six American victims in the 
US nuclear power, metals and solar products industries” (The United States Department of Justice 
2014).  Later in the same year a sixth Chinese national was indicted, and in this case was taken into 
custody, for a CNE scheme targeting the US C-17, F-22, and F-35 aircraft (Su Bin Complaint of 
Hacking for China 2014, Su Bin Indictment for Hacking for China 2014, and US Attorney’s Office 
2014).  The year 2014 also marked the release of Novetta’s report on the Axiom APT.  This report 
continued a trend of not only directly accusing China, but also attributing groups to specific PLA 
Units when possible and providing extensive attribution evidence.  Further, it represents new levels 
of collaboration between multiple IT companies and the US government to simultaneously shame 
the CPC publicly and provide mitigation techniques for private companies (FBI warns industry of 
Chinese cyber campaign 2014; Novetta 2014).  Taiwan officials also continued their assertion that 
they were the target of frequent Chinese CNE, including the theft of “information for use in 
negotiations with Taiwan” (China launching 'severe' cyber attacks on Taiwan: minister 2014).  Other 
targets of Chinese CNE in 2014 include the personnel files of US government employees in an 
attempt to identify those who had applied for top security clearance, and identification data for 
millions of patients belonging to Community Health Systems (New Claims of Hacking as US, China 
Discuss Cybersecurity 2014; US hospital firm: Chinese hackers stole patient data 2014).  In the latter 
case no medical or credit card information was stolen; however the data obtained could be used for 
spear phishing and the operation could have been a proof of concept or mapping of the network.  
Additionally, China was accused of intrusions into the US Postal Service and the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration, including the National Weather Service, compromising the 
personal information of more than 800,000 employees and disrupting satellite data respectively 
(Flaherty, Samenow, and Rein 2014). 
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Conclusion 
 
The development of China’s computer network exploitation (CNE) illustrates several key points and 
trends relevant to China’s cyber warfare doctrine.  Between 1998 and 2002, newly formed hacker 
groups were involved in large scale cyber riots with Indonesia, Japan, Taiwan, and the United States.  
Conforming to a general nationalist sentiment among the approximately 250 Chinese hacker groups, 
these cyber conflicts coincided with international incidents and perceived slights to China.  The 
hacker groups’ activity during these conflicts, and in subsequent years, was primarily computer 
network attack (CNA); however, it set the stage for Chinese CNE which became dominant around 
2002.  This chapter has explored over 100 isolated CNE incidents and 19 APT assigned to China 
through a collection of six attribution elements.  China appears to have recognized the benefits of 
online exploitation and embraced it through the formation of approximately 20 state-sponsored CNE 
groups.  Among its benefits, it provides a relatively inexpensive means to leapfrog decades of 
research and development in all sectors, and thus far, it has incurred minimal punishment.  Through 
the Internet, China has the ability to conduct large scale espionage operations against thousands of 
targets, stealthily, and on a global scale.  This dispersed trickle of intellectual property may, over a 
period of decades, result in a ‘death by a thousand cuts’ for Western states. 
 
Alleged Chinse CNE spanned all sectors of business, government, and military, within 71 countries, 
targeting any information which would be of value to the Chinese government.  Some single APTs, 
and even some individual isolated incidents, targeted hundreds of organisations, infected thousands 
of computers, and cost billions of dollars in losses.  The types of damage caused by alleged Chinese 
CNE include advantageous competitor insight, altering data, delays in production, forced 
replacement of computers, increased cost, increased work restrictions, loss of data, reduced 
efficiency, service outages, the spread misinformation, theft, and (unconfirmed) electricity blackouts.  
The PRC has also been accused of mapping computer networks and leaving behind tools to aid 
Chinese CNA capability.  Typical methods for initial access to computer networks included socially 
engineered spear phishing and watering hole attacks.  These, along with further exploitation after 
the initial breach, utilized the full range of common malware.  Some of the more novel vectors of 
exploitation allegedly used by China during the period of 2000-2014 were imposter Facebook 
accounts; manipulation of large flows of Internet traffic; mobile devices, including phones, cameras, 
and flash drives; the ability to turn on a target’s webcam and microphone; eavesdropping on online 
conference calls; targeting the providers of secure identification and encryption in order to breach 
the systems of their clients; and a variety of embedded backdoors.   
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There are a number of recurring themes in alleged Chinese CNE.  The Huawei Technologies Company 
was accused by multiple countries of facilitating the use of embedded backdoors by the Chinese 
government in 2003, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2012, and 2013.  Similarly, Chinese computer manufacturer 
Lenovo was accused of implanting exploits in its merchandise in 2006, 2007, and 2008.  Two 
separate studies in 2012, by the US Government Accountability Office and the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, raised concern that counterfeit parts and compromised supply chains may be 
furthering China’s ability to embed backdoors.  Additional incidents in 2008, 2010, and 2012 
demonstrated pre-installed malware within Chinese computer products.  Another trend within 
Chinese CNE is the use of insiders and traditional espionage to complement cyber espionage 
(HBGary 2011).  This was demonstrated by three European cases in 2005; a Ford Motor Company 
incident in 2006; the physical theft of laptops in 2008 and 2009; three cases involving LED, chemical, 
and paint companies in 2009; Su Bin’s alleged attempts to gather information on military aircraft 
between 2009 and 2013; a General Motors Company incident in 2010; and the disputed death of 
Shane Todd in 2013.55  Other trends in alleged Chinese CNE include recurring targets.  Intrusions into 
NASA’s computer networks have been continually occurring since 2002, including some incidents 
which belong to the Titan Rain and Avocado APTs.  Additionally, information pertaining to the F-35 
fighter aircraft has been under a sustained, yet seemingly scattered, CNE effort since 2007.   
 
International condemnation of alleged Chinese CNE, and pressure placed on China to cease CNE 
activities, has taken place in multiple forms and is on the rise.  Public accusations by government 
officials had a sharp increase around 2007 and continued through 2014.  These were individual 
accusations from multiple countries, rather than a single APT report which listed multiple countries 
as victims.  Around 2010, accusations of CNE began to convey greater confidence in attributing 
intrusions directly to the Chinese government.  Between 2010-2014, government offices and IT 
security firms began releasing a higher quantity of statistics, including the annual number of 
intrusions, estimated value and percent of losses, attributable to China.  There also appeared to be a 
new trend, particularly within the United Kingdom and the United States, of issuing warnings directly 
to business leaders of ongoing Chinese CNE activity, possibly representing an attempt to improve 
intelligence sharing.  A number of high profile reports on alleged Chinese APTs were made public 
during this particular period, including Google’s revelation of Operation Aurora and Mandiant’s 
report on APT1.  These represent new levels of boldness in assigning attribution, collaboration, and 
                                                          
55 China was accused of further traditional espionage during the period 2000-2014 (see Luard 2005); the cases 
noted here only represent those which appeared to directly supplement CNE.   
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transparency, which might encourage other companies to come forward with information about 
computer network breaches.   
 
Further, 2010-2014 revealed an increase in attempts to use legal action against Chinese CNE through 
arrests, bans, and lawsuits.  In connection with intrusions into the computer networks of NASA, a 
Chinese national was detained in 2010 and another was arrested in 2013.  In 2014, five Chinese 
military members were indicted in relation to APT1 and a sixth, separate, Chinese national was taken 
into custody for a CNE scheme targeting US aircraft.  While these may not result in convictions, they 
represent a hardening stance and vigilance on the part of the United States.  In 2012, Australia 
prohibited China from taking part in the development of its National Broadband Network.  This 
coincided with, and drew further attention to, the investigation of the US Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence into Chinese telecommunication companies Huawei and ZTE.  In 2013, 
NASA barred remote access to its computer network by Chinese contractors, and the US passed a 
law prohibiting the purchase and use of unauthorized Chinese-made information technology within 
select US organisations.  Lastly, lawsuits in relation to Chinese CNE were filed in 2010 and 2013 on 
behalf of Solid Oak Software Inc. and American Superconductor respectively.  A rise in accusations 
occurring roughly between 2010 and 2014, along with increased media exposure, could be the result 
of enhanced awareness of Chinese CNE and a decision to take a stronger stance towards China.  It 
could also reflect a more profound appreciation of China’s overall rise in power and the emergence 
of the Internet as a vital feature of contemporary society.  Despite increasing publicity, the benefits 
China has allegedly gained by conducting CNE appear to far outweigh the costs.  For this reason, it is 
probable that Chinese CNE activity will continue to increase rather than decrease. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Information Operations 
 
Information Operations (IO) entails utilizing and manipulating information online, without hacking, 
to influence actions.56  This encompasses a wide range of activities including censorship, propaganda, 
and psychological operations (PSYOPS).  It can be defensive or offensive, used during peacetime or 
war, and aimed at domestic or foreign audiences.  Compared to other states, China has much more 
control over Internet access within its borders and requires less hacking, therefore IO has a large role 
in China’s cyber warfare doctrine.  Further, it is essential to examine IO, because it is intertwined 
with Computer Network Operations and Net-Centric Warfare.  This connection will be demonstrated 
further in Chapter Six when Chinese cyber warfare is applied to the Taiwan issue.  As with other 
Chinese concepts, such as unrestricted warfare and comprehensive national power, China takes a 
holistic approach to cyber warfare (Andress and Winterfeld 2011, 43-44; China's Military Strategy 
2015; Gady 2015).  The Science of Campaigns prescribes “a combination of the orthodox and 
unorthodox” activities, while Science of Military Strategy instructs to “analyz[e] the enemy and our 
situations systematically and in their entirety” (Anderson and Engstrom 2009).  As such, this chapter 
will investigate the difficulties in mapping the structure of Chinese IO and arrive at a more clear 
understanding from which to work.  China’s attempts to influence foreigners via the Internet, and its 
attempts to defend against undesirable messages targeting China, will be examined in order to 
demonstrate what is possible with IO and the challenges China faces.  
 
 
Difficulties in Categorizing IO 
 
Identifying all elements that fall within the branch of IO and placing them into an organised structure 
poses several problems.  Cyber warfare literature which discusses using the Internet to one’s 
advantage without hacking includes terms such as coercion, censorship, deception, influence, media, 
perception, propaganda, psychological, public opinion, and shaping; often followed by the word 
operations or warfare.  There is significant overlap between these terms.  Attempting to categorize 
them, such as through identifying their relevant government departments, can create additional 
                                                          
56 Some Chinese military analysts use “information operations” as a catch-all term equivalent to cyber warfare 
or information warfare; however, this thesis uses a stricter definition (Thomas 2004, 15; Thomas 2007, 29-43, 
59-70, 119). 
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overlap.  For example, “… in 2003 the Communist Party’s Central Committee and the Central Military 
Commission approved a new warfare concept for the PLA, the ‘three warfares’…” (Wortzel 2013, 
151).  The Three Warfares (sān zhǒng zhàn fǎ; —三种战法) are categorised as public opinion (or 
media), psychological, and legal (Anderson and Engstrom 2009; Deptula 2011; Krekel, Adams, and 
Bakos 2012; Thomas 2009, 112, 221-223; US Department of Defense 2010; Wortzel 2014).  One 
problem with these distinctions is the overlap in meaning; media can be used to conduct PSYOPS, 
and PSYOPS can affect public opinion.  Further, while the Three Warfares are often discussed in 
Chinese cyber warfare literature, it is important to note that they are not cyber specific.  The Three 
Warfares include public opinion (or media), psychological, and legal outside of the cyber realm.  In 
some cases all that separates one element, like propaganda, from being cyber or non-cyber is the 
means by which it is transmitted (electronic versus print); however IO does contain other unique 
methods of influence which do not have an offline equivalent.   
 
Additionally the Three Warfares can be applied to all three branches of cyber warfare, not only IO.  
For example, CNO can be used to deface web pages, spread viruses, or alter data on a network.  
These can weaken morale, intimidate, or erode trust in information networks, making them CNO 
enabled PSYOPS.  Some examples of NCW enabled PSYOPS include using hi-tech camouflage to trick 
satellites, and using UAVs to broadcast a message or drop talking leaflets (Thomas 2004, 96-98).  
Turning to the media component of the Three Warfares, the “jamming of international broadcasts, 
including both Radio Free Asia [RFA] and the Voice of America [VOA]” in Tibet and Xinjiang are an 
example of NCW enabled media warfare (Access to Information and Media Control in the People’s 
Republic of China 2008).  Further, allegations that China used CNO to intimidate US media 
organisations, and to “gain warning about negative media coverage of China before it [was] 
published”, appear to demonstrate a combination of CNO enabled PSYOPS and CNO enabled media 
warfare (USCC Annual Report 2013).  Acting on this advance warning about negative media coverage 
by publishing pre-emptive articles online to counter the upcoming criticism would be IO enabled 
PSYOPS and IO enabled media warfare.  The legal, or lawfare, component of the Three Warfares is 
also applicable to IO; however it is more of a supplement than a defining characteristic of this branch.  
As with PSYOPS and media warfare, lawfare applies to all three branches of cyber warfare.  In 
determining whether the application of lawfare is an IO topic it is necessary to ask whether the 
intended outcome is going to affect an IO issue.  China’s push for international legal efforts against 
the weaponisation of space are NCW related lawfare, whereas laws requiring foreign companies 
operating in China to comply with domestic censorship practices are IO related lawfare.  IO itself can 
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be used to enhance lawfare capabilities in multiple realms by using online influence to aid in the 
adoption of favourable laws. 
 
Rather than try to force IO to correspond with an existing structure, a more productive approach is 
to examine its constituent elements and to see if one can detect a pattern.  The Internet is a 
communication tool, and the various non-hacking techniques – from media to psychological and 
censorship to propaganda – are concerned with conveying a message.  The purpose of the message 
is to influence a target’s opinions and subsequently their actions.  Information Operations 
Exploitation (IOE) entails using online information to one’s advantage, or more specifically, 
disseminating messages (true, false, or misleading) which can induce a preferable action.  
Information Operations Defence (IOD) protects against undesirable messages, by blocking them, 
changing them into preferred messages, or using them to undertake an opposing action such as an 
arrest.57  Common examples include propaganda and censorship respectively.  This model also 
applies to less obvious examples at the extremities of the spectrum.  Mundane activity such as a 
business creating its own website, the government judging a lower ranking Party official’s 
performance based on online opinion and information, or the cloning of popular Western websites 
for a Chinese audience (if done without hacking) are all related to online messages influencing 
actions.58  More exotic examples include virtual dead drops, which entail two people using the same 
email account to pass messages by saving them as drafts; or steganography, such as hiding 
information and communications within a publicly available image file or Microsoft Word document 
(Fritz 2008; Mandiant 2013; Thomas 2009, 111-112).  With these the message is hidden, aimed at a 
select audience, yet available online with the intent to influence action.  In some cases undesirable 
messages can be beneficial in that they provide actionable intelligence.  There can also be 
complexity within the messages used by IO, such as one message causing two opposite, yet desirable, 
actions amongst dual targets.  A message that intimidates or demoralizes a foreign audience could 
also encourage a domestic audience through nationalism, creating a type of win-win message.  With 
the Internet these messages can be in many forms, such as news articles, social media, mp3s, videos, 
                                                          
57 These acronyms are not meant to be rigidly defined or delineated here.  They are merely useful for 
discussing and exploring IO, and they have the benefit of resembling the established acronyms used for two 
subcomponents of CNO. 
58 While the government has advocated or allowed such actions, and benefits from them, it is predominantly 
citizens and businesses who are conducting IO in these examples. 
  China has a history of reverse engineering websites that become popular and profitable in the Western world; 
examples include clones of eBay, Facebook, Google, Twitter, Wikipedia, and YouTube being Taobao, Renren 
(or Sina Weibo), Baidu, Sina Weibo, Baidu Baike (or Hudong), and Youku Tudou respectively (see Denlinger 
2010; Goldkorn 2011; Moskvitch 2012). 
88 
 
and image files.  This way of conceptualizing IO bypasses the difficulties of overlapping terms, and it 
can help reveal new possibilities rather than continually rediscovering or reorganising old ones.   
 
While the above two forms of ‘messages influencing actions’ are useful for verifying and analysing 
examples of IO, further delineation is needed for the purpose of this thesis.  At first IOE and IOD 
seem comparable to CNO’s CNE (or CNA, due to its offensive nature) and CND.  CNO is largely 
concerned with attacking or exploiting other states and defending against attacks or exploitation 
coming from other states.  Similarly, it seems IO should be largely concerned with communicating 
preferred messages to other states and defending against undesirable messages coming from other 
states.  However; there are some difficulties with this, because there is much more domestic-foreign 
overlap in IO, due to the nature of globalization and the Internet59.  The Central Publicity 
Department (CPD), formerly the Central Propaganda Department and often referred to simply as the 
Publicity Department, is responsible for propaganda targeting a domestic audience, while the State 
Council Information Office (SCIO) is responsible for propaganda targeting abroad.  China traditionally 
refers to these types of propaganda as internal and external respectively (China’s Propaganda and 
Influence Operations, Its Intelligence Activities That Target the United States, and the Resulting 
Impacts on US National Security 2009; Shambaugh 2007).  However the distinction between them 
has become blurred with the Internet.  For example, there are a large number of foreigners within 
China or abroad who read Mandarin, and there is the large Chinese diaspora, making it hard to send 
split messages.  Further, internal IOE can influence Chinese people to conduct external IOE.  This is 
unique to IO; under CNO it is unlikely that China would want to attack its own people in order to 
influence them to attack a foreign state.  While this is conceivable in CNO, it does not warrant more 
than a theoretical mention in the context of this thesis; whereas there is a vast amount of literature 
detailing internal IOE and a high frequency of inspiring people to write preferred messages online 
that reaches foreigners.  Other ways in which internal IOE is relevant to international relations 
include its use to counteract external IOE conducted by foreign states, or to quell nationalism from 
escalating into an international incident.  The latter could damage China’s soft power, incite 
damaging retaliatory attacks, or force China into confrontation with a foreign state.  
 
Internal and external overlap is also seen within IOD.  The Golden Shield Project (Golden Shield), also 
known as the Great Firewall, is predominantly known for its use in internal IOD, and it is owned and 
operated by the Ministry of Public Security (MPS).  Yet the Golden Shield plays a vital role in external 
                                                          
59 The third branch of cyber warfare, NCW, has the least amount of domestic-foreign overlap, because access 
and capability are largely confined to states.  This is due to NCW involving advanced military hardware that is 
not connected to the Internet. 
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IOD, and many of the processes used for external IOD are the same as those used for internal IOD, 
therefore there is some inevitable crossover when attempting to examine the Golden Shield for 
external IOD.  Further, a foreign state can influence Chinese people to use IOE against their own 
government.  Chinese external IOD attempts to stop the initial foreign message before it can have 
this influence, yet when looking at IO comprehensively, the next level of defence would include 
internal IOD.  CNO does have an equivalent, such as a virus created in another state being used by a 
Chinese person; however tracing the origin of code seems more tangible than tracing the origins of 
influence.  Barriers to use, such as the technological limitations, the perceived consequences, and 
feelings of personal responsibility are greater with spreading a virus than spreading an opinion.  
Despite these limitations and overlap, the scope of this thesis is limited to a focus on international 
relations, therefore the following sections will emphasize external IOE and external IOD, and only 
note internal when it is intertwined with external, rather than a full exploration of all aspects of 
internal (for more information on these see Fritz 2008, 19-21; Fritz 2009, 3-4, 18).  Similarly this 
research will not delve into the details of psychology, marketing, and advertising (see Larson, Darilek, 
Gibran, Nichiporuk, Richardson, Schwartz, and Thurston 2009). 
 
A final difficulty to be addressed is trying to identify the government, or organisational, structure in 
place for conducting IO (see Diagram 3).  Detailed responsibilities and chain of interagency command 
for specific operations are considered state secrets (Shambaugh 2007).  This lack of transparency is 
in itself a useful form of deception making it difficult for a foreign state to create an effective 
opposition and disguising the purpose or role of officials at various events and interactions with 
foreigners.  Although it may also reflect an inefficient structure and competing interests within, so it 
is uncertain whether the benefits are worth the costs.  Multiple reports place IO under the purview 
of SCIO with supplemental actions being taken by a variety of ministries (China’s Propaganda and 
Influence 2009; Lawrence and Martin 2013; Rumi 2004; Shambaugh 2007).  General descriptions of 
these departments’ responsibilities posted online by the Chinese government, support these claims 
as they list several IO relevant areas (The Organizational Structure of the State Council 2003).  
However, a report prepared by the Northrop Grumman Corporation for the US-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission (USCC) in 2012 places IO under the joint responsibility of the 3PLA and 
4PLA coordinated by the Department of Informationization and the Information Assurance Base 
(Krekel, Adams, and Bakos 2012).  One possible reason for this discrepancy is that the Internet is a 
communication and media device, while at the same time it holds significant military application.  
Traditionally the military would hold a greater role in PSYOPS while the media would deal more with 
censorship and public opinion; however the two have become blurred with the Internet, just as 
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peacetime and wartime operations have become blurred.  Northrup Grumman’s report to the USCC 
might reflect a shift in area of responsibility towards the PLA or overlapping and competing interests.  
Meanwhile, Larry M. Wortzel’s 2013 book, The Dragon Extends Its Reach, places IO under the 
authority of the General Political Department (GPD) in close partnership with SCIO.  This book was 
written after the Northrup Grumman report, and Wortzel is a commission member on the USCC 
board, therefore it is probable that this information is more up to date.  It shows that the GDP works 
closely with SCIO, bridging the gap between the State Council and Central Military Commission (CMC) 
which could represent the beginning of a more efficient structure.  
 
 
External IOE 
 
China seeks to use IOE to aid in its continued modernization, avoid direct confrontation, maintain 
CPC control, reassure its neighbours and the world of its peaceful rise, and reduce western influence.  
Chinese history is replete with examples of using deception and perception management to gain 
advantage, from Sun Zi’s Art of War and the Thirty-Six Stratagems to classic literature like Romance 
of the Three Kingdoms, Outlaws of the Marsh, and Journey to the West.  Mao Zedong sought to 
minimize the perceived threat posed by the CPC and successfully utilized propaganda, while Deng 
Xiaoping instructed to “hide our capabilities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; 
and never claim leadership” (Anderson and Engstrom 2009; China’s Propaganda and Influence 
Operations 2009).  China’s rich history shows a predisposition to IOE, yet China does not highlight 
these traditions within external IOE itself, because that would lessen its effectiveness.  Instead 
China’s external IOE focuses on other aspects of their history: a revival of Confucian ideals, Hu 
Jintao’s Harmonious Society, and the naval voyages of Zheng He (Dotson 2011).  This may be 
deception, or it may reflect the true beliefs of the current Party, either way it serves as useful IOE by 
attempting to generate favourably foreign opinions and alleviate what some perceive as the China 
Threat.  Beginning in the 1990s China issued instructions to boost “external publicity through the 
Internet” and assigned public diplomacy with 5 main objectives: 
 
(1) more strongly publicizing China’s assertions to the outside world; (2) forming a desirable 
image of the state; (3) issuing rebuttals to distorted overseas reports about China; (4) 
improving the international environment surrounding China; and (5) exerting influence on 
the policy decisions of foreign countries (Rumi 2004). 
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Common examples for achieving these objectives include official statements to online media 
organizations and the posting of government White Papers.  Evidence of China implementing IO 
strategies can be seen with Tsinghua University teaching government officials “how the media works” 
and attempting to move away from the “static phrases, slogans, and warnings” characteristic of 
China’s past (Access to Information 2008).  Additionally, military courses offered at Wuhan 
University include “an introduction to US and Taiwanese social information systems” suggesting that 
China has recognized the benefits of utilizing social networking externally (China’s Proliferation 
Practices, and the Development of Its Cyber and Space Warfare Capabilities 2008).  External IOE is 
most effective when personnel have a thorough understanding of the language and culture of their 
target audience, at both the state and online community levels. 
 
China can enhance the effectiveness of its messages by directly or indirectly enlisting the assistance 
of foreigners in its external IOE, in a policy called “using foreign strength to promote China” (China’s 
Propaganda and Influence 2009).  One technique is to interview, or hire as a foreign correspondent, 
Western celebrities from the entertainment, political, or academic spheres who align with the CPC’s 
preferred message.  These individuals add credence and visibility through their standing, and clarity 
through their fluency and understanding of the subtleties of language and culture.  In some cases 
they may not need to be hired, they are already producing material such as news articles or 
academic research which aligns with the CPC’s preferred message.  This material can be promoted 
online, possibly through the aid of another type of celebrity, social media ‘power users’, or trend 
setters.  These individuals can popularize web links, generating traffic in the tens of thousands, 
which is then picked up by traditional media outlets.  This activity also improves the material’s rank 
in search engine results, thus perpetuating the spread of that viewpoint, such as the likelihood of it 
being referenced in subsequent academic papers.  This is accomplished through a deep 
understanding of online culture, history, and technology, and it is possible to purchase such a service 
(China cyber-gangs use 'vast underground network' 2014; Lawrence and Riley 2013).  Another 
technique is to provide funding for think tanks and university scholarships which can set research 
agendas and topics.  Further, “granting access to archives, research opportunities, interviews”, visa 
approval, and giving guests special treatment can all result in favorable online content, “sometimes 
consciously, and often unconsciously” (China’s Proliferation Practices 2008).  This is not necessarily 
insidious; it is good practice.  Non-celebrity foreigners are also valuable in putting out external IOE, 
because of their language and cultural fluency, along with appearing less controlled by virtue of 
being non-Chinese.  Mobilizing the Chinese diaspora is another type of foreign assistance.  Online 
support for China during the 2008 Tibetan unrest and Olympic torch relay, resulted in the 
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organisation of real world demonstrations and protests, and included individuals “attaching a red 
heart moniker next to the word China to their avatars” (China’s Proliferation Practices 2008).   
 
China may wish to tap into the power of a broad range of domestic Internet users, those who are 
not celebrities, nor skilled hackers, yet have wide-ranging knowledge of the Internet through 
frequent use.  Government officials have hired “tens of thousands” of Internet commentators, often 
known as the 50 Cent Party, who attempt to influence public opinion online in favour of CPC policy60 
(Bristow 2008; Thomas 2009, 90).  Comments posted online in message boards, or attached to news 
articles, blogs, videos, and social media might reflect genuine support for a CPC endorsed point of 
view, or they could contain misleading or false information61 to try to persuade people.  
Democratized news, where comments can be voted up or down, or news articles, videos, and mobile 
apps (including malicious ones) are displayed more prominently based on votes, can be artificially 
inflated using scripts or multiple accounts belonging to the same user (sockpuppets) (China cyber-
gangs 2014; Cuban 2008).  Xinhua could attempt to raise its international popularity in the way that 
Russia Today and Al Jazeera have risen.  They could purport to show news and opinion that is 
unavailable by Western media, possibly showing controversial and self-critical pieces as a way to 
build an initial user base.  Flooding YouTube with news clips, artificially inflating the view count, and 
posting positive comments would increase their presence.  Even if a more experienced audience can 
see through these tactics, it can make a false impression on casual Internet users or the young.  For 
example, a student researching a topic for presentation may replay one of these videos in their class 
because it was readily available and the view count and comments seemed to demonstrate 
credibility, thus the message spreads.  While there is value in quantity, quality still matters.  For this 
reason, China also needs fully trained and dedicated external IOE operatives, beyond common 
Internet users, and a coordinated strategy to maximize effectiveness.   
 
A more advanced and fully employed commentator can be trained in PSYOPS, mob mentality, 
propaganda, logical deterrents, and key topics of discussion.  They could subtly, or aggressively, 
point out flaws in online commentary which does not support the CPC’s views, and present 
researched and well thought out counter arguments.  Subtle techniques, such as self-deprecating 
humour, can sway a crowd’s emotions and train of thought.  This is where the previously mentioned 
psychology, marketing, and advertising come into play; and they might be desirable academic 
                                                          
60 The opposite of the 50 Cent Party is the Internet Water Army.  They are paid by Chinese companies or 
foreigners to influence opinion in opposition to the CPC. 
61 Beyond false statements, “fake news” is a phenomenon which China has had to defend against (Thomas 
2009, 115). 
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degrees for a career in IOE.  Beyond commentating or promoting, operatives can also monitor 
Internet activity and set up online polls to help judge public opinion for crafting appropriate 
messages.  There is a fine line between soft power and propaganda; if not carefully orchestrated, 
external IOE can do more damage than good.  For example, on multiple occasions China has been 
accused of using Photoshop to digitally alter photos in its favour (Pasternack 2008; Yue 2008).  For 
this reason, external IOE should place an emphasis on finding, and clandestinely promoting, 
favourable media from third parties when possible.  Similarly, promoting messages of truth, poses 
less risk, and can still have beneficial results; although a combination of techniques is optimal.  Since 
IO is restricted to the Internet, and is available to anyone, IO deals primarily with mass opinion.  
However in some cases these messages, while visible to the general public, are intended to influence 
specific foreign leaders and officials.  For example, statements through online media can indicate 
how China would respond to specific foreign actions.  External IOE also seeks to transition seamlessly 
from peacetime to wartime.  It can be used to build justification and support for war, or boost 
nationalism during conflict such as posting a video of precision strikes on YouTube.  As discussed in 
Chapter Three’s Rise of Hacker Groups, 1998-2002, and seen in subsequent conflicts involving Israel 
and Russia, cyber warfare has become a supplement to wars and crises, and IO plays a role in this 
(Clarke and Knake 2010, 30; Fritz 2008).   
 
IOE can be used as a means to control, or as a way to prepare, an unknowing militia.  In one view, 
patriotic Internet users “are treated as useful idiots by the Chinese regime”, and China “has figured 
out a rough method, using the propaganda apparatus, to shape [their behaviour]” (China’s 
Proliferation Practices 2008).  China can use skilled IOE operatives to influence and direct this larger 
crowd, using them as a political tool.  For example, internal IOE can be used to organise protests and 
CNA to denounce Japan’s lack of remorse for WWII atrocities, criticize Falun Gong followers, or rally 
support for the One China Policy (Faiola 2005).  The 2003 Information Operations Roadmap notes 
that PSYOPS and manipulating the thoughts of populations through the media and Internet requires 
constant observation during peacetime, otherwise in the event of conflict, a state would not be 
sufficiently engrained into the information culture to utilize them fully.  This includes knowledge of 
websites’ histories and the rapid evolution of memetics, pop culture, slang, and subcultures (Anti 
2012; Baidu 10 Mythical Creatures 2014; Chin 2012; List of Internet Phenomena In China 2014; Pang 
2008; Slashdot Subculture 2008; Slashdot Trolling Phenomenon 2008).  Controlling this sort of ‘mob’ 
is not a skill that can be quickly obtained.  Project Chanology gives insight into how these non-hacker 
Internet users can come together towards a common goal of disruption using the rapid growth of 
available Internet capabilities (see Fritz 2008, 35-37).  While Anonymous is a Western example, it is a 
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notable case study and comparable to China’s Honker Union or Red Hacker Alliance (Henderson 
2007a).  In the case of Anonymous, humour is used to unite and to obfuscate logic and responsibility.  
Credence within the group may come from inside jokes and creativity, rather than sound 
information – even revelling in their own failure.  While China seeks to harness the power of these 
emergent communities through IOE, they also pose a non-traditional security threat, which China 
must understand in order to construct an effective defence.   
 
 
External IOD 
 
The Golden Shield plays an integral role in IO defence.  China’s “Internet filtering system [the Golden 
Shield] is the most sophisticated in the world” (USCC Annual Report 2005).  It uses regularly updated 
lists of IP addresses, URLs, DNS, VPNs, packets, and keywords which can be blocked or filtered (held 
for review or automatically altered) at any of China’s three major international gateways located in 
Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou.  To paraphrase Richard A. Clarke, it is like trying to prevent a 
terrorist attack in Manhattan by inspecting traffic entering the 4 tunnels that connect to the island, 
rather than trying to defend every building (Clarke and Knake 2010, 161).  However, these gateways 
are only one level of the Golden Shield.  ISPs and individual businesses, such as hotels, Internet cafes, 
individual websites, and universities, employ additional blocking and filtering.  In some cases they 
can be held responsible for their customers’ activity and are required to check identification and 
keep detailed records (China may require real name registration for internet access 2012; 
Kurtenbach 2012).  China also relies on “many tens of thousands of censors, working inside Chinese 
social media firms and government at several levels” to manually check content and remove 
questionable material (King, Pan, and Roberts 2014).  In 2009 China attempted to make the Green 
Dam Youth Escort content control software a mandatory pre-installation on all computers sold in 
China or imported from abroad.  This was later made voluntary, but it shows China’s interest in 
improving control by placing another layer of defence at the individual computer level.  Individual 
users can also be influenced to comply with government controls either willingly or through fear of 
the consequences, resulting in self-censorship.  There are some ways to bypass the Golden Shield, 
such as proxy servers or virtual private networks (VPN); however, “the vast majority of Internet 
users will not, or cannot, make the effort to try to get around censorship … these can be technically 
challenging, insecure, slow, and unreliable … many of these services are unencrypted and so easily 
monitored…” (Access to Information 2008). 
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Beyond a lack of transparency on the part of the government and frequent updates to blacklists, the 
Golden Shield appears unpredictable and sporadic due to its multi-layered approach.  Certain 
keywords and websites may be blocked briefly or for long periods of time.  The block might be lifted 
during visits by foreign dignitaries or after the dates of sensitive anniversaries and Party meetings 
have passed, and blocks may only apply to certain cities.  Specific IP addresses can be assigned to 
have less restriction, either for those who have been granted approval, or given to foreigners 
without their knowledge.  For foreigners this can give the impression that all computers in China 
have that same access, or give a false sense of security, causing them to be more open in their 
activities and communication without realising they are being monitored.  Another reason for 
discrepancies in research stating what is, or is not, censored is the wide array of censoring practices 
and software used at the mid-level of the Golden Shield (King, Pan, and Roberts 2014; Qiang 2005).  
Different businesses use different software, in addition to the state wide filtering, which will yield 
different results.  Different locations also have an interest in blocking information that is unique to 
their area, such as issues concerning the local Party’s image; and self-censorship will vary amongst 
individuals and regions.  Tactics also vary depending on circumstances or who is in charge.  In some 
cases it might be deemed that allowing users to vent their frustration online can prevent escalation 
of an incident, whereas other times the opposite is true.  An alternative tactic is to flood comments, 
websites, or topic areas with the opposing view, so without removing something it has been made to 
look like a minority opinion.  A 2008 hearing before the USCC reveals a win-win type of IO: 
 
Access to websites such as YouTube, Blogspot, and Wikipedia have been unblocked these 
past months … Chinese authorities probably realized it made them look bad on the 
international scene and those websites have a limited audience in China, so blocking them 
was not worth the trouble. The BBC news website in English was recently unblocked, but the 
BBC Chinese news website was not… Xinhua, the state news agency, is releasing an 
increasing number of stories only in English about previously taboo topics, such as peasant’s 
riots, in a clear attempt to show the rest of the world that China is opening up, while keeping 
this information out of reach of most Chinese citizens (Access to Information 2008). 
 
Censorship of only the Mandarin language is also seen in the blocking of key word searches.  In 2011, 
microblogging websites blocked searches for the name “Hong Bopei”.  This was the Chinese name 
for the United States Ambassador to China, Jon Huntsman.  While searches for his English name 
continued to provide search results, searches for his Mandarin name yielded the message “according 
to the relevant laws, regulations and policies, the search results cannot be shown” (Page 2011).  This 
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incident was allegedly in response to photos and a video which had surfaced online showing 
Huntsman outside a Beijing McDonald’s restaurant during a pro-democracy protest which called for 
a Jasmine Revolution in China. 
 
This uncertainty and variation makes it difficult for an opposing force to develop an IOE campaign 
against China, and it limits criticism of the Golden Shield by foreigners, because it is fluid.  A report 
might claim that a specific website or term is blocked, but then there will be others who will dispute 
this because it is not the case in every city or on every day.  By avoiding detailed official statements 
of what is not allowed, China avoids some international scrutiny and condemnation, such as when 
the government issued its “11 Commandments of the Internet” in 2005 (Reporters Without Borders 
2005).  When an official statement is made, keeping terms vague allows China greater flexibility 
when deciding whether to punish various online activities, and the uncertainty causes more self-
censorship.  The root concern for China in its IOD is maintaining CPC control.  The following is a list 
key topics and words frequently blocked by the Golden Shield, which helps identify China’s 
perceived threats:  Arab Spring, collective action (protests, demonstrations, etc.), corruption, 
criticizing Party leaders (or publishing their family and income details), defending the Dalai Lama, 
divide between rich and poor, ethnic unrest, Falun Gong, forced relocation or land seizures, gambling, 
human rights abuses, mining incidents, pollution, poor construction practices such as revealed by 
collapsed schools during the Sichuan earthquake, pornography, pro-democracy, outbreaks of 
infectious disease (avian influenza H5N1, HIV/AIDS, SARS), Taiwan independence, Tiananmen Square 
incident, Tibet independence, terrorism (aid in), Xinjiang (East Turkestan) independence (Access to 
Information 2008; King, Pan, and Roberts 2014; Qiang 2005). 
 
Annual surveys conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences “suggest that Chinese 
attitudes support some varieties of government censorship” (Access to Information 2008). This 
might reflect a more communal culture and fear of oppression by foreign powers following the 
narrative of the Century of Humiliation (from the First Opium War in 1839 to Communist victory in 
1949).  While not as extensive, Western countries do regularly block Internet content dealing with 
sexual exploitation of children, various forms of hate speech, and some content that aids terrorism 
and criminal activity.  Further, the US PRISM program reveals a desire by some in the United States 
for increased surveillance.  In terms of IOD effectiveness, the Golden Shield offers China many 
advantages which are currently unavailable to the West.  At the same time China must carefully 
observe foreign press and consider possible outcomes, rather than blanket blocking and 
confrontational denouncements.  Here the line between IOE and IOD begins to blur comparable to 
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active defence (see Chapter 1).  China must listen to and understand the foreign audience in order to 
construct effective counter messages.  In some cases which are deemed highly sensitive, Xinhua is 
the only media outlet allowed to report on the matter, so that it can be closely controlled; all other 
media outlets are confined to reprinting the Xinhua article (China’s Propaganda and Influence 2009).  
In some cases minimal responses to foreign criticism, or no response at all (not taking the bait) is 
preferable.  Western media is often seen in China as being anti-Chinese, in part due to the high 
percentage of foreign articles which focus on the negative or threatening aspects of China, as 
opposed to positive stories covering the country’s rich history and alleviation of poverty.  While 
nationalism might help distract from censorship concerns domestically, it is also an IOD concern for 
the CPC because it could escalate beyond its control.  For example, during the 2008 Tibetan unrest 
there was widespread anger towards foreign media: 
 
Several foreign news media—especially those with websites enabling visitors to post 
comments—were flooded with messages repeating the government propaganda word-for-
word. Many foreign correspondents of such Western media such as CNN, BBC, and USA 
Today received death threats after their personal information was posted online. The 
website antiCNN.com was also launched. (Access to Information 2008). 
 
In addition to states, China must defend against foreign messages from non-state actors, particularly 
terrorist groups.  In 2013, China supported the UN Security Council’s anti-Internet terrorism 
resolution 2129 (Prevent cyberterrorism 2013).  China labels terrorism as one of the ‘three evils’, 
along with separatism and religious extremism.  Recent attacks have shown terrorists striking 
beyond Xinjiang and Tibet, with the 2013 Tiananmen Square attack and the 2014 Kunming railway 
station massacre.  Information gained on the internet can yield maps of installations, bus schedules 
to and from those installations, operating hours, photographs, telephone/e-mail directories, and so 
forth.  Much of this may be considered non-sensitive information on its own, but when pieced 
together it can reveal a picture which may have been deemed classified.  In this regard, China has 
pressured the United States to reduce the image quality of satellite photos provided by Google Earth, 
particularly those showing Chinese government facilities, stating that the United States “could be 
held responsible if terrorists used that information” to conduct an attack (Glanz and Markoff 2010).  
Additionally, the internet’s ability to identify specific groups based on ethnicity, belief, or affiliation 
has enhanced the ability of terrorists to recruit and target.  This can be used to identify individuals 
who may possess specialized access or knowledge, who can be targeted for recruitment or an email 
phishing campaign.  In terms of recruitment, many terrorist organisations operate their own 
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websites, complete with propaganda, donation collection, and information on how to join their 
cause.  China closely observed the US operations in Iraq, where Sunni insurgents have used the 
Internet to post articles and video which undermined coalition forces by glorifying terrorism, 
demonizing the coalition, and promoting their interpretation of events (Carfano 2008).  The Chinese 
Foreign Ministry has stated that the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) has "published many 
audio and video products to stir up so-called Jihad against the Chinese government in recent years” 
(China hails UN's anti-Internet terrorism resolution 2013).  It has been reported that Islamic militants 
from Xinjiang have joined the Islamic State in order to gain training which they can use to conduct 
attacks in China (Hui and Wee 2014).  Due to the global nature of the Internet, authorities have 
difficulty in shutting down these sites as the web host may be located in foreign states with varying 
laws, and alternative hosts can be set up relatively easily if one is shut down. Rather than try to shut 
down the source, the Golden Shield attempts to prevent these sites from being accessible in China.   
 
China faces several difficulties in maintaining IOD through the Golden Shield.  Readily available free 
web sources, such as blogs, photo uploading, video uploading, podcasts, torrents, and social 
networking sites have given powers to individuals that were once restricted to large media outlets. 
Attempts to block these new forms of distribution were seen during the 2009 Ürümqi riots, the 2008 
Tibetan unrest, the 2003 SARS outbreak, and numerous local protests.  While this is a primary 
concern for internal IOD, it also relates to external IOD, because average citizens from other states 
can take part.  Low cost, low entry level, the removal of distance, and a high level of anonymity 
reduce barriers for someone deciding to participate.  Redundant communication platforms and the 
rapid pace of technological change also make it difficult to defend against.  Foreign states acting 
within China have been using IOE against China, such as the US embassy in Beijing using Twitter to 
report on air pollution, often contradicting the Chinese government’s reporting (Wong 2013).  
Similarly, the US Consulate Generals in Hong Kong and Shanghai “have stood out for their use of 
playful language filled with trendy online [Chinese] expressions” to comment on “ hot social and 
political topics in China” (Tang 2012).  Several foreign organizations have voluntarily taken on the 
task of circumventing China’s internal censorship and making this information public (China Tightens 
Vice on Internet 2006; US in new push to break China internet firewall 2011; Mulvenon 2005).  
Difficulties associated with software, proxy servers, or VPNs were noted earlier, yet China must 
continually combat these to maintain control.  Both RFA and VOA have been developing alternative 
methods for getting their radio broadcast into Xinjiang and Tibet, including republishing of reports 
without identifying signatures, using “SMS to send short messages with proxy information, a peer-
to-peer system to distribute content, and Instant Messaging (IM) exchanges, which are less subject 
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to filtering than is email…” (Access to Information 2008).  Additionally, external IOD is concerned 
with information available across the Internet; it does not always have to reach China’s domestic 
audience to be damaging.  Foreign bloggers using commercially available satellite imagery have 
compromised Chinese military secrets on numerous occasions.  These non-governmental bloggers 
and private companies have uncovered Chinese aircraft carrier developments, a site used for 
developing submarine technology, sites used for spy satellite calibration, a training facility used to 
prepare for a potential conflict with India, and construction of the Wenchang Satellite Launch Center 
in Hainan (Aroor 2006; Gardner 2008; US Satellite Snaps China's First Aircraft Carrier At Sea 2011; 
Wolchover 2011).  Lastly, copyright infringement of multi-media remains an IO related Western 
criticism of China, yet cracking down on this would seem to align with China’s interest to reduce 
Western cultural influence.  Ironically, China has had some success in winning copyright 
infringement cases against the same companies which have on other occasions accused China of 
copyright infringement or intellectual property theft (see Apple loses another copyright lawsuit in 
China: Xinhua 2012; Chinese authorities find 22 fake Apple stores 2011; Jia and Yu 2009). 
 
China’s use of IO related lawfare, reveals some additional IOD capabilities.  China has sought greater 
inter-governmental control over the Internet, such as attempting to get the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) to turn control over to the UN, so they can have greater say 
in its evolution and reduce US influence (Hsu 2014; USCC Annual Report 2012).  China continues “to 
promote an Information Security Code of Conduct that advances a state-centric concept of 
cyberspace and seeks to impose state control of content in cyberspace” (US Department of Defense 
2014, 11).  Allegations of China violating its WTO obligations claim that China is not only blocking 
foreign websites but also redirecting users to their equivalent Chinese competitor.  Internet 
“customers in China upon requesting YouTube and Yahoo on their computers received an error 
message and were redirected to Baidu, China's leading search engine (Access to Information 2008).  
The Golden Shield can also slow down access to foreign websites.  This might be intentional, or it 
could simply be the result of the extra processing taking more time; either way it is harmful to 
business.  This has encouraged some foreign companies to relocate their business and servers to a 
location within China, where traffic will no longer need to go through the big gateways.  Not only 
does this promote economic development in China, but also once in China, these businesses can be 
subjected to additional laws requiring access to their facilities and products enabling the opportunity 
for reverse engineering.  Chinese law can also enhance their internal IOD by requiring foreign 
companies to be complicit with China’s censorship practices, or reveal the user’s personal 
information as was the case with pro-democracy activists Li Yibing and Jiang Lijun of Hong Kong who 
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were using a virtual dead drop (Yahoo Implicated In Third Cyberdissident Trial 2006).  Further, in 
relation to the Golden Shield, “the transfer of financial information from firms like Dow Jones, 
Reuters, and Bloomberg” must be submitted to Xinhua for government approval before it can be 
posted online.  Relaying financial information to customers quickly is essential for business, and 
providing this information to Xinhua, a business competitor, places these companies at a significant 
disadvantage.  In addition to advance access to this data, Xinhua has the legal authority to “to alter 
or delete any material they deemed offensive” (Access to Information 2008). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Information Operations (IO) influences actions through the orchestrated, non-hacking, control of 
online information.  This encompasses aspects of censorship, media, perception, propaganda, 
psychology, and public opinion.  Relevant literature can be consolidated, given the presence of three 
core characteristics: the Internet, non-hacking, and attempted sway.  This allows a more in-depth 
examination of IO’s full potential, rather than restricted and overlapping views such as the Three 
Warfares.  In comparison to other states, China exercises considerable control over domestic 
Internet activities and this increases the role of IO.  Other states would require hacking to 
accomplish some of the same actions, which hinders or prohibits their doing so.  Further, IO is linked 
with the other two branches of cyber warfare and plays an important part in China’s holistic 
approach.  Information Operations Exploitation revolves around communicating false, misleading, or 
true messages, intended to cause a desired response.  Information Operations Defence guards 
against undesirable communications by blocking, changing, or countering them.  In this sense, IOE is 
about sending messages, while IOD is about responding to messages.  These messages can take 
multiple forms on the Internet, from government reports and news to social media and memes.  
Information operations can be used during conflict or peace, and it can be aimed at external or 
internal audiences.   
 
A large number of government organisations are reportedly responsible for managing Chinese 
Information Operations (see Diagram 3).  For example, the Ministry of Public Security operates the 
Golden Shield, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology issues security standards and 
dealt with the Green Dam Youth Escort, and the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, 
Film and Television released a list of topics prohibited online.  Further, the Central Publicity 
Department has traditionally been responsible for internal IO, while the State Council Information 
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Office has been responsible for external IO.  While all of these entities likely provide input or 
supplementary actions related to IO, the current entities primarily tasked with IO appear to be the 
General Political Department and the SCIO.  A close partnership between these two could represent 
a more streamlined approach, and it bridges the gap between the State Council and Central Military 
Commission.   
 
In some ways, IOE is like a popularity contest or political campaign.  It can be used to boost 
perceived strength, soft power, and support for government policies.  Alternatively it can be used to 
intimidate, sow dissent, and weaken an adversary’s soft power.  In the 1990s, near the birth of the 
modern Internet, China began pursuing ways to improve its image through online means; and in the 
2000s, government officials began taking IO-related university coursework.  In addition to popularity, 
IOE can be used to subtly convey messages, such as indirectly informing nationalist hackers or 
protesters when they have the government’s support, or when they have gone too far.  Similarly, it 
can be used for sabre-rattling or signalling a likely response to a potential foreign action without 
committing to an official statement.  More unique forms of exploitation include copycat websites, 
steganography, and virtual dead drops.  IOE is most effective when the person conveying the 
message has a deep understanding of the topic, the transmission medium, and the target audience’s 
language and culture (both physical and online).  For this reason, external IOE can benefit from the 
credence and fluency of foreigners.  They can be enlisted directly or influenced through scholarships 
and special treatment, in order to shape their research or generate a positive view of China, which 
will carry into their messages.  Domestically, China is alleged to have recruited thousands of Internet 
commentators, in addition to those who conduct IOE voluntarily through shared beliefs and possibly 
the impact of internal IOE.  Tactics for shaping opinions includes the artificial inflation of the votes 
and view counts of particular articles, comments, and videos.  Blurring the line between exploitation 
and defence is the use of IOE to counter external IOE conducted by foreign states. 
 
A key component of China’s Information Operations Defence is censorship, and central to this is the 
Golden Shield.  China blocks or filters content at critical nodes (international gateways), and further 
content combing is done through a multi-level patchwork of participants and software.  These 
include varying practices used by businesses and Internet service providers, hired censors who 
manually check content, and self-censorship.  This dispersed variety and a lack of transparency give 
the appearance of unpredictable and sporadic censorship.  IO is concerned with perceptions, since 
these influence action, therefore blanket censorship is not an option.  Examples of specific deception 
tactics employed include drowning out negative messages through an overabundance of preferred 
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messages, and blocking Mandarin language content while allowing the same content in English.  The 
latter makes it difficult for a domestic audience to access, while simultaneously creating a false 
impression of openness among foreigners.  Under the guise of censorship China has also been 
accused of intentionally slowing, blocking, or redirecting access to foreign websites which are the 
business competitors of Chinese companies.  On the other hand, Chinese IOD faces several problems 
as the result of interference from foreigners.  These include the promotion of ways to circumvent 
the Golden Shield, backlash over copyright infringement, satellite imagery revealing the location and 
identity of multiple military installations and developments, and foreign embassies criticizing the 
government from within China on issues such as pollution.  In this regard, China is seeking 
cyberspace sovereignty.  Terrorist groups also pose IOD challenges through their enhanced ability to 
recruit and target online.  The Internet has given individuals powers which were once restricted to 
large media outlets, and these capabilities include characteristics of anonymity, the near-removal of 
distance, and a relatively low cost.  This exacerbates non-traditional security threats like corruption, 
criminal organisations, disease, pollution, protests, and natural disasters (particularly relating to 
building construction and emergency services response), because it allows criticism to spread.  
Despite some limitations, it is in China’s best interest to promote the growth of the Internet as it will 
boost the economy, improve education, and keep the nation competitive in the 21st century.  A 
careful balance, therefore, needs to be maintained between restriction and freedom.  
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Chapter Five 
 
Net-Centric Warfare 
 
Net-Centric Warfare (NCW) – also called Network-Centric Warfare – is synonymous, or significantly 
overlaps, with the terms informationization and the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).  Chinese 
government and military literature during the decade 2004-2014 predominantly used the term 
informationization.  However, in the absence of a consensus regarding terminology, this thesis 
favours NCW.  It predates informationization and is more conceptually precise with its inclusion of 
the word warfare; while the Revolution in Military Affairs, which in turn predates NCW, lacks the 
implications of net or network whereby NCW places an emphasis on the role of computer networks 
and has developed into a more specialized field than the broad concept of RMA.  Additional 
justification for this preference in terminology will be given throughout this chapter.  However, more 
important than the name applied is what these terms collectively denote.  They refer to the 
continuing technologic evolution of military equipment and operations, particularly towards the 
utilization of computers and computer networks.  These computers can be hacked; yet seldom over 
the Internet, as they tend to be closed networks or are in the process of being transitioned to closed 
networks to enhance security.  NCW is not only hacking into advanced military weapons and C4ISR 
(Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance), 
but also the use of those systems.  Examples include the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and 
precision strikes.  These might seem far removed from popular conceptions of cyber warfare when 
used offensively, yet they rely on computers, are susceptible to non-Internet hacking, and help 
provide an information advantage on the battlefield.  As will be demonstrated further in this chapter, 
this means NCW is distinct from computer network operations (CNO) and information operations 
(IO).  This is an important distinction which is too often neglected in the literature and can lead to 
misunderstanding.  At the same time, NCW shares significant similarities with the other two 
branches, and this warrants its inclusion under the umbrella term of cyber warfare. 
 
There are additional terms in common usage which connect with NCW, or are components of NCW, 
yet their relationship is not always made clear.  For example, Electronic Warfare (EW) or ‘dominating 
the electromagnetic spectrum’ is an element of NCW, and it has a large body of literature in its own 
right.  EW includes radio waves, microwaves, infrared, ultraviolet, and X-rays, used for military 
communication, radar, weaponry, and situational awareness.  Just as cyberspace has been declared 
the fifth domain of warfare, on occasion, so too has the electromagnetic spectrum (Bronk 2011; 
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Chase, Engstrom, Cheung, Gunness, Harold, Puska, and Berkowitz 2015; Clifford 2014; International 
Institute for Strategic Studies 2015; Krekel, Adams, and Bakos 2012; USCC Annual Report 2007; US 
Department of Defense 2013).  This thesis views them together, under cyber warfare, as the fifth 
domain of warfare62.  Another term found in Chinese literature is Integrated Network Electronic 
Warfare (INEW).  Some reports suggest that INEW is a combination of the EW component of NCW 
and the attack component of CNO, possibly stemming from an increase in the area of responsibility 
of the 4PLA which traditionally only dealt with EW (Krekel 2009; Krekel, Adams, and Bakos 2012).  If 
that is the case, this pairing could be lost in future shuffles of organisation, particularly since a 
holistic approach and pairing of core architectures seems better suited to productivity (International 
Institute for Strategic Studies 2015; Tol, Gunzinger, Krepinevich, and Thomas 2010).63  Further, 
additional reports note disagreement amongst Chinese officials themselves as to what INEW 
denotes, and they make direct comparisons to the term NCW (Salmon 2008; Thomas 2004, 3; 
Thomas 2005; Wilson 2007).  Another term found in Chinese literature, called ‘system of systems’, 
refers to attempts to link all of the various military networks and weapons platforms together, so 
they can be used in coordination and share information (International Institute for Strategic Studies 
2015).  System of systems, including its discussion of the ‘cognitive, information, and physical 
domains’, is directly taken from NCW and RMA literature which predates China’s use of the term.  
This, therefore, reinforces this thesis’ use of NCW as the preferred branch title.  Finally, the term 
Anti-access Area Denial (A2/AD) is firmly rooted in the use of NCW, as well as exploiting the 
weaknesses of an NCW-reliant opponent.  In essence, A2/AD literature discusses the use of NCW 
under the set conditions of two countries at different NCW development stages, with the more 
advanced state pushing in on the coastal border of the less advanced state. Common components of 
A2/AD discussion, such as anti-satellite weaponry, jamming, over-the-horizon targeting, radar, ship 
destroying missiles, and stealth bombers, are all tied to NCW.  Some individual components of 
A2/AD, like hacking into NIPRNet to delay force deployment, belong to CNO, yet the majority of 
components frequently discussed in A2/AD articles are firmly connected to NCW.  It is the non-
                                                          
62 One difficulty with viewing the electromagnetic spectrum and EW as their own domain is that there is 
significant overlap with the existing domains.  Air, land, sea, and space all utilize the electromagnetic spectrum 
for communications, operations, or weaponry.  Linking EW to its parent category of NCW and the even larger 
category of cyber warfare reduces the risk of creating an inefficient overabundance of domains.  Further, 
cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum share the core similarities of utilizing computer networks, 
having an information foundation, being susceptible to hacking, and being an intangible dimension (US 
Department of Defense 2014). 
63 Computer network attack, defence, and exploitation all require the same equipment and skillset, whereas 
electronic warfare requires different equipment and training.  Further, computer network exploitation can 
transition seamlessly to attack.  Therefore, it seems unproductive to separate the attack portion and place it 
under another department.  INEW might yield some novel combinations, yet these can still occur without 
direct departmental grouping, and those combinations are not necessarily any better than other combinations 
which might occur from the random pairing of branch subcomponents.   
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Internet connected computer networks and proliferation of technology which has made A2/AD 
distinct from discussions of CNO and traditional war scenarios. 
 
Exploring these terms and concepts presents a structural challenge as there is significant overlap and 
interweaving.  As such, this chapter will begin with a discussion of RMA, because RMA is the oldest 
of these NCW-related terms and it is the broadest.  Next this chapter will examine NCW specifically, 
followed by its sub-element EW, and the set conditions of A2/AD.  After this base has been 
established it will be more conducive to show how the preferred Chinese term of informationization 
is a relabelling of the earlier concepts of RMA and NCW, and why this thesis prefers to use the term 
NCW even in the context of Chinese cyber warfare.  The informationization subsection will also 
examine China’s current NCW capability and goals.  In reality every section in this chapter is about 
the development path of China, even though the terminology may initially appear to be US-centric.   
 
 
Revolution in Military Affairs 
 
The Revolution in Military Affairs is a theory about the future of warfare, and to a lesser degree, a 
theory about a cyclical pattern of paradigm shifts throughout military history.  The current RMA 
(hereafter simply referred to as RMA64) is heavily influenced by the technologic changes of the 
information age, which may have the potential to yield a dramatic increase in military capability and 
effectiveness.  It is not a single technology which constitutes RMA, but rather the cumulative effect 
of multiple technologic advancements.  Further, while technologic change is the driving force behind 
it, RMA also refers to changes in doctrine, operational methods, strategies, tactics, training, and 
organisation which make use of those technologic changes.  A precursor to the concept of RMA 
began in Soviet military literature in the 1970s and 1980s.  This concept was adopted and expanded 
on by the defence community of the United States.  The Gulf War (1990-1991) is seen as the first 
example of RMA being implemented in a full scale conflict.  The US military’s speed, coordination, 
precision, low casualty rate, and overall technologic dominance in this war, increased interest in the 
study of RMA domestically and internationally, including in China (Bronk 2011; Chase, Engstrom, 
Cheung, Gunness, Harold, Puska, and Berkowitz 2015; Metz and Kievit 1995; Thomas 2004, 47-48; 
Thomas 2007, 71).  US technologic superiority and interest in RMA has continued, most notably with 
                                                          
64 If RMA is viewed as a recurring phenomenon, then there are multiple RMAs throughout history.  This section 
is focused on examining the current RMA, but will refrain from continually labelling it as “the current” RMA 
throughout. 
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the Kosovo War (1998-1998), the War in Afghanistan (2001-2014), and the Iraq War (2003-2011).  In 
2004 Vice President Richard Cheney stated: 
 
With less than half of the ground forces and two-thirds of the military aircraft used 12 years 
ago in Desert Storm, we have achieved a far more difficult objective . . . . In Desert Storm, it 
usually took up to two days for target planners to get a photo of a target, confirm its 
coordinates, plan the mission, and deliver it to the bomber crew. Now we have near real-
time imaging of targets with photos and coordinates transmitted by e-mail to aircraft 
already in flight. In Desert Storm, battalion, brigade, and division commanders had to rely on 
maps, grease pencils, and radio reports to track the movements of our forces. Today, our 
commanders have a real-time display of our armed forces on their computer screen 
(Raduege 2004). 
 
Key changes associated with RMA include precision strikes and improved C4ISR, as well as a push 
towards streamlined and rapidly deployable forces such as special operations forces.  However, the 
latter may reflect the mission needs of recent conflicts; this could change in the event of conflict 
between technologically advanced near-peer competitors.  In either case RMA may represent a shift 
from centres of gravity,65 like massed forces, towards a “more sophisticated notion of interlinked 
systems” (Metz and Kievit 1995).  For example, dispersed and interchangeable assets could provide 
increased efficiency and redundancy, comparable to peer-to-peer software and cloud computing.  
RMAs are composed of multiple minor and major technological and organisational advancements.  
Not every minor change must be adopted in order to remain a top military competitor.  Indeed, 
perusing every minor advancement can overstretch resources, reduce efficiency, and create 
weaknesses.  However, major changes in the conduct of war, revolutionary components which will 
endure for decades or centuries, cannot be ignored without falling behind the competition. 
 
A commonly held belief among RMA analysts is that the Revolution in Military Affairs will have at 
least two stages.  The first stage is comprised of components which have become increasingly 
familiar, such as improved C4ISR, global positioning systems, information dominance, 
interoperability, jointness, missile defence, precision strikes, and stealth.  These in turn create 
characteristics which are associated with RMA.  For example, guided munitions or smart bombs have 
reduced casualties and collateral damage.  Similarly, improved situational awareness, including the 
ability to identify friendly or foe positions on a battlefield, has reduced friendly casualties while 
                                                          
65 The Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, viewed centres of gravity as focal points, the disruption 
of which can cause a system to collapse (Clausewitz 2013; Echevarria 2002).  
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increasing the tempo and lethality of operations.  There is no definitive source which outlines which 
technologies belong to the first or second stage, yet the second stage is generally believed to still be 
in its infancy and will result in a more fundamental change in the conduct of warfare than the first.  
Elements which have been associated with the second stage of RMA include attempts to manipulate 
the ionosphere, like the High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program (HAARP); biotechnology 
and mind-machine interfaces; clean bombs, including theoretical antimatter weapons which would 
reduce nuclear fallout; lasers, such as the field tested Laser Weapon System; nanotechnology; 
robotics; the use of holographic imagery; and the weaponization of outer space (Fritz 2008, 43-44; 
Kurzweil 1999; Osborn 2014).  One subcategory of robotics is powered exoskeletons, which could 
allow soldiers to carry heavier loads and wield larger weapons while simultaneously increasing their 
hiking endurance.  Further, these exoskeletons would aid logistical crew by improving their ability to 
load heavy armaments, equipment, and supplies.  Non-lethality is also a frequently discussed feature 
of RMA, which could include the use of adhesives and foams, or directed energy weapons such as 
acoustic, electromagnetic pulse (EMP), and microwave weapons.  Acoustic weapons have already 
been used to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden, and the United States temporarily deployed a 
microwave weapon, the Active Denial System, in the War in Afghanistan (Evers 2005; Pike 2011).  
Additional components which have been ascribed to the second phase of RMA include increased 
soldier protection, such as nanotechnology enhanced body armour; “instantaneous global 
communications” including mobile phones; and “the pervasiveness of the electronic media”, such as 
a soldier being able to see the battlefield and troop positions in real-time on a tablet device or heads 
up display (Metz and Kievit 1995).   
 
As previously stated, RMA encompasses multiple technologic advancements which create an overall 
picture, yet the advancements which will truly stand out might only be clearly known in retrospect.  
For this reason not all authors include the same items, and it is the broad concept which is more 
important.  This is exemplified by authors Sean J. A. Edwards and Martin Libicki of the Rand 
Corporation who have written about BattleSwarm tactics and “fire ant warfare” in which thousands 
of small machines could swarm a target (Edwards 2004; Libicki 1994).  Other authors discuss swarm 
tactics, but in a different context.  For example, soldiers could present problems in a chat room 
environment where globally dispersed experts could collaborate on solutions, and information can 
be gathered from a decentralized source, reminiscent of BitTorrent.66  Further, networked troops 
can operate in smaller units with loose formation, because they have greater awareness of friendly 
                                                          
66 BitTorrent is a peer-to-peer file sharing protocol.  Rather than download a file from a single source, 
BitTorrent allows a user to download pieces of a file from multiple sources simultaneously, in a swarming 
technique, and assemble those pieces into the complete file.   
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and foe positions; if a unit comes under fire or locates a valuable target, the other units can swarm 
to their position.  These dispersed, yet connected, small units can cover more ground and are more 
difficult for an enemy to target (Wilson 2007).  RMA analysts might dispute the feasibility or 
originality of particular systems, yet the broad elements of nanotechnology, networked systems, 
robotics, and semi-autonomous systems will likely remain an element of RMA.  Beyond the two 
phases of RMA development, there is also a cyclical pattern to RMAs which begins at relative 
equilibrium.  This equilibrium is disrupted by the implementation of new technologies.  Once this 
collection of various technologies reaches a critical mass, there are consolidation and response 
periods before returning to stasis.  It is uncertain which technologies or plans of implementation will 
survive the consolidation and response periods.   One of the difficulties of implementing RMA is 
attempting to decide which elements to adopt.  Perusing all of them could cause bankruptcy or 
confusion, yet there are advantages to early adoption of elements that are able to endure 
successfully.  Some analysts advocate focusing modernization efforts on the second, more 
fundamental, stage and advancing at a more moderate and cautious pace. 
 
States attempting to utilize RMA face a number of challenges, and these challenges remain present 
in the NCW and informationization iterations discussed later in this chapter.  RMA is most effective 
against a mid-level opponent, one which has a “rigid centralized decision making” process and relies 
on “limited range, easy-to detect, weapons platforms such as tanks, conventional artillery, and 
manned aircraft” (Metz and Kievit 1995).  Peer-level adversaries possess comparable abilities, which 
can offset the dramatic advantage seen against mid-level opponents; they also understand common 
RMA-associated weaknesses, and can bolster their defences or create countermeasures accordingly.  
At the other end of the spectrum, low-level opponents, such as terrorists, tend towards asymmetric 
and guerrilla warfare which can exploit the weaknesses of an RMA-reliant force.  They are often 
widely dispersed, operate in cells, blend in with the civilian population, and “emit a limited 
electronic signature”, all of which erode opportunities for targeting and make a clear cut victory 
difficult to determine.  Similar to computer network attack and computer network defence, a 
terrorist organisation might only need to identify one weak point for an attack to have the desired 
impact, whereas the defender must consider all possible exploits.  The complex nature of advanced 
technology and its propensity towards networks could present a greater attack surface for 
adversaries.  Further, over-reliance on these technologies could cripple an RMA force in the event of 
a system failure.  Discontinuing the old ways of operating could significantly hinder their 
reintroduction should they once again be deemed necessary, yet maintaining both is costly and 
inefficient.  Additionally, if systems become too complicated or the bugs are not fully worked out, 
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they can become counterproductive.  There is also a high financial cost associated with advanced 
technology and attempting to completely restructure how forces are organised and operate.  The 
technology itself is rapidly changing, which makes it hard to keep pace.  Additionally, the more that 
states invest in RMA, the more adversaries will invest in countermeasures, and this exacerbates the 
cost factor.  One example is the use of a multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) 
to counter ballistic missile defence; another is the cost of an ASAT or laser versus the cost of 
launching and operating a satellite.   
 
Despite reduced casualties on the side of the RMA advanced force, and claims of reduced collateral 
damage, many of the elements of RMA, such as non-lethality, precision strikes, and robotics carry 
ethical concerns and new challenges.  Precision air strikes, for example, have become the accepted 
norm for advanced militaries.  A return to carpet bombing would cause a severe backlash, and yet 
precision strikes themselves are a regular source of international outcry.  Without a human presence 
on the ground, it can be difficult to disprove claims of civilian casualties or conduct battle damage 
assessment, and global communications have dramatically increased the ability of those attacked to 
transmit opposing messages.  While heightened scrutiny over collateral damage is a noble cause, it 
also increases the expectations and financial cost of warfare.  The Israeli Defence Force has gone as 
far as dropping leaflets, telephoning neighbourhood residents, and using radio to warn of their own 
impending strikes.  They have also adopting a ‘roof knocking’ tactic in which a low yield explosive is 
detonated on the roof of a targeted building.  This rattles the building and acts as a final warning to 
evacuate, moments before the full strength missile strike (Israeli 'knock on the roof' bombing 
technique caught on film 2014).  Additionally, the use of drones has raised criticism of the 
dehumanizing effects of RMA.  Drone operators may be located on the opposite side of the planet 
from their drone and go about a normal life outside of work hours.  Furthermore, their use of a 
joystick and computer screen gives it the appearance of a video game, and critics feel this is causing 
a disassociation.  However, it can be argued that manned aircraft dating back to World War I have 
always been distanced from their targets, and many other weapon systems strike from a distance.  It 
is unclear at what point a strike would be considered ethical, if ever, under conditions of war, yet the 
criticism remains.  (Drone use will be discussed further in the following subsections of this chapter.)  
 
 
The Development of Net-Centric Warfare 
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Net-Centric Warfare is a theory about warfare in the information age that was promulgated by the 
United States’ Department of Defense and US armed forces from the 1990s (Alberts, Garstka, and 
Stein 2000).  In essence, NCW is the application of information and communication technology (ICT) 
to provide a battlefield advantage.  More specifically, NCW seeks to integrate ‘command’, ‘sensors’, 
and ‘shooters’ into a shared network (discussed below).  This can enhance coordination, information 
sharing, lethality, precision, situational awareness, speed of command, speed of communication, 
and tempo of operations.  Further, it allows for distributed weapon assignments, engagement from 
greater distances, geographically dispersed collaboration, an increased range of missions capable of 
being undertaken, rapid target assessment, a reduction of combat unit sizes (which in turn allows 
them to travel lighter and faster), and superior decision-making (Electronic Warfare 2007; NCW 
Roadmap 2007; Network-Centric Warfare: Creating a Decisive Warfighting Advantage 2003).  In turn, 
all of these can improve overall combat effectiveness and efficiency.  Net-Centric Warfare is not only 
known as Network-Centric Warfare (as noted above), but is largely interchangeable with the terms 
Network Centric Operations and Future Combat Systems; NCW literature often notes the goal of 
obtaining an information advantage, information dominance, or information superiority (Raduege 
2004; Wilson 2007).  Use of these information terms can lead to misunderstanding, particularly in 
mass media, such as falsely assuming these networks are Internet-connected.  ICT enables NCW, but 
these technologies need not be connected to the Internet as that would reduce their security.  
‘Information superiority’ becomes clearer when considering the range of items which can be viewed 
as ‘information’ in warfare (see Thomas 2004, 39).  For example, the locations of friendly, foe, and 
neutral people on a battlefield is valuable information and it can be transmitted as data.  The 
Internet has become so pervasive that it has become common to associate all computers as having 
an Internet connection (a trend which has expanded to mobile phones as well).  Yet computers 
existed before the Internet, and modern weapons and weapons platforms, such as sniper rifles or 
the F-35 aircraft, utilize computers in their operation (American Sniper: Chris Kyle Interview 2012; 
McGarry 2014).  Similarly, hacking has become commonly associated with the Internet, yet these 
isolated computers and non-Internet networks can also be hacked.  US military officials have warned 
that deployed aircraft, ground systems, missiles, satellites, and ships are all vulnerable to hacking, 
and China has been specifically cited as perusing this capability (USCC Annual Report 2012).   
 
The Iraq War (2003-2011) is seen as a momentous occasion for the development of NCW, just as the 
Gulf War (1990-1991) was for RMA.  US troop levels were approximately 30 percent less in the first 
year of the Iraq War compared to the Gulf War, yet the Iraq War consumed 96 percent more 
bandwidth, suggesting the possibility that Washington was able to accomplish its goals with fewer 
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troops due to an information advantage (Raduege 2004).  This was despite the fact that NCW in the 
Iraq War was still deemed “transitional rather than transformational”; many of the NCW systems 
were being field-tested on a trial basis and not all units had the same level of networked equipment 
(Wilson 2007).  As with RMA, NCW is not only a collection of new technologies but also entails their 
optimal use through changes in doctrine, training, and organisation (Alberts, Garstka, and Stein 2000; 
Raduege 2004).  Much of what constitutes NCW will require further implementation, testing, and 
debate before it is fully developed.  Many computerized military systems are already networked, 
such as an unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) being controlled by an operator who is far 
removed from the battlefield.  The operator can receive orders from command in additional 
locations, or receive input from soldiers on or near the field of battle.  Using NCW terminology, the 
operator is the ‘shooter’ and the UCAV is the ‘sensor’ and weapon platform.  Soldiers on the field 
providing additional input (battlespace awareness) are also ‘sensors’, and the commander giving 
orders or determining tasking is the ‘command’.  Each of these computerized inputs are a node 
within the network.  Some NCW authors also discuss physical, information, and cognitive domains.  
The physical domain is the tangible environment, such as the sensors, platforms, and shooters.  
Information gathered by the sensors is transmitted as data through the information domain and 
processed by human recipients in the cognitive domain (the human brain) (Ahvenainen; Alberts, 
Garstka, and Stein 2000; Cyberspace Operations 2013; Information Operations 2012).  As another 
illustrative example of existing computerized information networks,67 a strike aircraft can 
communicate with command, receive supplemental radar information from Airborne Early Warning 
and Control aircraft, and utilize global positioning system (GPS) satellite or ground assisted laser 
guidance68 targeting.   
 
One of the proposed goals of NCW is to link all of these existing networks under one unified network, 
creating a ‘system of systems’, and linking all branches of the armed services together to create a 
synchronization like RMA’s interoperability and jointness.  Efforts to create an overarching network 
are still in development.  One possibility being pursued by the United States is the Global 
Information Grid (GIG), which seeks to interconnect all sensors, shooters, weapons platforms, and 
command and control.  The GIG initiative seeks to coalesce the United States Air Force’s C2 
Constellation, the Army’s LandWarNet, and the Navy and Marine Corps’ FORCEnet programs (Wilson 
                                                          
67 Being computerized is a key feature of NCW, otherwise ‘information networks’ have a much longer history.  
A ground unit using radio to call in close air support could be viewed as an information network.  Similarly, 
satellite and aerial imagery has been used in battle planning since their inception, the difference in NCW is the 
speed with which this information can be obtained, digested, shared, and implemented into planning due to 
ICT advancements. 
68 A laser can be pointed at a target by ground forces.  Known as ‘painting a target’, the laser radiation scatters 
off from the target and provides a source for the missile to lock onto. 
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2007).  A supplemental goal of this interconnection is to create an environment where information is 
‘pulled’ rather than ‘pushed’.  Traditionally information is pushed down the chain of command to 
those who need it; this is sometimes instigated by a request from the lower levels, or the higher 
levels attempt to anticipate the needs of the lower levels.  Under a unified network, all information 
could theoretically be accessed (pulled) on demand by “authenticated users within a given 
community”, thereby reducing the amount of time it takes for dissemination and promoting greater 
depth of “information sharing and collaboration” (Wilson 2007; Raduege 2004).69  This partially non-
linear decentralized approach to command and control would also give more freedom to individuals 
and tactical units (Alberts, Garstka, and Stein 2000).   
 
The inevitability, and some of the risks, of networked systems can be illustrated further using the 
above mentioned unmanned aerial vehicle networks.  While the use of these ‘drones’ (as UAVs and 
UCAVs are commonly referred to) remains contentious, their numbers and use continue to rise and 
additional markets are opening up (see Fritz 2013a).  The International Institute for Strategic Studies 
identified 807 drones in active service around the world not including any that may be in use by 
China, Turkey, and Russia (Rogers 2012).  As of 2013, some estimates placed the number of enemy 
combatants killed by US drones at 4,700, and this figure has likely risen following American-led 
intervention in Iraq and Syria against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant which began in 2014 
(Knox 2013; Dwyer 2013).  According to an article in The Wall Street Journal, the US Air Force has 
“staked its future on unmanned aerial vehicles” with drones accounting for 36 percent of all new 
planes in its proposed 2010 budget and plans “to buy as many as 375 Reapers” (Gorman, Dreazen, 
and Cole 2009).  The Global Hawk reconnaissance UAV, and Predator and Reaper UCAVs, rely on 
satellites to communicate globally with command and control (Norris 2010, 230-232; Wong and 
Fergusson 2010, 59).  UAVs have already come to the attention of hackers.  Insurgents in Iraq and 
Afghanistan used a 26 USD off-the-shelf software program called SkyGrabber, from Russian company 
SkySoftware, to capture unencrypted Predator video feeds.  SkyGrabber accesses data being 
broadcast by satellites, allowing users to tune into different data streams comparable to tunning in 
broadcast radio stations (Ward 2009).  This did not allow the insurgents to control or disrupt the 
UAVs; it only permitted them to eavesdrop on the signals being sent.  This, however, bore a number 
of alarming implications.  First, of all types of satellite operators the military is thought to implement 
the highest level of security measures, and yet encryption was not being used.  Once this particular 
weakness was exposed it had to be fixed, which added cost to the program, took time to implement, 
and reduced the efficiency of the equipment.  Secondly, the information gained by insurgents might 
                                                          
69 The aforementioned cloud computing (see Chapter 2) would suit this purpose and provide redundancy, if a 
secure non-Internet version is developed. 
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have revealed the areas that were under surveillance and patterns of drone use, providing them 
with information they could use to avoid detection or set up an ambush (Gorman, Dreazen, and Cole 
2009).  Further, while SkyGrabber did not allow hackers to take control of the UAVs, control and 
other hacking options remain theoretically possible.  Under asymmetric warfare, exploiting 
weaknesses in drones and an opponent’s reliance on them could be used as part of a larger “blinding 
campaign” (Krepinevich 2010; Tol, Gunzinger, Krepinevich, and Thomas 2010).  As Captain J. W. 
Rooker of the US Marines states, “If an enemy can disable or destroy the satellites on which these 
systems depend, or hack, jam, or spoof them, he will have effectively gouged out our eyes” (Rooker 
2008).  
 
Net-Centric Warfare not only utilizes networked systems but also denies an adversary’s use of such 
systems while protecting one’s own.  The increased range of conducting warfare, as well as the new 
targets and types of targets these systems present, has expanded the battlefield (Thomas 2004, 28).  
Further, the reduced size of deployed forces, data hubs, and critical network nodes could become 
concentrated high value targets.  Despite NCW’s goals of increasing information sharing through 
networked systems, not all information from every system is meant to be shared with each node.  If 
this were to occur, it could result in information overload, increased bandwidth demands, reduced 
speed, and security or command and control concerns.  The degree to which nodes are to be 
connected must be determined by examining the roles and responsibilities of each entity.  This 
relates to the above observation that NCW represents more than advancements in ICT; it also 
concerns changes in doctrine, training, and organisation.  The goal is to create sets of 
interconnections which can enhance situational awareness and decision making through greater 
availability of information.   Commanders must be able to “allocate, assign, and employ assets and 
then modify these allocations, assignments, and employments as awareness of the situation changes” 
(Alberts, Garstka, and Stein 2000).  In addition to the swarm tactics discussed in RMA, sensors can 
also be tasked to focus on an area of interest or to fill in gaps in the network due to deficiencies in 
capability or the destruction of platforms.  This introduces an element of redundancy and self-
healing into the network.  Net-Centric Warfare is a holistic evolution of traditional military 
equipment, doctrine, training, and organisation.  The wide range of systems being incorporated into 
NCW, along with the technical aspects, are beyond the scope of this thesis.  However, some 
recurring concepts are examined in the following paragraphs to provide a deeper understanding of 
NCW.  These include architectural aspects of NCW, improved targeting capability, software 
interfaces, improved logistics, and problems or concerns with implementing NCW.   
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Exploring the architecture of an NCW system of systems is complicated by the wide variety of 
systems which states are attempting to incorporate, the classified nature of the topic, and the use 
and modification of commercial ICT products to suit closed military networks.  Military radio (voice 
communications) alone has a long and complex history dealing with the delineation of frequency 
bands, interoperability of equipment, cryptography, and ensuring secure transmissions.  NCW is not 
only attempting to incorporate this, but also all communications, command and control, sensors, 
shooters, and platforms, across all military branches.  Each of these are large and diverse categories.  
One need only consider how many different types of weapons platforms there are.  Within these 
elements several systems have already been formed, such as multiple air defence, intelligence, 
navigation, radar, reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting, and weather forecasting systems.  These 
systems can be components of larger systems, and each is comprised of varying technical 
specifications, hardware, software, and means of connectivity.   Some networking efforts, such as 
creating tactical data links70 between nodes, have undergone development in an isolated fashion by 
being restricted to specific programs or service branches.71  This adds to the difficulty of creating a 
comprehensive system, as well as the difficulty of researching this topic.  Tying all of these systems 
together while maintaining security, reliability, and speed is a significant undertaking.  However, the 
limitations of science and technology may have forced some initial conformity, because there are 
only a select number of ways to transmit and receive data effectively and efficiently.  This 
conformity will be helpful in integrating these systems; however, it also has the unintended 
consequence of furthering the misconception of Internet connectivity.  NCW appears to be built on 
common elements found within Internet architecture, such as fibre optic cables, the use of Internet 
Protocol (IP), Internet-like routers, satellites which rely on radio and microwave transmissions, and 
line-of-sight towers (comparable to those used for mobile phones) to provide a high-bandwidth 
communication backbone (Wilson 2007; Raduege 2004).  In some cases these are modified for 
enhanced security, and NCW does use some methods which are uncommon within Internet 
architecture, like infrared, or lasers used for concentrated burst transmissions.  Given NCW 
developmental status, some networks which will ultimately become a part of this system of systems 
may currently possess limited Internet connectivity.  The end goal is to remove these connections 
                                                          
7070 Tactical data links can provide ‘beyond voice’ information sharing, including command assignments, 
imagery, radar and target information; the operator’s health status and vital signs; and the platform’s status, 
such as real-time armament inventory, diagnostic, and fuel consumption information.   
71 Examples of varying networking programs across US service branches include Advanced Tactical Targeting 
Technology, Air Force Link 16, Army Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below, Army Warfighter 
Information Network and Joint Network Nodes, Joint Tactical Radio System, Navy Cooperative Engagement 
Capability, Standardized Tactical Entry Point, Transformational Communications Study, and Transformational 
Satellite Communications (NCW Roadmap 2007; Raduege 2004; Wilson 2007). 
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and rely on closed networks to enhance security.  For example, China has built “dedicated fiber-optic 
command and control networks” which are air-gapped from the Internet (Krepinevich 2010).  In 
addition to being separate from the Internet, they are “hardened and buried” to reduce the risk of 
NCW-style hacking, EMP, or physical destruction (Tol, Gunzinger, Krepinevich, and Thomas 2010).  
China has also been developing “new satellites for establishing a unique [military-only] GPS network” 
(Wilson 2007).  These are in addition to the previously mentioned closed network, which China is 
pursuing for classified information (Thomas 2004, 10-11).  Due to commonalities in hardware and 
software, some of the malware discussed in the CNO chapter could be effective under NCW, but the 
infection, communication, and exfiltrated data would not transmit directly over the Internet. 
 
Despite the enhanced security offered by closed networks, illicit access can still be gained through 
wireless (electromagnetic) connections or removable data storage, such as USB thumb drives, 
memory cards, or compact discs.  In 2012, for example, China was accused of using removable data 
storage to access a closed network at India’s Eastern Naval Command (USCC Annual Report 2012).  
Additionally, intruders can access these networks through the same fibre optics and wireless 
connections that legitimate users employ, if the networks are exploited or credentials are falsified.  
However, these networks may be more difficult to access than Internet networks because peripheral 
entry cannot be obtained through a commercial Internet service provider (ISP).  Further, their 
workings and technical specifications are likely to be classified and the networks are likely to be 
operated under high levels of security, including encryption, monitoring, and geographic proximity 
requirements.  The distinction between Net-Centric Warfare and Computer Network Operations is 
complicated by some overlapping grey area and combined effects, such as the previously discussed 
accusation that China eavesdropped on conference calls pertaining to classified F-35 designs.  In that 
case, CNO allegedly allowed China to obtain information on the F-35’s software and “secure 
communications and antenna systems” – information which could be used separately to exploit 
closed networks under NCW-style hacking or to degrade the effectiveness of NCW-enabled 
equipment (Reed 2012).  As another example of a grey area, the US military has sought the 
development of USB flash drives or similar devices which can act as automated forensic tools.  These 
tools can quickly extract intelligence from enemy combatant computers on site, such as during the 
raid of Osama Bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan and raids of the suspected homes of high value 
targets within Iraq (Cox 2014; Goodin 2009).  Fast retrieval limits the amount of time soldiers must 
remain in a dangerous position and it eliminates the need to transport heavy or cumbersome 
computers back to base.  The computers which are searched may or may not be Internet enabled, 
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yet such devices appear more in line with NCW than CNO because the data retrieval is occurring on a 
battlefield at its place of origin rather than over the Internet.   
 
The networking of sensors, shooters, and command has led to an increase in the tempo of 
operations and the effectiveness of targeting.  Illustrative of this is communication with missiles that 
allows their trajectory to be changed in-flight in the event that a target has moved, the target has 
already been destroyed, or commanders decide to abort the attack (Wilson 2007).  It also permits a 
missile to be fired by one platform at great distance, such as a ship, and then guided to its target by 
another platform which is closer to the target, such as an aircraft, in a move similar to passing a ball 
downfield in sports (Macri 2015).  This can extend the range and accuracy of missiles and reduce 
shooter casualties as drones could guide them in the final stage.  It also reduces the amount of 
ordnance these drones must carry, which enhances stealth, reduces fuel consumption, and increases 
the amount of time they can loiter over potential targets.  Bombers, too, have greater flexibility 
through networked data links and satellite-guided (smart) bombs, as improved targeting data or 
changes in the situational assessment may become available after take-off (Alberts, Garstka, and 
Stein 2000).  Separate strikes which had not yet occurred at the time of their departure can be taken 
into account and corrective measures incorporated.  Further, the time it takes analysts and 
commanders to identify targets through satellite or aerial imagery and issue orders against those 
targets has been reduced through the use of computer networks.  In the Gulf War this took up to 
four days, but by the time of the Iraq War this was reduced to around 45 minutes (Wilson 2007).  
The US ‘shock and awe’ campaign was not meant purely as a measure of destruction.  It also 
referred to the speed and accuracy with which a large number of critical targets were struck.  
Increasing the speed of decision making and actions is essential as there is limited time to “detect, 
track, classify, and engage targets” (Alberts, Garstka, and Stein 2000).  Improved sensor technology 
has increased the efficiency and effectiveness of strikes.  This is in part due to advancements in 
technology and control of the electromagnetic spectrum (discussed in detail below); however, it is 
also due to computerized networks allowing multiple sensor data to be rapidly shared and utilized.  
Radar and thermal cameras are able to detect movement and heat signatures in rain or darkness, 
and aircraft equipped with smart bombs have the ability to conduct close air support during the poor 
visibility of sandstorms without suffering friendly fire (Wilson 2007).  Some networks, such as the 
previously noted Advanced Tactical Targeting Technology and Cooperative Engagement Capability, 
allow multiple aircraft and ships to combine their individual sensor pictures (including radar) to 
create a real-time composite image and air defence network.  This can allow ships to shoot at targets 
from great distances, targets they could not see through their own sensors alone, such as incoming 
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anti-ship missiles.  During the Iraq War, some Bradley Fighting Vehicles and M1 Abrams tanks 
“replaced paper maps and routine reporting by radio voice communication” with digital data (Wilson 
2007).  They were capable of pinpointing positions during adverse weather conditions, and they 
could be tracked and monitored by commanders overseas.  Additionally, some ground units field 
tested eyepiece displays and tablet-like devices for enhanced battlespace awareness, as well as 
lightweight short range drones and unmanned ground vehicles in order to see what was around 
corners or over hills (Raduege 2004).  
 
Battlespace awareness and the effectiveness and efficiency of networked military systems can be 
enhanced through computer aids and user interface software.  Linking together multiple systems, 
such as the previously mentioned radar, can create a larger picture, yet traversing that picture as a 
unified whole and making useful sense of it in a timely matter can be problematic.  This is 
particularly difficult when considering the large array of systems which NCW seeks to interconnect.  
Ultimately, NCW seeks to have a three-dimensional map of the battlefield comparable to a modern 
video game.  A user could zoom in on a single slice of the battle, such as a single firefight or the 
status of a single vehicle, and zoom out to see the entire theatre of operations, including overall 
statistics.  At any given scale, various components on the map and available types of information 
could be added or subtracted from display.  This map would need minimal lag time and distortions 
to be effective.  Some templates or models of recurring elements, known as common operation 
pictures (COPs), could help in this programming.  According to Alberts, Garstka, and Stein’s Network 
Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority, a standard COP might include 
the following four elements: 
 
(1) Location (current positions, rate of movement, and predicted future positions); 
(2) Status (readiness postures including combat capability, whether or not in contact, 
logistics sustainability, and so forth); 
(3) Available courses of action… [ability to call for air support or reinforcement, assessment 
of enemy capabilities, and the predicted enemy courses of action];  
(4) The environment (including current and predicted weather conditions, the predicted 
effect of weather on planned operations and enemy options, and terrain features such as 
trafficability, canopy, sight lines, and sea conditions). 
 
All of this information would be continually updated to include movements, changes, and battle 
damage assessment.  A simplified version of a COP has become common on commercial airlines – 
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individual passengers can view a map which displays their current altitude, heading, location (with 
an airplane shaped icon), and speed; it automatically zooms in and out, showing where they have 
been and where they are going, as well as displaying additional information such as which parts of 
the planet are in sunlight or darkness; and some planes also switch to a live video feed from a nose-
mounted camera during landings.  Military interfaces aim to have much more detail and interactivity 
than this, but it illustrates the technologic feasibility of such an undertaking.  The capability and 
usefulness of automated alerts, support, and helpful information might also be easier to accept 
when considering all of the alerts and pop-ups on a modern computer operating system, or even the 
‘check engine’ light on an automobile or the autopilot on an airplane.  Similar to the planning 
required to create COPs – decision aids,72 “doctrinal models”, and rule sets can be made to help 
users (soldiers) make decisions in minimal time which have the highest probability of success 
(Alberts, Garstka, and Stein 2000).  These are predetermined responses to set conditions, which a 
user can choose to employ, or in some cases can be set as an automated or semi-automated 
response.  Some systems, such as Northrup Grumman’s carrier based drone, the X47-B, and fly-by-
wire technology already rely on some autonomous programming (Skillings 2012; Weinberger 2012).  
Net-Centric Warfare does not entail relinquishing control to computerized systems.  Doing so would 
likely create a public backlash but there are some instances, such as logistical support, where 
automated systems would be beneficial and cause minimal ethical concerns.  Since they help to 
achieve stated goals, the amount of automated systems in use seems likely to increase as these 
systems develop.  Similar to RMA, robotics, nanotechnology, and biotechnology are a part of NCW 
which remains in the early stages of development.   
 
Some of NCW’s early concepts were derived by examining how advancements in ICT had improved 
operations in the business world, such as improving the ability to monitor competitor prices, 
customer satisfaction, inventory, production, shipping, and situational awareness, including machine 
malfunctions or low stock.  Orders can be taken and sent electronically, price changes determined by 
a head office can be set to occur automatically within stores, the bestselling products and trends can 
be identified and analysed, and customers can be sent to sister stores if an item is sold out.  As in 
NCW, these increase the speed of command and operations, allow operations and projects to be 
coordinated from great distances, allow well-informed decisions, free-up time and resources, allow 
smaller tactical units to conduct operations effectively, and limit a competitor’s plans and options.  
In both the commercial sector and networked warfare, the “relevance, accuracy, and timeliness” of 
information are crucial to success (Alberts, Garstka, and Stein 2000).  Increasing efficiency and 
                                                          
72 Those familiar with American football can relate this to the 2-point conversion playbook. 
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allowing portions of the team to participate from great distances reduces the number of personnel 
needed in the theatre of operations.  This creates a smaller battlefield footprint allowing forces to 
travel “lighter and faster”, including during the initial deployment phase (Wilson 2007).  For example, 
fewer soldiers and personnel mean less equipment, food, and supplies that need to be shipped.  
Once NCW infrastructure has been fully developed, this reduction in size could translate to a lower 
cost as the movement of information is cheaper than that of personnel and equipment.  Efficiency 
itself provides cost savings, and NCW provides multiple avenues for increasing efficiency and speed.  
For example, teleconferences for planning, virtual collaboration for problem solving, automated 
delivery orders for when supplies become low, and electronic manifests for shipping.  Previously 
supplies and soldiers had to be manually accounted for on clipboard and paper before departure; 
this time expenditure has been significantly reduced by using scanners and wireless identification.  In 
the theatre of operation, data links between platforms can also greatly enhance logistics.  Aircraft or 
vehicles can relay their status – whether it be items that need maintenance, fuel requirements or 
armament levels – to base or an aircraft carrier, so that these items and associated teams can be 
prepared to respond appropriately.  Ordnance or replacement parts, for example, might need to be 
moved to a staging area, which can be a timely process.  Additionally, knowing the status of damage, 
fuel consumption, and armaments can help commanders prioritize a queue for resupply or reassign 
platforms which are capable of responding to further missions without a return to base.  Other 
activities which are removed from fighting, yet integral to mission success, are also enhanced by 
ICT.73  Troops can communicate with family overseas on a more frequent basis through email, 
satellite phone, or video conference, which helps to increase morale.  Some troops and commanders 
who operate from great distances, such as drone operators, can maintain their normal off-duty 
activities in their home country.  Lastly, deployed troops no longer have to take leave for 
supplemental education and training programs as these can be conducted electronically. 
 
Implementing NCW presents multiple problems and concerns.  Complex electronic systems are 
subject to technical difficulties, interruptions to service, and even cascading failures.  If forces 
become too reliant on using information networks and are faced with a disruption to its service, they 
might no longer have the support or experience of previous warfare methods.  Maintaining backup 
systems and training would increase cost and occupational demands.  Further, if hackers are able to 
exploit NCW systems, they could introduce false data to send troops and missiles to the wrong 
                                                          
73 These may or may not be Internet connected.  They seem appropriate to discuss under NCW, however, as 
they are closely tied to the battlefield.  Further, where Internet connectivity does exist, a transition to closed 
networks is likely being perused, because adversary eavesdropping on these communications could 
compromise mission success (Wortzel 2014).  
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targets.  These problems are also relevant to essential logistics support, particularly in the build-up 
to war and deployment phases, which are increasingly reliant on information networks (Mulvenon 
1999).  Information overload, or signal-to-noise ratio, is another concern (Alberts, Garstka, and Stein 
2000; NCW Roadmap 2007; Wilson 2007).  Individuals could be presented with so much information 
that the useful parts get lost amidst the unessential information, or an overabundance of 
information creates a distraction and reduces response time.  As with computer network defence, 
there is concern that the software these systems use could be compromised by embedded 
backdoors (Thomas 2004, 45).  One way to overcome this is to require all software to be produced 
domestically and under strict security procedures; though, this would escalate the cost of an already 
expensive transformation.  Increasing security is often accompanied by a rise in cost and a decrease 
in speed.  The implementation of encryption, which slows down speed, demonstrates this; so does 
the costly hardening (shielding) of NCW equipment to protect against electromagnetic pulse attacks 
or natural phenomena like solar flares.  The use of commercial entities and Internet connections in 
developing NCW capabilities saves money at the cost of reduced security; although cost saving does 
not appear to have been the motive.  Rather, development of an NCW information backbone has yet 
(in 2015) to meet demand.  This does however present an interim problem.  During the first half of 
the Iraq War, approximately 80 percent of US satellite-enabled bandwidth was provided by 
commercial entities, placing them in greater danger of computer network attack and exploitation 
(Wilson 2007).  Even when robust closed networks are operational, bandwidth can pose problems as 
the volume of data that system of systems will generate is potentially enormous.  Beyond 
disruptions to service, a lack of timeliness can be a serious concern.  For example, in 2003 a US Army 
battalion was “surprised by a large force of Iraqi tanks and troops”, because their information 
network was “unable to update enemy information in databases quickly enough to keep front line 
units accurately informed” (Wilson 2007).  The challenge of creating interoperability among multiple 
developing systems is exacerbated by a need to cooperate with allies or engage in military 
operations other than war (MOOTW).  Partners will want a free-flow of information, while 
maintaining some restrictions for security purposes, and the ability to add or remove access as 
missions end or alliances change.   
 
 
Electronic Warfare 
 
Electronic Warfare (EW) is the use of the electromagnetic spectrum to enhance combat capability.  
As stated in this chapter’s introduction, some authors view EW as a distinct domain of warfare; 
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however, this thesis deems EW to be a component of NCW (Bronk 2011; Chase, Engstrom, Cheung, 
Gunness, Harold, Puska, and Berkowitz 2015; International Institute for Strategic Studies 2015; 
Krekel, Adams, and Bakos 2012; USCC Annual Report 2007; US Department of Defense 2013).  The 
electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), includes X-rays, ultraviolet, visible, infrared, microwaves, and radio, 
all of which are intertwined with NCW systems (see Figure 1).74  For example, sensors use the visible, 
infrared, and radio (radar) portions of the EMS to gather targeting information (Electronic Warfare 
2007).  This information is often transmitted as data to commanders and shooters via radio waves, 
and in some cases shooters use the EMS itself as a weapon, such as lasers and microwaves.  
Electronic warfare literature notes that EW has been used for more than a century, primarily as a 
means of communication; however, “new technologies” are ushering in an EW military “revolution” 
(Electronic Warfare in Operations 2009).  Even military radio communications, which must transmit 
through an increasingly crowded electromagnetic environment75 while maintaining secrecy and 
reliability, have become so complex that computers are required in their operation.  These and other 
recurring statements mirror the Revolution in Military Affairs and Net-Centric Warfare.  Common 
topics of EW discussion include the ability to act from great distances, C4ISR, integrated air defence, 
precision and non-lethal weapons, robotics, and situational awareness.  Further, EW theorists 
discuss how the spread of commercial ICT products, including a growing trend towards wireless 
technologies, has given less technologically advanced militaries and non-state actors the ability to 
compete in this arena; this correlates with NCW, as well as the upcoming section on anti-access area 
denial.  Additionally, EW seeks to enhance the capabilities of sensors, shooters, and command, and 
the primary means of transmitting information within NCW is wirelessly through the EMS.76  While it 
is explicitly addressed in EW, all of this chapter’s subsections involve military attempts to control or 
“dominate the electromagnetic spectrum” (Electronic Warfare in Operations 2009).  In other words, 
armed forces are developing ways to “exploit the opportunities and vulnerabilities that are inherent 
in the physics” of the electromagnetic environment (Electronic Warfare 2007).   
 
                                                          
74 The electromagnetic spectrum includes items which are technically relevant to CNO, since it includes Wi-Fi 
and all that is visible to the human eye; however authors discussing electronic warfare are overwhelmingly 
referring to the NCW aspects of cyber warfare. 
75 The US, EU, and NATO have assigned letter designations to widely used frequency ranges within the radio 
spectrum (see Figure 2).  Some generalizations can be made as certain applications tend to group within 
specific bands, such as roving telephone services and broadband communication using the C and Ka-bands 
respectively.  “Ultra-High Frequency, X-, and K-bands have traditionally been reserved in the United States for 
the military” (Space Security Index 2012).  Higher frequencies (shorter wavelengths) are capable of 
transmitting more information than lower frequencies (longer wavelengths), but require more power to travel 
longer distances.   
76 There is some use of fibre optic cables in NCW, but they are restricted to land and sea.  Cables by themselves 
cannot be quickly deployed, connect mobile platforms, or offer a comprehensive ability to act from great 
distances. 
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Electronic warfare is composed of three components: electronic attack (EA), electronic defence (ED), 
and electronic surveillance (ES).  Some EW literature uses slightly different terms for these three 
components; however, the ones chosen here are the same as those used by the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation.  They also have an added benefit of elegance, since they resemble CNO’s attack, 
defence, and exploitation components (Clifford 2014).  Some EW literature uses the terms electronic 
protection (EP) in place of electronic defence, and electronic warfare support (also ES), instead of 
electronic surveillance (Electronic Warfare 1999; Electronic Warfare 2007; Electronic Warfare in 
Operations 2009).  The definitions of ED and EP are interchangeable; however, surveillance and 
warfare support have different connotations.  This thesis uses ES to refer to both surveillance and 
warfare support collectively.  They already share the same acronym, and only together do they 
encompass all of the remaining elements of EW, which do not fall under attack or defence.  It is also 
important to note that there are some discrepancies between authors as to which component 
specific activities belong.  Some items which are described below under ED, for example, are 
described by others as “defensive electronic attack” under the category of EA (Electronic Warfare in 
Operations 2009).  Jamming transmissions is illustrative in that it could be considered defensive or 
offensive; it might prevent enemy precision weapons from being guided and triggered, or it might 
knock out enemy air defences.  In the absence of consensus on some categorization details, the 
following discussion is organised in what was deemed to be the most logical way for conveying the 
larger picture as it relates to NCW.  Regardless of subcategory, the following items are universally 
recognized as belonging to EW as a whole, and they utilize the electromagnetic spectrum.  The goal 
of EW is to obtain an advantage through the use of the EMS, to maintain unimpeded access to the 
EMS, and to deny an adversary’s ability to do the same.  EW supports military activities through 
various types of “detection, denial, deception, disruption, degradation, protection, and destruction” 
(Electronic Warfare 2007). 
 
Electronic attack (EA) involves using the electromagnetic spectrum to degrade, destroy, or neutralize 
an opponent’s equipment, facilities, people, platforms, and sensors.  EA includes the use of directed 
energy weapons, such as dazzler, electromagnetic pulse, laser, and microwave weapons.  Dazzlers 
can be used to disrupt the optics of surveillance satellites, or small-scale rifle-mounted dazzlers can 
be used to blind temporarily or confuse enemy combatants during a raid (Krepinevich 2010).77  Laser 
and microwave weapons include the previously mentioned US Navy’s Laser Weapon System and the 
Active Denial (microwave) System.  Anti-radiation missiles which lock-on to sources of radiated 
                                                          
77 China is alleged to have used a dazzler in 2006 to blind temporarily a US satellite.  Further, China allegedly 
possesses “free-electron and chemical oxygen-iodine high energy lasers” which could blind satellites 
temporarily or permanently (USCC Annual Report 2007). 
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energy, such as enemy radio emissions, are also EA weapons.  Infrared homing missiles, or heat 
seekers, are another type of anti-radiation missile.  Jamming, which will be discussed further below 
in relation to satellites, can degrade or prevent the use of enemy infrared, laser, and radar guidance 
systems.  Additionally, jamming can limit or prevent enemy communications and situational 
awareness sensors, thus degrading an opponent’s ability “to see, report, and process information” 
(Electronic Warfare 2007).   This, along with other aspects of EA, can also support PSYOPs and 
deception.  For example, control of the electromagnetic spectrum can allow transmissions and 
broadcasts to be hijacked and replaced with messages from the opposing side.  Further, intrusion or 
hijacking of signals allows for false information to be planted.  This deception can create confusion 
or fear within the target audience, or cause enemy forces to make misinformed decisions (Thomas 
2009, 105).  Purposefully radiating energy to create false targets, for instance, can cause an enemy 
to waste ammunition, be lured into a trap, or led away from friendly forces.  Lastly, electronic 
probing is considered a type of electronic attack.  Similar to the probing in computer network 
exploitation, the EMS can be used to reveal the function and capability of enemy systems, such as 
causing anti-aircraft systems to light-up (fooling them into activating) and reveal their location 
(Electronic Warfare in Operations 2009). 
 
Electronic defence (ED) protects equipment, facilities, people, platforms, and sensors from enemy or 
friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum which might degrade, destroy, or neutralize combat 
capability.  The need to defend against friendly EMS usage is a result of the complex nature of the 
electromagnetic environment (EME) and its increasing use by military and civilians alike which can 
create overcrowding.  Care must be given to the assignment of frequencies, electromagnetic 
compatibilities, and all around spectrum management (Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum 
Management Operations 2012).  Soldier education and training are important in minimizing an 
enemy’s ability to use the EME against them.  For example, understanding and vigilance on the 
battlefield can reduce unnecessary emissions which might be intercepted, jammed, or targeted by 
the enemy.  This can include following proper equipment calibration, installation, and procedures; 
keeping transmissions brief and avoiding the unnecessary transmission of highly sensitive 
information; reducing power consumption; and using a variety of technical techniques like 
directional antennas and spread spectrum78 (Electronic Warfare in Operations 2009).  To prevent 
espionage or embedded backdoors in the production chain of EW equipment, the acquisition of EW 
products can be restricted to trusted vendors who have obtained certifications and met required 
standards.  On a tactical level, ED includes the use of countermeasures which can protect against 
                                                          
78 Spread spectrum is a method that intentionally varies a transmission’s frequency to reduce an opponent’s 
ability to intercept or jam the signal. 
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bombs and incoming missiles.  Personnel and vehicles can use devices which jam the radio signals 
used to detonate some types of improvised explosive devices.  Chaff, decoys, smokes/aerosols, and 
pyrotechnics/flares can be deployed to impair enemy “precision guided weapons and sensor 
systems” (Electronic Warfare 2007).  Further, stealth technology evades electronic attack and 
detection by absorbing and redirecting radar waves, and by minimizing its visible and infrared 
signatures, such as the use of internal weapons bays and exhaust techniques.  Camouflage is another 
type of electronic defence (Thomas 2007, 122, 296-297).  Low-technology methods include hiding 
among civilians or using natural terrain and foliage to conceal troops, vehicles, and facilities from 
detection by aerial and satellite imagery (Thomas 2009, 105).  Camouflage clothing, nets, and paint, 
which are relatively low-tech, are increasingly relying on computers to generate sophisticated design 
patterns and reduce thermal signatures (Thomas 2009, 104).  Meanwhile, research and development 
(R&D) is underway on new types of camouflage such as cloaking devices and an “electric field-
induced” chameleon film which can change colour to suit the environment (Thomas 2009, 102; Mark 
2008; Winkler 2003).  Additional R&D points towards a rise in high technology and attempts to 
master the EME.  These include the application of bionics and plasma to stealth design; adding 
chemical compounds to water fumes to absorb infrared, radar, and other EMS waves; the use of 
nano-ceramic materials to reduce radar signatures; and the use of specialized paint which can 
reduce a vehicle’s surface temperature (Thomas 2009, 102, 107).  All of these reduce an enemy’s 
ability to sense, shoot, and command.   
 
Electronic surveillance (ES) is the use of the electromagnetic spectrum to enhance intelligence and 
situational awareness.  Night vision goggles are one type of ES which is frequently portrayed in 
popular culture, and are a technology which is becoming increasingly accessible to civilians through 
commercial entities.  ES detects, locates, identifies, and evaluates sources of electromagnetic 
radiation.  As examples, this can yield the location of enemy forces and provide an assessment of 
their equipment, or it can provide intercepted transmissions such as the previously discussed 
SkyGrabber software, which captured unmanned aerial vehicle video feeds.  It is, therefore, a source 
of information which can be used to conduct electronic attack, improve electronic defence, task 
weapons and sensors, and make informed command decisions.  The significant overlap between ES 
and signals intelligence (SIGINT) suggests the two terms may be consolidated in future organisational 
changes.  In general, their current differences are their development path, or context in which they 
are examined, and historic areas of responsibility; ES tends to be more tactical, relies on rapid 
battlefield assessments, and is closely tied to EA and ED (Electronic Warfare in Operations 2009).  
Despite uncertainty within EW literature, it seems appropriate that the category of ES should also 
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include all of the non-attack and non-defence aspects of utilizing the electromagnetic spectrum to 
enhance combat capability.  In other words, ES includes the use of communication and radar 
systems by a military force, not only the surveillance of the opposing side’s use of such systems.  Like 
the Internet, digital communications go beyond voice to include images, text, and video.  Morse 
code is an older, yet continuingly relevant, example of beyond voice communication, and it is 
noteworthy for being able to transmit through the visible portion of the EMS by Naval signal lamps 
on warships or submarine periscopes.  A developing aspect of ES is wireless power, or the ability to 
transmit electronic fuel.  There are two categories of this: non-radiative and radiative.  Non-radiative, 
or near-field, can be observed in emerging technologies such as radio-frequency identification (RFID), 
the recharging stations for some electric vehicles, and wireless charging pads for computerized 
devices like mobile phones, mp3 players, and netbooks or tablets.79  R&D into radiative, or far-field, 
technologies are attempting to transmit power through concentrated beams of electromagnetic 
energy.  One proposed application is to provide refuelling for unmanned aerial vehicles.80  If this 
seems farfetched, remember that solar power is also electromagnetic radiation composed of the 
infrared, visible, and ultraviolet portions of the EMS.81    
 
EW can be applied from land, sea, air, and space, as well as unmanned and autonomous systems.  
The technical details and full range of systems and platforms which use the electromagnetic 
spectrum in warfare are beyond the scope of this thesis; however, a few select examples will provide 
a better understanding.  Moreover, examples of systems and platforms provided elsewhere in this 
chapter can also be applied to EW, not only the subsection to which they belong.  This is due to 
significant overlap between terminologies; as previously stated, this chapter argues that all of these 
terms, including EW, are a part of NCW.  Two aircraft which epitomize EW platforms are the United 
States’ EA-6B Prowler and its replacement the EA-18G Growler.  Both of these aircraft possess anti-
radiation missiles, the ability to locate enemy EMS signals, and the ability to conduct multiple forms 
                                                          
79 RFID ties in with the logistics component of NCW discussed above, such as logging soldier and supply 
manifests or ordering and tracking supplies.  Charging pads could also have increased relevance as more 
soldiers begin using tablet-like devices on the battlefield. 
80 This technology could be combined with the ability for ships to ‘pass’ missiles to UAVs (mentioned above 
under The Development of Net-Centric Warfare).  This would significantly improve the amount of time a UAV 
can loiter over potential targets.  Energy can be beamed to the UAV as needed, and once a target is acquired, a 
ship can loft a missile into the warzone where it is ‘picked up’ by the UAV and more precisely guided to its 
target.  Eventually the ship itself could become an unmanned system, allowing a greater portion of soldiers 
and commanders to operate from greater distances.   
81 Wireless power provides another example of overlap between terminologies.  Powered exoskeletons 
(mentioned under the subsection RMA) utilize on-board computers and could aid in logistic support as well as 
combat (discussed under The Developments of NCW).  One of the primary difficulties in developing 
exoskeletons has been their power source, hence the tether commonly seen in demonstrations.  Charging 
stations or radiative wireless power (discussed here under EW) could provide a solution.   
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of jamming.  Further, they can not only jam signals but also intercept signals for “processing, analysis, 
and intelligence reporting” (Electronic Warfare Operations 2009).  This means they are capable of 
both EA and ES.  The Growler also possesses an anti-jamming capability and enhanced NCW 
attributes, such as improved situational awareness and improved connectivity with other sensors, 
shooters, and command (in theatre and abroad).  Satellite Hacking: A Guide for the Perplexed (see 
Fritz 2013a), provides details on one large category of systems which are reliant on the EME.82  It 
reveals an increasing reliance on such systems and how the global spread of commercial technology 
is placing them at risk.  Moreover, it demonstrates how ‘hacking’ closed military networks through 
the use of the EMS can appear quite different from CNO’S Internet hacking.83  The following 
paragraphs have been adapted from this text to provide greater insight into EW. 
 
Satellite hacking can be broken down into four main types: Jam, Eavesdrop, Hijack, and Control.  
Despite some limitations, these four types of satellite hacking are significantly different and warrant 
precise terminology.  Jamming is flooding or overpowering a signal, transmitter, or receiver, so that 
the legitimate transmission cannot reach its destination.  In some ways this is comparable to a DDoS 
attack on the Internet, but using wireless radio waves in the uplink/downlink portion of a satellite 
network.  In general jamming “requires a directed antenna, knowledge of the frequency to be 
affected, and enough power to override its source” (Rooker 2008).  In many ways this can be 
considered the easiest form of satellite hacking since it can be as simple as throwing an abundance 
of noise at the receiver to drown out the transmission.  The receiver can be the satellite receiving an 
uplink or a ground station or user terminal receiving a downlink.  Jamming the uplink requires more 
skill and power than a downlink, but its range of disruption tends to be greater, blocking all possible 
recipients of the relay rather than a single or range limited portion of possible downlinks (GAO 
Critical Infrastructure 2002).  Alternatively, eavesdropping on a transmission allows a hacker to see 
and hear what is being transmitted.  Information available online provides details on how to conduct 
such operations, as well as the means to purchase the appropriate equipment, and a niche 
subculture has emerged that is combing the skies in search of access points.84  The third type of 
                                                          
82 The predominant means of satellite transmission is radio and microwave signals.  Any platform which resides 
in the air or space domains will require the EMS to communicate as part of a terrestrial network.  For the land 
and sea domains, it depends on the type of platform and desired outcome.  These domains at least have the 
option of wired or tangible connections, like fibre-optic cable, to create networks, whereas air and space 
presently do not.   
83 Portions of the Internet rely on satellites and EMS connections, so CNO also exists in this realm.  However, it 
is less prevalent in CNO than NCW, and less acknowledged in CNO literature.  The intended target, and 
whether or not there was Internet connectivity within the network, remain decisive factors in determining if 
an incident belongs to CNO or NCW. 
84 NCW operations do not involve the Internet, but the Internet can provide information and tools which will 
aid in the ability to conduct such operations.   
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satellite hacking, hijacking, is the unauthorized use of a satellite for transmission, or seizing control 
of a signal such as a broadcast and replacing it with another for the purpose of misinformation, 
propaganda, PSYOPs, or terror.   
 
Controlling refers to taking control of part or all of the tracking, telemetry, and control (TT&C) 
ground station, bus, and/or payload85 – in particular, being able to manoeuvre a satellite in orbit.  
Controlling a satellite involves breaching the TT&C links.  Theoretical examples include issuing 
commands for a satellite to use its reserve propellant to either enter a graveyard orbit or re-enter 
the Earth’s atmosphere and burn up, or causing a satellite to rotate, so that the solar panels and 
antenna are pointed in the wrong directions (Norris 2010, p36; Gutteberg 1993, p12).  Reaching this 
command and control level appears to be the most difficult of satellite hacking, since this is where 
security is greatest.  In particular, military satellite networks often locate TT&C ground stations 
within military bases and they employ encryption at multiple levels.  However the military often 
leases commercial satellites to meet the growing needs they cannot fulfil on their own, and in these 
cases the satellite service provider is typically responsible for the TT&C links and satellite control 
ground station, with the military only securing the data links and communications ground stations 
(see Figure 3) (GAO Critical Infrastructure 2002).  Further, weakness in the command and control of 
commercial satellites, such as VSAT hubs, could place military satellites at risk from collision or the 
creation of debris fields due to compromised control of the commercial satellites.   
 
Jamming, Hijack, and Control are examples of Electronic Attack, while Eavesdropping belongs to the 
category of Electronic Surveillance.  The complete document, Satellite Hacking: A Guide for the 
Perplexed, contains timelines of open source satellite hacking incidents.  These include 20 cases of 
jamming, 12 cases of hijacking, and five instances of control.  Among the types of satellites which 
have been jammed were broadcasting, communications, earth observation, GPS, imagery, and 
satellite phones.  China in particular is noted for possessing a GPS jamming capability, as well as anti-
jamming satellites. 
 
 
Anti-Access Area Denial 
                                                          
85 The payload is usually a collection of electronic devices specific to that satellite’s desired function. For 
example, a surveillance satellite would contain imaging equipment, while the payload for a communications 
satellite would include transponders for receiving and relaying signals such as telephone or television. The bus 
is the platform housing the payload; this includes equipment for manoeuvring, power, thermal regulation, and 
command and control (Wong and Fergusson 2010, pp35-36). 
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Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD) is another recurring military modernization concept which shares a 
strong connection to China’s NCW, yet this connection has not been made clear in popular literature.  
A2/AD refers to the growing capability of countries to deny a foreign power “the ability to enter or 
operate in maritime territories adjacent to these countries” (Bitzinger 2014).  A2/AD originated as 
part of a larger US concept known as AirSea Battle, and it has since exceeded its parent concept in 
notoriety.  Chinese officials have also begun using the term A2/AD, despite initial criticism that it 
portrayed China as an aggressor or that it sought to limit China’s power (East Asia Security 
Symposium and Conference 2013).  AirSea Battle (ASB) is often illustrated using a US-China scenario, 
or to a lesser degree US-Iran, however this concept is being implemented for use beyond these two 
regions, in part due to the proliferation of advanced weaponry and ICT which are making A2/AD a 
rising global phenomenon.86  For example, high performance aircraft and extended range missiles 
with improved accuracy, effectiveness, and destructive power, are no longer restricted to great 
powers.  Not only does this threaten the application of sea power along foreign shores, it also 
threatens allied military ports and bases in the region.  Since WWII, the United States has been able 
to operate largely unchallenged off the shores of its opponents.  As demonstrated during the Korean 
War, Vietnam War, Gulf War, War in Afghanistan, Iraq War, and numerous other skirmishes, this 
allowed for the unhindered flow of “supplies and reinforcements” (Krepinevich 2010).  It also 
allowed ports, bases, and aircraft carriers to serve as safe havens.  These coupled with stealth 
technology, precision guided weapons, and advanced sensors, allowed the United States to conduct 
increasing portions of operations from a relatively safe distance.  China is acquiring a range of 
powerful new military capabilities, in what some believe is an attempt to create a ‘no-go zone’ off its 
shores and push the US fleet back to the second island chain.87  These include anti-ship missile 
systems, ASATs, improved air defence networks, long-range surveillance and targeting, stealth 
bombers, advanced submarines, UAVs, and the overall ability to disrupt adversary C4ISR which is 
critical for operating at increased distances.  It also includes the often cited, yet misrepresented, 
cyber warfare and electronic warfare.  ASB addressed ways in which air and naval forces could 
integrate capabilities across all domains (land, sea, air, space, and cyber) to counter growing 
challenges to the US, particularly anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities.  ASB emphasizes 
“battle networks”, electronic warfare, stealth, rapid response, long-range strikes, security through 
redundancy, and Air Force and Navy interoperability; all of which are closely tied to NCW 
                                                          
86 The spread of technology also played a role in the previous sections on RMA, NCW, and EW. 
87 Chinese military theorists have identified two island chains as holding key strategic value.  The First Island 
Chain runs approximately from “the Japanese main islands through the Ryukyus, Taiwan, the Philippines, and 
Borneo”, while the Second Island Chain “stretches from the north at the Bonin Islands southward through the 
Marianas, Guam, and the Caroline Islands” (see Figure 4) (Tol, Gunzinger, Krepinevich, and Thomas 2010).   
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(Krepinevich 2010; US Department of Defense 2013).  ASB, and A2/AD specifically, are both worth 
examining in this chapter, since the two influence each other and are accelerating NCW 
advancement on both sides.   
 
China perceives the US as its greatest threat, and the US relies on NCW, therefore it seems logical 
that China’s A2/AD would be set to counter the use of NCW.  Moreover, China is developing its own 
NCW capabilities which it would use as a part of A2/AD.  In this sense, A2/AD in a US-China scenario 
can be seen as an NCW battle under set conditions.  It would be two opponents at different NCW 
and military development levels, with the more advanced NCW force pushing in on the other’s coast.  
It is ironic that China is pursuing the same NCW capability that the US possesses, yet in this scenario 
that US capability could provide asymmetric vulnerabilities of which China would attempt to take 
advantage.  Even less intuitive, China would be using select NCW-enabled abilities to do so.  In other 
words China is not opposed to NCW, but it would attempt to exploit US reliance on it and the 
weaknesses it contains, until China’s NCW can reach a comparable level.  This scenario also fits the 
doctrine of ‘local wars under conditions of informationization’ (high-tech conditions), which will be 
discussed later in this chapter, and there are several ‘home field’ advantages for China.  Additionally, 
this scenario raises a larger question which is present here and beyond – will China’s proclaimed 
defensive and regional policies continue once its NCW development (among other competencies) 
reaches a global capacity?  Regionally China is concerned with protecting “national sovereignty, 
security and territorial integrity”, including maritime disputes, the One-China policy, and deterring 
US containment (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China 2013).  Yet 
China also seeks “national economic and social development”, and this requires greater interaction 
with the international community, the protection of SLOCs, and the ability to project power 
(Information Office of the State Council 2013).  It is important to note that A2\AD activities are not 
entirely comprised of NCW.  The A2/AD phenomenon is a result of the proliferation of advanced 
weapons and ICT.  Many advanced weapons are directly related to NCW, and ICT is a driving force 
behind NCW, so there is a strong connection.  However, employing ant-access methods does not 
restrict itself to NCW-only activities and can include CNO,88 IO, and traditional weaponry used 
against military and civilian targets of the opposing force or its allies.    
 
China could use A2/AD techniques to erode the ability of the United States to operate in the 
Western Pacific.  Central to this would be precision strikes against critical nodes to render US forces 
                                                          
88 CNO is a potential component of A2/AD; however, A2/AD literature which discusses cyber attacks is often 
erroneously implying CNO when they are actually discussing NCW, because most of the networks they refer to 
would not be Internet-connected. 
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“deaf, dumb, and blind” (Tol, Gunzinger, Krepinevich, and Thomas 2010; US Department of Defense 
2013).  For example, kinetic ASATs, ASAT lasers, jamming, and space-based ASAT weapons could 
degrade or destroy US satellites which provide a wide range of communications, early warning, 
navigation, surveillance, and targeting, as well as entire systems like GPS or some models of UAVs 
which are reliant on satellites (Chase, Engstrom, Cheung, Gunness, Harold, Puska, and Berkowitz 
2015; McGarry 2013; USCC Annual Report 2014).  In the event that a conflict in the Western Pacific 
escalated to the point of unrestricted targeting of space assets, the PRC would enjoy the advantage 
of regional proximity.  China could rely on its land-based, hardened, and buried fibre-optic 
connections, whereas the United States would be operating far from its home and be more reliant 
on wireless network connections.  Further, China would have shorter lines of communication and a 
smaller area requiring coverage.  However, a loss of satellites could render China’s A2/AD ineffective 
since China needs them for over-the-horizon identification, targeting, battle damage assessment, 
situational awareness and so forth.  The same benefits that satellites provide the US would aid China 
in its ability to conduct A2/AD, and Beijing is continually improving and becoming reliant on its own 
satellites.  In addition to striking critical nodes, A2/AD shares another similarity with CNO – 
asymmetric qualities and the assassin’s mace.  For example, ASAT dazzlers are much cheaper than 
the cost of constructing, launching, and operating a satellite.  One military analyst estimates the cost 
of one Chinese DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile, which has the potential to ‘mission kill’89 an aircraft 
carrier, at 11 million USD compared to the 13.5 billion USD cost of an aircraft carrier (USCC Annual 
Report 2014).  Moreover, direct confrontation could be avoided through attacks on the logistical 
aspects of force deployment, disrupting an opponent’s civilian society, exploiting vulnerabilities in 
essential networks, or coercing an enemy’s allies to deny the use of their bases.  Assassin’s mace 
tactics seek to deliver a swift and devastating blow, such as an EMP or NCW-embedded backdoors, 
and being the first to take destructive action must be considered (Krepinevich 2010; Mulvenon 1999).  
Adding to non-lethal operations, unattributable actions such as mapping networks, planting latent-
viruses or backdoors, mapping underwater terrain, and cataloguing enemy space assets would 
“minimize the time required to execute attacks against key nodes and sites” at the onset of conflict 
(Tol, Gunzinger, Krepinevich, and Thomas 2010).   
 
Precision strikes against crucial hubs or links can include network nodes such as aircraft carriers, 
airfields, bases, ports, satellites, and vital aspects of deployment and logistics.  An often cited 
component of Chinese A2/AD is anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM) and anti-ship cruise missiles 
                                                          
89 An anti-ship ballistic missile would not have to completely destroy its target to have the desired effect.  
Inflicting sufficient damage could render an aircraft carrier unable to perform its mission function or cause it to 
retreat. 
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(ASCM), like the Russian made SS-N-22/SUNBURN and SS-N-27B/SIZZLER supersonic ASCMs (US 
Department of Defense 2013).  Some of these missiles could be destroyed by missile defence 
systems, however a missile barrage or the use of decoys could exhaust these systems’ limited supply 
of magazines.  Placing ships in adjacent waterways at risk reduces their freedom of action and slows 
operations; it could also force aircraft carriers to operate at such a distance that their ability to 
provide air support is severely degraded.  This would place increased pressure on land-based 
runways which are even more susceptible to runway cratering as they are static targets.  Anti-ship 
missiles can use over-the-horizon radar for targeting and utilize anti-radiation detection, microwave 
EMP, MirVs (decoys), and multi-spectral imaging, all of which were discussed under electronic 
warfare in this chapter’s previous subsection.  Additionally, frequently discussed components of 
China’s A2/AD capacity include aspects of NCW, like C4ISR systems and “near real-time sensor-to-
shooter” networks; and RMA aspects, like advanced submarines, AEW&Cs, long-range capabilities, 
missile defence, ramjet propulsion, and stealth aircraft and warships (USCC Annual Report 2007).  In 
the naval realm, China’s Kilo-class submarines possess guided weapons, such as Russian designed 
“wake-homing and wire-guided torpedoes”, and the ability to fire missiles while submerged 
(Krepinevich 2010).  Undersea sensor networks can provide China with enhanced underwater 
situational awareness.  These sensor networks could be linked to automated systems for deploying 
torpedos or “mobile mines”; and “acoustic jamming” could hinder an opponent’s ability to operate 
in littoral areas or mask friendly movements (Tol, Gunzinger, Krepinevich, and Thomas 2010).  In the 
air domain, China’s Eastern coast “is blanketed by a dense network of SAM launch sites and radars”, 
which could even threaten stealth aircraft (Krepinevich 2010).  China itself is deploying stealthy fifth-
generation aircraft and a number of UAVs, including the High-Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) ISR 
UAV.  This UAV can extend the range of over-the-horizon radar, and all-around C4ISR, thereby 
providing an alternative to satellites for multiple A2/AD functions.    
 
Rather than deterring US development of NCW, A2/AD seems to be pushing forward and 
strengthening its development.  For example, the uncertainty of being able to maintain 
unchallenged access to the Western Pacific is pushing the United States to develop unmanned 
submersible vehicles, directed energy missile defence systems, and the ability to apply force from 
even greater distances, all of which were already goals of NCW.  As another example, concern that 
UAVs could be grounded in the event of a satellite network disruption, could drive militaries towards 
“conducting autonomous [UAV] ISR or strike missions”, since no satellite communication would be 
needed (Tol, Gunzinger, Krepinevich, and Thomas 2010).  Many of the vulnerabilities in US NCW 
(including RMA and EW) which China would seek to exploit in an A2/AD campaign had previously 
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been identified by the United States itself.  Adding the threat perception of Chinese A2/AD provides 
additional justification and budgetary support for addressing these problems.  Aside from strategy 
adjustments, the best defence against A2/AD appears to be fixing the problems with NCW and 
making it as optimal as possible, rather than scrapping the concept all together.  This would include 
creating redundant airborne C4ISR systems as an alternative or backup to satellite networks, the 
hardening of forward bases and computer networks, ensuring computer networks are closed and 
secure, enhancing system standardization and interoperability, identifying critical nodes and making 
those the top priority for defensive improvements, and preparing for the possibility of network 
outages.  However, one major problem with all of the NCW categories is the cost factor, in this case 
A2/AD could lead the US to overextend its resources.   
 
In the US-China scenario, the United States would attempt to conduct a blinding campaign, just as 
China would for anti-access and area denial.  Long-range precision strikes, and the use of stealth 
technology and drones, would target China’s C4ISR sensors (including over-the-horizon radar) and 
network functionality to disrupt situational awareness, communication, and targeting.  Anti-ship 
missile, counter-space, and land-based missile sites would be high priority targets.  Some of these 
are mobile, so it would require timely surveillance and tracking.  Using decoys, or electronically 
spoofing China’s radar sensors, to create false targets could cause China to expend its large missile 
inventory and reveal valuable targets.  As with China, the use of embedded backdoors and latent kill 
switches within NCW equipment and software could be exploited.  Electronic attack and defence, 
such as jamming, directed energy weapons, and camouflage, could also be used to deny China’s 
emerging UAV ISR capabilities.  Acting at greater distances would challenge China’s current military 
capability and range.  In this regard, the United States could conduct “distant blockade operations” 
to discourage Chinese actions (Tol, Gunzinger, Krepinevich, and Thomas 2010).  This is especially 
relevant in view of 85% of China’s oil imports traversing through the Strait of Malacca and South 
China Sea, as well as the majority of its gas imports and overall trade (see Figure 5) (Le Mière 2013; 
Richardson 2012; Storey 2006).  Additionally, undersea fibre-optic cables which electronically 
connect China with the rest of the world could be disabled from great distances; and the United 
States’ extensive experience and R&D in space activities suggests they possess a premiere anti-space 
capability.  Undoubtedly these actions would entail serious repercussions; however, they remain 
valid theoretical concepts for scenarios and contingency planning. 
 
 
Informationization 
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There is much confusion surrounding the term informationization.  The term has multiple spelling 
variations, vague and varied definitions, including two distinct types of definitions amongst those, 
and overlap with multiple other terms.  In some cases Chinese and English authors are using RMA, 
NCW, EW, and other cyber terms interchangeably, inconsistently, or with no clear distinction 
(Thomas 2007, 89).  Some of this stems from the PLA’s use of a wide range of Western doctrinal 
military writings.  These are selectively adopted and slightly modified, without clear reference to the 
original, and then converted into Mandarin (Mulvenon 1999).  This creates recognizable themes and 
recurring elements amongst research material, yet there are a large number of discrepancies when 
comparing finer details.  These problems will be explored below, ultimately arriving at the 
conclusion that informationization is equivalent to NCW, including RMA, EW, and the majority of 
A2/AD features.  Once this connection is established, the previous sections of this chapter can be 
viewed as being as much about China as this section is.  In other words RMA, NCW, EW, and ASB are 
what China is developing, and China faces the same “deep-level contradictions and problems” in this 
regard as the United States does (Krekel, Adams, and Bakos 2012).  Additionally, this section will 
examine China-specific literature on the development of informationization (NCW), government 
organisation, and as yet undiscussed weapons platforms.  In essence, informationization is the 
integration of ICT and computerized networks into “military systems and doctrine” to enhance 
combat capability (USCC Annual Report 2007).  It is a beneficial way to “acquire, transmit, process, 
and use information during war” (US Department of Defense 2014).   
 
There are at least six primary variations of the word informationization, all beginning with the prefix 
“informa”.  These are: -tionalization, -tionalized, -tionization, -tionized, -tization, and -tized.   
Additionally it is common to see some sources replacing the letter “z” in these words with the letter 
“s” (- “ise” being a widely used form by British English).  One reason for these discrepancies is 
variation in translations from Mandarin to English, and the subsequent use of these varied 
translated terms by Chinese authors, which are then translated from English back into Mandarin 
(Thomas 2004, 3).  Further, it appears that leading Chinese military analysts and government officials 
have not settled on a term themselves.  China’s bi-annual national defence white papers began using 
informa-terms on a wide scale beginning in 2004, first as “informationalization” and then as 
“informationization” in 2006 and all subsequent years (see Table 2).  These seemed to replace or 
supplement the term modernization, and this makes sense as NCW-related advancements, or a 
global trend towards the use of computers in military weapons and operations, are the current 
direction of modernization.  Despite frequent use of the words technologic, technologies, and 
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technology in China’s defence white papers, there is almost no mention of CNO, IO, the Internet, 
online, or the Web.  This suggests that informationization is distinct from CNO and IO which are 
Internet-connected.  NCW is not mentioned at all in these national defence white papers.  Given the 
emphasis the United States has placed on NCW, and China’s pattern of examining and integrating 
key US military developments, this further suggests that informationization is synonymous with 
NCW.  Meanwhile, RMA and EW are mentioned an intermediate amount of times.  Beyond inferring 
a correlation, there are instances where PLA officers and Chinese government officials directly state 
that informationization is equivalent to NCW, or they refer the United States as having an 
informatized military (Thomas 2007, 80; US Department of Defense 2013).  Unfortunately, the 
majority of authors are not so explicit in making this connection and instead leave it open to 
interpretation.   
 
Informationization is often noted as part of a larger Chinese slogan or policy goal – the ability to win 
“local wars under conditions of informationization” (China's Military Strategy 2015; Information 
Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China 2013; USCC Annual Report 2012).  This is 
an updated version of the PLA’s previous stated goal of being able to “fight local wars under high-
tech conditions”, which was in use from approximately 1993 to 2002 (Krekel, Adams, and Bakos 
2012).  This suggest there is possibly a strong connection between the meanings of 
informationization and high-tech conditions.  Informationization continues to refer to modernization 
and high-technology conditions, but is attempting to be more precise and descriptive by conveying 
the central role that information plays in these, particularly through its sharing via networked 
systems (Krekel, Adams, and Bakos 2012; USCC Annual Report 2012).  This is equivalent to NCW, 
although the term NCW is less clumsy, and carries a more intuitive definition in English.  The 
reference to local wars is also revealing in that it corresponds to China’s stated regional focus and 
concurrent A2/AD capability.  As stated above, these policies could shift as China’s NCW and overall 
military modernization reach a sustainable global capacity, and as China becomes entangled in 
worldwide responsibilities resulting from transregional needs.   
 
An additional difficulty with clarifying informationization’s meaning is that it is occasionally used by 
PLA officers and government organisations to mean something separate from the warfare concept 
described thus far, and this split meaning has to be identified by context.  This chapter is discussing 
the more common usage which refers to “military informationization” as opposed to “national 
informationization” which denotes modernizing the government and society through Internet-
connected information networks (Thomas 2007, 86, 88).  China’s Twelfth Five Year Plan 2011-2015 
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provides an example of the term informationization being used by Chinese officials in a broad, non-
military, context.  Chapter 13 is titled, “Comprehensively improve the informationization level”; 
however, the title is the only occurrence of the word in that chapter.  The chapter content discusses 
non-military networks that are connected to the Internet, such as goals to enhance national 
broadband coverage, mobile phone networks, digital radio and television broadcasts; promote e-
business and e-government services; and strengthen online IT security (China's Twelfth Five Year 
Plan 2011).  While the word informationization is occasionally used in this context, it is the exception 
not the rule.  One of the reasons this thesis prefers the term NCW is that it is less susceptible to 
being used in this way, in part because it directly contains the word “warfare”.  Chinese documents 
may eventually make this distinction clearer in their choice of terms, as evidenced by the recent 
name change of the “Internet Security and Informationization Leading Group” to the “Central 
Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs” (China's New Small Leading Group 2014; Creemers 2015; Jing 
2014; Panda 2014; Rawlinson 2015; Tham 2015; Xi Jinping leads Internet security group 2014).  This 
may have been an attempt to clarify the group’s function, as it deals with IO, and to a lesser degree 
CNO, but not NCW.  As noted in the NCW section above, China possesses and is further developing 
closed networks for military operations (Krepinevich 2010; Thomas 2004, 10-11; Tol, Gunzinger, 
Krepinevich, and Thomas 2010; Wilson 2007).  Adding to the NCW-Informationization connection, 
key features of informationization which are frequently discussed in informationization literature 
will be examined below to show how they align with the key features of RMA, NCW, and EW 
literature. 
 
The 1991 Iraq War is frequently cited as a watershed moment, or revelation, for the RMA, and the 
same is true for informationization.  PLA leadership was impressed by US dominance, including the 
use of precision strikes and stealth technology, and this provided an impetus for China’s push 
towards informationization (Mulvenon 1999; Thomas 2004, 4, 27; US Department of Defense 2013; 
USCC Annual Report 2014; Wortzel 2014).  Influential PLA authors and military strategists from China 
assign varying meaning to their use of the term RMA (Thomas 2007, 78).  Some directly describe it as 
informationization, or the use of informatized equipment, but there is no consensus.  Further, these 
authors sometimes stray from their own definitions within the same text.  Therefore, it is more 
useful to look for patterns rather than the details of a single definition.  Recurring topics which are 
attached to the RMA in Chinese literature, are also frequently seen in NCW, EW, and 
informationization literature.  These include: C4ISR, communications, high technology, ICT (as a 
driving force), increased ability to act from a distance, increased combat efficiency and effectiveness, 
increased speed of actions and decisions, missile defence systems, networked systems, non-lethal 
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weapons, precision strikes, reduced causalities, sensors, and situational awareness (Thomas 2007, 
71-96; US Department of Defense 2014).  These authors also discuss the need for changes in 
organisation, strategy, tactics, and theory in order to take advantage of new technologies, and they 
note the danger of information overload.   
 
It is common for Chinese and Western authors to refer to RMA or NCW “with Chinese 
characteristics”, and perhaps part of the rationale for using the term informationization is an 
attempt to convey something which is unique to China (Information Office of the State Council 2013).  
It is true that China has a different level of economic and scientific development as well as a 
different philosophical and cultural base from which to formulate its military concepts, rather than 
“simply follow Western thinking and add only Western developments and technologies to the 
existing framework” (Thomas 2007, 74).  However, current distinction between Chinese and 
Western RMA-type developments is overblown and not convincingly demonstrated by prominent 
authors (Thomas 2004, 5-11).  For example, a recurring topic which is proclaimed to be uniquely 
Chinese is a greater focus given to the cognitive, psychological, or perceptual aspects of warfare, yet 
this was already shown earlier in this chapter to be an early US NCW concept, and many Western 
authors are discussing the ‘mind’ aspect without explicitly labelling it as such (Ahvenainen; Alberts, 
Garstka, and Stein 2000; Cyberspace Operations 2013; Information Operations 2012).  Additionally, 
while some Chinese and Western authors see this as a Chinese characteristic, other Chinese writers 
directly give credit to the United States for its use (Thomas 2007, 90-91, 164).  Technology is the 
driving force behind informationization, and this constrains the possibility of drastically different 
approaches emerging.  In other words, globalization, strong ties to the commercial sector, and the 
universal laws of science, ensure that the best approaches or network architecture will be adopted 
globally.  Greater variation might occur in the organisational and strategy aspects of RMA-style 
development.  Although, once this knowledge becomes known to opposing militaries, they could 
decide whether to adopt it themselves, and this thesis is based on open source knowledge.  It is in 
China’s interest to pursue its own novel ideas; however, any advantageous revelation in 
informationization is likely to be incorporated into NCW, and vice versa.  This continual “merging of 
Eastern and Western military cultures” will limit country-specific characteristics (Thomas 2007, 76). 
 
China has closely studied US NCW developments and appropriated them for informationization.  For 
example, a book published by the PLA, titled An Interpretation of Network Centric Warfare, uses the 
terms informationization and NCW interchangeably (Thomas 2007, 163-174).  On the whole, the 
book insinuates a difference between these terms, yet it offers no clear distinction.  Only the final 
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chapter is dedicated to Chinese-based NCW, and this chapter lacks the detail of the previous US-
centric chapters, suggesting that the Chinese version is largely the same as that of the United States.  
Further to this point, “informationized weapons” have been described as those which use computer 
networks and “other technologies in unison”, and “informatized wars” are wars which are heavily 
reliant on computer networks, particularly for C4ISR and situational awareness (Thomas 2007, 167; 
USCC Annual Report 2007).  Discussion of informationization commonly features the same topics 
discussed in NCW, without any distinguishing differences.  This includes GPS, integration, 
interoperability, jointness, mobility of combat forces, operating from great distances, rapid decision 
making, and reduced preparation time.  The CMC and PLA view systems of systems, an NCW concept, 
as central to achieving informationization.  They are seeking to link all commanders, platforms, 
sensors, and shooters through closed computer networks (International Institute for Strategic 
Studies 2015; Krekel, Adams, and Bakos 2012; USCC Annual Report 2006).  Electronic warfare, a 
component of NCW, is also frequently discussed as part of informationization.  This includes regular 
mention of anti-radiation missiles, electronic decoys, jamming, radar, wireless communication, and 
training ‘‘under complex electromagnetic environments’’ (USCC Annual Report 2009; Information 
Office of the State Council 2013; Krekel, Adams, and Bakos 2012; US Department of Defense 2013; 
USCC Annual Report 2014). 
 
Having established the connection between Informationization and NCW (including RMA, EW, and 
A2/AD), additional aspects of Chinese NCW will be examined.  The General Staff Department’s 
Department of Informationization,90 along with individual initiatives among the military branches, 
are seeking to achieve integrated operations by modernizing equipment and linking systems across 
domains and military branches (Information Office of the State Council 2013).  It is believed this will 
allow for leaner forces and joint operations, as well as the ability of a central command to control, 
direct, and coordinate a greater portion of operations by using “information networks to transmit 
battle space awareness data and joint strike commands” (USCC Annual Report 2007).  In China’s 
pursuit of a system of systems, it is using a combination of “fiberoptic cable, high-frequency and 
very-high-frequency communications, microwave systems, and multiple satellites” to facilitate 
connections (Wortzel 2014).  The US Department of Defense 2013 annual report to Congress on 
China’s military capability provides insight into China’s current level of regional informationization 
capability. 
 
                                                          
90 This department is also sometimes referred to as the Headquarters of the General Staff (GSH) 
Informationization Department.  
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New technologies allow the PLA to share intelligence, battlefield information, logistics 
information, weather reports, etc., instantaneously (over robust and redundant 
communications networks), resulting in improved situational awareness for commanders.  In 
particular, by enabling the sharing of near-real-time ISR data with commanders in the field, 
decision-making processes are facilitated, shortening command timelines and making 
operations more efficient.  These improvements have greatly enhanced the PLA’s flexibility 
and responsiveness.  “Informatized” operations no longer require meetings for command 
decision-making or labor-intensive processes for execution.  Commanders can now issue 
orders to multiple units at the same time while on the move, and units can rapidly adjust 
their actions through the use of digital databases and command automation tools (US 
Department of Defense 2013). 
 
China possesses an Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) and early warning sensors capable of 
regional coverage.  These consists of “weapon systems, radars, and C4ISR platforms working 
together” with a primary goal of defending against long-range precision weapons and manned and 
unmanned stealth aircraft (US Department of Defense 2014).  The C4ISR component relies on 
“reconnaissance, data relay, navigation, and communications satellites”, although the aircraft 
discussed below could provide alternatives (US Department of Defense 2014).  China’s strategy is to 
concentrate its “best capabilities against the enemy’s most important assets”. (Krekel, Adams, and 
Bakos 2012).  Moreover, using long range strikes against critical nodes could deter an adversary’s 
willingness to fight, without the need for mass destruction or “the seizing of territory” (Andress and 
Winterfeld 2011, 43; Mulvenon 1999).   
 
In addition to keeping these networks separate from the Internet, the tangible infrastructure must 
be protected.  For example, fibre-optic cables can be buried, and facilities can be camouflaged, 
hardened from blasts, and shielded from electromagnetic radiation.  To this end, China’s drive 
toward informationization has accelerated the construction of underground facilities and research 
into “advanced tunnelling and construction methods” (US Department of Defense 2013).  Weapons 
platforms are often required to remain mobile, however some command and control facilities might 
remain static, and China’s no first use policy necessitates that they are able to survive an initial 
nuclear or EMP blast.  As with A2/AD, China would not only use informationization to enhance its 
abilities, it would seek to deny an opponent’s ability to do the same.  Another consideration is that 
all of the problems associated with developing NCW-style capabilities, which were listed in the 
previous sections of this chapter, apply to China.  The technologic, organisational, and financial 
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challenges of integrating such a wide range of systems, and relying on these to provide reliable and 
timely information, has the potential to backfire (Chase, Engstrom, Cheung, Gunness, Harold, Puska, 
and Berkowitz 2015). 
 
China’s rapid economic growth, promotion of science and technology education, and attempts to 
transition to high technology exports benefit informationization.  China’s military budget has 
increased by double digit percentages every year since 1989, with the exception of 2010 (USCC 
Annual Report 2014).  In 2014, China’s military budget was approximately 131.6 billion USD, which is 
second only to the United States at approximately 581.0 billion USD (International Institute for 
Strategic Studies 2015; USCC Annual Report 2014).  However, China’s total military spending may be 
far greater than the official figures reported. Foreign acquisitions, research and development of dual 
use science and technology, national security, construction, and emergency response and disaster 
relief, are a few examples of expenditures which may fall under non-military headings but directly 
relate to the advancement of the military (Fritz 2008).  Additionally, China may be saving billions of 
dollars in R&D and leapfrogging in development due to alleged technology transfer through 
computer network exploitation, traditional espionage, and reverse engineering.  The State Council’s 
Fifteen Year Plan for science and technology (2006-2020), states that China’s “defense industries are 
pursuing advanced manufacturing, information technology, and defense technologies”, including 
“radar, counter-space capabilities, secure C4ISR, smart materials, and low-observable technologies” 
(US Department of Defense 2013).  In addition to the PLA’s clear push towards R&D and training in 
“new and high technology weaponry”, national-style informationization development aids military-
style informationization (Information Office of the State Council 2013).  While China’s Twelfth Five 
Year Plan has a different use for the term informationization than how it is discussed in this chapter, 
dual use military application needs to be considered.  ICT professionals can be recruited into the 
military, as can their research and products which would have the added ease and security of being 
domestically produced.  China’s push towards civilian innovation in science and advanced 
technology includes key areas such as “new-generation IT, biology, high-end equipment 
manufacturing, new energy sources, new materials”, and new transportation systems (China's 
Twelfth Five Year Plan 2011).  Further, Chinese State-owned enterprises (SOEs) allow the CCP to give 
preferential treatment to the development of key defence-related industries, in an attempt to create 
“national champions”.  Industries that the Chinese government has identified as ‘‘strategic’’ and 
‘‘heavyweight’’ include armaments, automobiles, civil aviation, construction, fossil fuels, machinery, 
metals, power generation and distribution, shipping, and telecommunications (USCC Annual Report 
2011).   
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PLA modernization has focused on quality over quantity with many new platforms possessing over-
the-horizon weapons and sensors (USCC Annual Report 2014).  As has previously been stated, 
modern military weapons often utilize computers and computer networks, therefore this thesis 
cannot cover all of them in detail.  However, three types of Chinese aircraft warrant further 
examination, since they are frequently mentioned in association with informationization literature.  
The first is China’s fifth generation stealth fighters, the Chengdu J-20 and Shenyang J-31.  Once fully 
operational, these aircraft are expected to possess “advanced sensors, radars, and datalinks” as well 
as electronic attack and defence capabilities (USCC Annual Report 2014; US Department of Defense 
2013).  Second is China’s Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft.  These can extend 
the coverage and range of ground and space based C4ISR platforms, or provide an alternative to 
them.  China’s primary AEW&Cs are the KJ-2000 and the smaller KJ-200 (or Y-8) (US Department of 
Defense 2014; USCC Annual Report 2014).  Lastly, China has been fielding a number of unmanned 
aerial vehicles and unmanned combat aerial vehicles dating back to at least the 1990s with the 
Israeli-made IAI Harpy UCAV (US Department of Defense 2013).  Five prominent Chinese designs are 
the Harbin BZK-005, Lijian (or AVIC 601-S), Sky Saber, Xianglong (or Guizhou) Soaring Dragon, and 
Yilong (or CAIG Wing Loong) Pterodactyl, with the Lijin being a candidate for future carrier-based 
launches (US Department of Defense 2013; USCC Annual Report 2014).  Collectively these UAVs 
possess qualities of extended range, long endurance, and stealth.  They can enhance multiple 
aspects of C4ISR, including extending the range of over-the-horizon radar, and providing surveillance 
and battle damage assessment (Tol, Gunzinger, Krepinevich, and Thomas 2010).   Further, they can 
allow China to conduct long-range strike operations, aid in anti-ship missile targeting, and conduct 
electronic attacks.  Given the relatively low cost of these UAVs, they could provide an appealing 
means for managing China’s maritime disputes (USCC Annual Report 2014).91 
 
As China’s satellite capabilities expand, so does its dependence on them.  Initially China sought “fiber 
optic cables, mobile radios, datalinks, and microwave systems” for its C4ISR, however over the 
decade 2004 to 2014 this has shifted towards space-based assets (USCC Annual Report 2014).  The 
PLA views control of space systems “as central to enabling modern informationized warfare” (US 
Department of Defense 2014).  Space is its own domain of warfare, however the non-Internet 
connected military satellites are largely tied to the cyber domain’s NCW.  In essence, these satellites 
are all nodes in various computer networks, because they must transmit the information they 
                                                          
91 Monitoring all air and sea traffic in the Western Pacific alone is a “formidable challenge” (USCC Annual 
Report 2014).  It would require near real-time identification and tracking of all vessels in a heavily trafficked 
875,000 to 1.5 million square nautical mile area (see Figure 5). 
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receive or collect back to Earth.  As the space domain develops it will expand to take on a greater 
variety of missions beyond satellite data relays.  The land, sea, and air domains are also becoming 
increasingly entangled with NCW.  This, however, represents a more gradual process compared to 
the challenges of operating in space that require it to be a high technology computerized endeavour 
from its inception.  As of 2014, China has “approximately 100 active satellites in orbit” with many 
performing C4ISR functions (USCC Annual Report 2014).  This includes the ability to provide 
communications, data relay, electronic surveillance, imagery, long distance targeting, meteorological 
information, navigation, radar, and situational awareness.  Non-military communications and 
scientific satellites can be appropriate for military purposes or serve dual use functions, as can 
manned spaceflight missions.  China is developing a range of counter-space capabilities including 
direct-ascent ASATs, directed energy weapons, and jammers; as well as co-orbital ASATs capable of 
colliding, damaging, docking, grabbing, jamming, or mine laying (USCC Annual Report 2014).  The 
majority of China’s maritime ISR satellites are currently focused on the First Island Chain, however 
this is expected to expand to the Second Island Chain and Indian Ocean, and eventually provide 
global coverage.  Similarly, China’s Beidou satellite navigation (and communication) system is 
planned to expand beyond its present regional coverage.92 
 
The PLA regularly conducts training exercises under “conditions of informationization”, including 
elements such as C4ISR, jamming, joint operations, and precision strikes (Information Office of the 
State Council 2013).  There are numerous PLA, Chinese government, and Chinese media reports 
discussing information-related training exercises.  However, the language used in these reports is 
often imprecise, making it difficult to determine whether these were NCW or CNO exercises, and in 
many cases they were both.  For example, a 2008 PLA training exercise employed “simulated cyber 
[CNO] and electronic attacks [NCW]”, and since 2008, all large scale PLA exercises have included 
“cyber [CNO] and information-operations [NCW] components” (USCC Annual Report 2009; 
International Institute for Strategic Studies 2015).  The context and key words reveal which branch, 
or branches, are being tested.  It appears that training “under complex electromagnetic 
environments’’ became a core requirement93 for PLA training around 2007, with the addition of 
“system of systems operations” around 2010, both of which belong to the informationization (NCW) 
branch of cyber warfare (USCC Annual Report 2009; Krekel, Adams, and Bakos 2012).  Military 
exercises conducted under informatized conditions occur “nearly every week or month by units 
                                                          
92 For more detail on China’s space-based capabilities, see Chase, Engstrom, Cheung, Gunness, Harold, Puska, 
and Berkowitz 2015; Fritz 2013a; US Department of Defense 2014; and USCC Annual Report 2014. 
93 Training of this type occurred much earlier, but this is when it gained prominence.  Additionally, CNO 
continues to also be a focal point of training exercises, but this chapter is specifically examining NCW. 
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somewhere in China” (Thomas 2009, 104).  Recurring activities observed in these exercises include 
the use of C4ISR, electronic decoys, EMP attacks, “jamming communications and radar systems”, 
interoperability, stealth, and attempts to strike vital points early in a conflict in order to obtain 
information dominance (USCC Annual Report 2009).  These exercises demonstrate China’s 
informationization abilities and goals, as well as the problems they face.  For example, Chen Weizhan, 
the head of the Guangzhou MR’s “Military Training and Service Arms Department”, stated that 
extensive software incompatibilities, “unmatched hardware interfaces”, and “non-unified data 
formats” significantly hindered combat operations and joint exercises (Krekel, Adams, and Bakos 
2012).94 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
By examining all five primary and interwoven concepts of networked warfare, a more complete 
understanding of China’s NCW capability and development is provided.  The Revolution in Military 
Affairs (RMA) is a theory which claims future warfare will witness a dramatic increase in combat 
effectiveness and efficiency through the application of presently developing technologies.  Net-
Centric Warfare (NCW) is the application of ICT and advanced technology to link military (command, 
sensor, and shooter) systems together in order to achieve a battlefield and information advantage.  
Electronic Warfare (EW) is a sub-component of NCW which aims to enhance combat capability 
through dominance of the electromagnetic spectrum.  Computerized communications, radar, and 
wireless closed network connections are among the uses of the electromagnetic spectrum.  NCW 
and its accompanying technologies are the primary means through which China could conduct Anti-
Access Area Denial (A2/AD).  A2/AD would attempt to deny an unauthorized foreign military access 
to areas within the First Island and Second Island Chains, and this fits China’s stated goal of being 
able to win local wars under informatized conditions.  Informationization is China’s present 
modernization goal, and it seeks to increase combat capability through the use of battle networks 
and high technology.  All of these concepts involve the use of closed military computer networks 
which have the potential to be hacked.   
 
Chinese government and military publications tend to use the term informationization; however, 
this thesis prefers the term NCW for multiple reasons.  First, the many varied definitions of RMA, 
                                                          
94 For a detailed assessment of Informationization exercises, training and war games, from 1997 to present, 
see Information Office of the State Council 2013; Krekel, Adams, and Bakos 2012; Thomas 2004, 24-27, 65-72; 
and USCC Annual Report 2009. 
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NCW, and informationization are largely synonymous, and EW and A2/AD are subcomponents of 
them.  Prominent Chinese and English publications use these terms interchangeably, inconsistently, 
or with no clear distinction.  Second, informationization itself has vague and varied definitions with 
at least six major spelling variations – there is no consensus.  It is also used to represent two distinct 
concepts, military informationization or national informationization, which must be determined by 
assessing the context.  Further, there is some evidence to suggest this name will be changed in the 
relatively near future.  Third, informationization and NCW in particular appear to be interchangeable.  
There are instances where Chinese documents label the United States military as being informatized, 
define informationization with the same definitions as NCW, or explicitly state that 
informationization is the same as NCW.  Part of the confusion could the result of the PLA integrating 
concepts from Western military writings.  Other writings which proclaim the existence of a unique 
NCW “with Chinese characteristics” fail to account for the impact of globalization and the scientific 
method.  Fourth, this thesis has chosen to use the term NCW as it has a more intuitive meaning in 
English, and it predates the term informationization.   
 
NCW-related literature often contains small collections of lists, or recurring key terms, which 
represent examples and core attributes of interlinked systems.  They can be of assistance in 
capturing the essence of NCW.  Among these are broad types of existing and overlapping systems 
which could be incorporated into a larger system of systems.  These include anti-ship missile systems, 
autonomous or semi-autonomous systems, C4ISR systems, early warning systems, global positioning 
systems, integrated air defence systems, missile defence systems, and satellite systems.  Many of 
these enhance situational awareness and improve decision making through a greater availability of 
information.  Specific types of weapons and weapons platforms are also commonly identified, like 
anti-radiation missiles, ASATs, directed energy weapons (EMP, laser, or microwave), non-lethal 
weapons (aiding a reduction in casualties and collateral damage), precision strike weapons, and 
stealth technology (with low infrared, radar, and visible signatures).  As discussed in this chapter, US 
weapons platforms which are representative of NCW were the EA-6B Prowler, EA-18G Growler, 
Global Hawk UAV, Predator UCAV, Reaper UCAV, X47-B carrier based drone, and upgraded versions 
of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle and M1 Abrams tank.   Three measurable attributes or benefits of 
NCW systems are distance, size, and speed.  NCW seeks the ability to operate from great distances, 
such as extended range missiles with improved accuracy, effectiveness, and destructive power.  
Additionally, over-the-horizon radar, long-range surveillance and targeting, and geographically 
dispersed collaboration or command and control all have this distance factor.  Size reductions of 
combat units and logistical requirements due to the implementation of NCW allows forces to travel 
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lighter and faster, and it increases mobility and the ability to deploy quickly.  Speed in itself is a key 
attribute, with NCW enabling increased tempo and lethality of operations, speed of command, 
speed of communication, rapid target assessment, rapid decision making (or response), and reduced 
preparation time.  Lastly, NCW literature notes recurring themes of coordination, integration, 
interoperability, and joint operations.   
 
All of these new technologies and systems provide new targets and methods for attack.  This, 
coupled with the global proliferation of new technologies, and the ability to conduct operations 
from long distances, has expanded the battlefield.  Vital nodes within networks are high value 
targets, and blinding campaigns aimed at eliminating sensors can erode an NCW force’s ability to 
operate.  NCW is not only a collection of networked technologic advances, but also changes in 
doctrine, training, and organisation which can allow the optimal use of those new technologies.  
Additionally, networked systems not only enhance direct fighting but also the planning, training, and 
logistical aspects of military operations.  While there are many benefits to pursuing NCW, there are 
also concerns.  One of these is the initial, and possibly continued, high financial cost.  High 
technology systems are expensive and rapidly changing.  Further, force-wide restructuring is slow 
and it is uncertain which technology will endure as being revolutionary.  Other problems such as 
allied interoperability, increased bandwidth demands, latency, and system security require 
substantial funding to resolve.  The complex and interconnected nature of NCW systems could 
provide new and asymmetric ways for adversaries to attack.  New means of attack include 
embedded backdoors, introducing false data, and targeting the computerized logistical aspects of 
force deployment.  Asymmetric means of attack include the financial cost of ASATs or lasers versus 
satellites, anti-ship ballistic missiles versus aircraft carriers, or an electromagnetic pulse versus an 
NCW-reliant force.  Over-reliance on NCW is a risk in itself as technical difficulties or interruptions to 
service could halt operations.  Another concern is that overly complex systems or interfaces could 
cause information overload or slow productivity.  Finally, autonomous systems, drones, non-lethal 
weapons, and precision strikes are creating new international standards and ethical concerns for 
warfare. 
 
As this chapter has shown, NCW is a component of cyber warfare, because it involves computers and 
hacking; however, it remains a distinct branch.  Using microwaves or radio waves to access the 
computers used by aircraft, satellites, ships, or tanks, is quite different than what is commonly 
thought of as hacking.  Further, defensive aspects such as physical camouflage seem far removed 
from computer networks, yet it can alter the data collection of enemy radar and satellite imagery 
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which are components of computer networks.  In some cases, the use of fibre optic cables or 
removable data storage, allow for non-wireless or non-proximity restricted hacking which is more 
reminiscent of CNO, yet these remain non-Internet networks.  Another distinguishing feature is that 
unlike Internet-connected CNO, where computers can serve a wide range of functions and are not 
seen as a military threat until used for attack or exploitation, the closed networks of NCW are 
explicitly tied to military operations.  Additionally, physical destruction under CNO has thus far been 
minimal and largely restricted to making other computers and networks inoperable.  There are 
theoretical examples of derailing trains or overloading generators to cause explosions, but these 
have a much lower probability of occurring.  On the other hand, NCW computer networks have 
weapons platforms as part of their network and are capable of causing mass casualties, albeit far 
less discrete.  The wide range of military systems, each with highly technical and continually 
changing specifications, in addition to the classified nature of such systems, make it difficult to 
provide a comprehensive examination of NCW hacking. 
 
China possess a regional, but rapidly expanding, NCW capability.  China’s military build-up and 
modernization efforts are closely tied to NCW, as NCW-type systems are the standard for modern 
equipment and China has pursued quality over quantity since the 1980s.  As such, China’s largely 
regional air and naval power projection correlate to NCW capability.  These also fit China’s present 
defensive, sovereignty, and non-expansionist policies, and it fits the stated goal of being able to win 
local wars under conditions of informationization.  This is in part why examination of A2/AD is 
important, because A2/AD fits China’s present NCW capability and concerns.  China possesses a 
large number of military computer systems which will become a part of their system of systems.  
Large scale examples of these existing systems include C4ISR and integrated air defence.  China has 
been developing closed networks specifically for classified information sharing, command and 
control, navigation, precision targeting, and tactical data links.  Key Chinese NCW weapons include 
anti-radiation missiles, anti-ship missiles, ASATs, directed energy weapons, EMP, and jammers, while 
key platforms include advanced submarines, the J-20 and J-31 stealth fighters, KJ-2000 and KJ-200 
AEW&Cs, and a number of UCAVs.  China currently operates around 100 satellites, which provide 
communications, data relay, electronic surveillance, imagery, long distance targeting, meteorological 
information, navigation, radar, and situational awareness.  The majority of these assets are aimed at 
functioning out to the First or Second Island Chains.  Exercises and training under NCW conditions 
became a core priority of the PLA around 2007, with less focused efforts dating back to the 1990s.  
Key strategies which suit China’s current NCW capability include asymmetric tactics and targeting 
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critical nodes.  China’s increasing defence budget, promotion of science and technology education, 
and promotion of high technology industries will further aid the development of NCW.   
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Chapter Six 
 
Application of Cyber Warfare to the Taiwan Issue 
 
Applying Chinese cyber warfare to a particular issue will demonstrate how CNO, IO, and NCW work 
in unison, yet remain distinct.  China has several maritime disputes, from Japan and South Korea in 
the East China Sea and Yellow Sea, to the Philippines and Vietnam in the South China Sea.  The status 
of the Republic of China (Taiwan), however, warrants particular attention as it is a perennial affair.  It 
has been described as “the world’s most dangerous flashpoint” and the most likely to cause a Sino-
US conflict (Pillsbury 2004; China’s Proliferation Practices 2008; Recent Developments in China’s 
Relations with Taiwan and North Korea 2014).  China views the Taiwan situation as a core national 
interest, and it seeks peaceful reunification under the ‘one country, two systems’ principle (China's 
Military Strategy 2015).  At the same time, Chinese policy dictates that it “will absolutely not allow 
Taiwan to be separated from China and will definitely make no promise to give up the use of force.” 
(US Department of Defense 2012).  As a demonstration of this resolve, the PLA has positioned 
approximately 1,200 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) along the Taiwan Strait.  A few hundred 
kilometres are all that separate these missiles from Taiwan’s 23 million inhabitants.  The United 
States, on the other hand, remains committed to the 1979 Taiwan Relations act, which states that 
the US must intervene militarily if China attacks or invades Taiwan, and the US must maintain 
“Taiwan’s self defense capability” (Pillsbury 2004).  The Taiwan situation is further complicated by 
US adherence to the One-China Policy.  This means Washington must tread carefully in all decisions 
pertaining to the matter, so as not to offend either state (USCC Annual Report 2014).   
 
Officially, Beijing, Taipei, and Washington are all opposed to “any destabilizing unilateral changes to 
the status quo”, yet there is continual jostling (US Department of Defense 2014).  Each change in 
government administration among these three brings renewed uncertainty.  Further, there is a high 
risk for incidents to escalate, and under heightened circumstances, there is minimal reaction time.  
As Mark Stokes of the Project 2049 Institute stated in 2010, “every citizen of Taiwan lives within 
seven minutes of destruction” (Taiwan-China: Recent Economic, Political and Military Developments 
across the Strait, and Implications for the United States 2010; Stokes 2010).  In the event of a conflict, 
or preferably, to prevent a conflict, China will seek to leverage its cyber capabilities.  On a strategic 
level, China maintains its pursuit of national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and peaceful 
development, including active defence and the development of informationization (China's Military 
Strategy 2015; Information Office of the State Council 2013).  In relation to the Taiwan issue, the two 
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most likely operational parameters are provided below to show how cyber warfare would be 
implemented, including an overview of tactical options.  Lastly, cyber warfare is not restricted to 
China, so cyber defence considerations, which have not been explored thus far in this thesis, will be 
examined.   
 
 
Victory without War 
 
China will not accept Taiwanese independence, and it has openly shown its capability and 
willingness to use force in this regard; however, Beijing does prefer a peaceful solution.  This is not 
only a reflection of China’s strategic culture, including harmony and defence, or even Sun Zi’s 
deception, it is a logical preference.  A full-scale missile bombardment and amphibious invasion 
“would strain China’s untested armed forces”, and it is the type of operation which would elicit “the 
most serious U.S. military intervention” (Taiwan-China: Recent Economic 2010; US Department of 
Defense 2012).  If China were to fail in its attempt, Taiwan would achieve independence.  If China 
were to prevail, the death and destruction would result in global economic damage, international 
condemnation, and a volatile Taiwanese population (Bronk 2011; China’s Proliferation Practices 
2008).  Cost-benefit analysis may change over time, and maintaining a brute force option provides a 
deterrent; however, current circumstances warrant a more subtle approach.  Cyber warfare can 
accommodate for this.  For example, by using information operations, China can attempt to shape 
Taiwanese public opinion in favour of reunification.  At the same time, computer network 
exploitation can be used to create circumstances which are more favourable to China in the event of 
a conflict.  The founding father of Chinese IW, Shen Weiguang, explains these aspects of cyber 
warfare by citing former US President Richard Nixon.  In Nixon’s book, The Real War, he states 
“there is a gray area between peace and war, and the struggle will be largely decided in that area” 
(Thomas 2004, 36).   
 
As of 2014, the most recent polls revealed 80 percent of Taiwanese were opposed to reunification, 
60 percent identified themselves as “Taiwanese” only (in contrast to “Taiwanese and Chinese”), and 
50 percent viewed China’s attitude toward Taiwan as “unfriendly” (Hammond 2014; Southerland 
2014b; US Department of Defense 2012).  Additionally, a 2013 survey found that the majority of 
Taiwanese favoured the “status quo in cross-Strait political relations for the time being” 
(Southerland 2014a).  China can attempt to change these opinions through the use of online 
propaganda and soft power.  Marketing can be conducted to boost China’s image, highlight the 
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cultural and economic benefits of closer relations, and portray favourable and transparent 
government policies.  Increases in travel and educational exchanges, along with providing special 
treatment to Taiwanese celebrities and influential individuals, can translate into Taiwanese people 
voluntarily, and unknowingly, conducting IO on China’s behalf.  Anti-US commentary and news can 
also be promoted.  Commentators, like the 50 Cent Party, can be used to post comments which are 
favourable to China, and automated scripts can be used to artificially inflate ‘view counts’ and the 
‘thumbs up, thumbs down’ voting of social media.  Shen Weiguang’s 2003 book, titled Deciphering 
Information Security, proposed university courses for Military Information Security Studies.  These 
courses included: computer virus program design and application, a study of hacker methods, 
information attack and defense tactics, and an introduction to US and Taiwan Social Information 
Systems (Thomas 2004, 154-155).  The last course named demonstrates the importance placed on IO 
and China’s view that it belongs to the same field as CNO.   
 
During election cycles, China can seek to influence voters through the purchase of online 
advertisements and by encouraging (through electronic means) Taiwanese business workers in China 
to vote for Beijing’s preferred candidates (Southerland 2014b).  Despite an increase in scepticism 
towards China, public concerns over military action against Taiwan have decreased (Murray 2013; 
Pillsbury 2004).  China will seek to continue, or enhance, this perception as it makes it difficult for 
Taiwan to justify its defence budget, which already has decreased from 3.8 percent of gross 
domestic product in 1994 to 2 percent in 2014 (USCC Annual Report 2014).  Further, Taiwan has 
gradually been converting to an all-volunteer armed force, which is facing difficulties in its ability to 
recruit high calibre volunteers and a cultural bias against military service (Murray 2013).  By 
promoting online news articles which portray Taiwan’s military, or a career in the armed forces, 
negatively, China can exacerbate the situation.  China can also conduct information operations 
against the United States in order to impact Taiwan.  China adamantly voices its opposition of US 
arms sales to Taiwan through traditional and online means, with the two augmenting each other, 
and this has had an effect.  Washington has been accused domestically of becoming overly cautious 
in its dealings with Taiwan out of concern that it will offend China and disrupt economic stability 
(Hammond 2014; Taiwan-China: Recent Economic 2010).  Similarly, this type of control, and the 
One-China Policy, limits US military official’s interaction within Taiwan.  In the event of a conflict, 
commanders could suffer from limited first-hand familiarity of the surroundings, directly impacting 
on the NCW component of cyber warfare (USCC Annual Report 2014).  Lastly, IO can be used to 
recruit Beijing sympathisers, either to enhance operations, such as computer network exploitation 
or technology transfer of NCW equipment, or to embed in Taiwan agents who are capable of 
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conducting PSYOPS or sabotage in a time of conflict.  The latter is connected to cyber warfare in that 
agents are recruited through IO.   
 
One way to entice voluntary reunification is through increased dependence.  Under Taiwanese 
President Ma Ying-jeou, commercial, cultural, and educational ties with China have flourished 
(Southerland 2014a).  Taiwan has struggled to recover from the global economic crisis of 2008-2009, 
and this facilitated agreements with China, including the Economic Cooperation Framework 
Agreement signed in 2010 (Hammond 2014; USCC Annual Report 2013).95  Not only do these 
agreements help in Taiwan’s integration, they also provide China with opportunities for enhanced 
cyber warfare tactics.  The 2014 Sunflower Student Movement, which protested the Cross-Strait 
Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA), reveals how economic arrangements can provide China with 
increased access and influence (Hammond 2014; USCC Annual Report 2014).  Protesters argued that 
the trade agreement opened up Taiwanese telecommunications, publishing, and retail (through the 
favouring of big businesses) to increased Chinese control, thereby threatening Taiwan’s national 
security, freedom of speech, and economy.  Advocates of the agreement argued that unspecified 
details, which would be favourable to Taiwan, would be worked out after the treaty was ratified.  
The CSSTA might represent a recurring tactic used by China in which it takes ‘two steps forward, one 
step back’.96  Additionally, China has pressured media owners to censor content, and encouraged 
the purchase of media outlets by pro-China business people by rewarding or withholding the prize of 
economic opportunities on the mainland (USCC Annual Report 2014).  Botnets or nationalistic hacker 
groups can be used to conduct DDoS attacks as a means of punishing China’s critics.  This provides 
plausible deniability for Beijing, and it encourages self-censorship.  Taiwan has sustained persistent 
attacks from Chinese hackers dating back to the large-scale cyber conflict of 1999 (see Chapter 3) 
(Henderson 2007a; Krekel 2009).  PLA exercises, such as one in 1997 which the Taiwan Central News 
Agency labelled as an attempt to “develop a computer-virus warfare capability”, can be viewed as a 
cyber deterrent or IO intimidation (Thomas 2004, 24).  The Science of Military Strategy advocates 
using strategic deterrence to control the Taiwan situation (Thomas 2004, 305).   
 
During peacetime, computer network exploitation can be used to alter the conditions of a potential 
conflict in China’s favour.  This includes the theft of intellectual property and defence information, as 
                                                          
95 Taiwan’s largest trading partners in 2013 were China, Hong Kong, Japan, and the US; at 22, 7, 11, and 10 
percent, respectively (USCC Annual Report 2014).  This places Taiwan in a difficult position with its largest 
trading partners being roughly split between Chinese and US policy interests. 
96 The two steps forward are considered a bold move; and despite backlash, this is allowed to set.  Eventually, 
one step back is conceded to ease tension, yet it remains a net gain of one step.  Examples include China’s 
establishment of an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, and the placement of an oil 
rig in waters claimed by Vietnam (see Keck 2013; Vuving 2014).   
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well as implanting backdoors in networks and microchips, both of which can enhance CNO and NCW.  
Relevant to security concerns of embedded backdoors, three of Taiwan’s top five imports from China 
are computers, microchips, and mobile phones.  Conversely, and possibly a concern for reverse 
engineering, three of Taiwan’s top five exports to China are microchips, printed circuit boards, and 
semiconductors, which are tested and assembled into products in China (USCC Annual Report 2014).  
Since 2011, concerns have risen over the integrity of media and telecommunications, as a result of 
Chinese business transactions.  Among these is the Huawei Technologies Company, which was 
detailed in Chapter 3 as having been accused of a decade-long string of espionage incidents.   
 
Huawei has a major presence in Taiwan’s telecommunications sector: It has secured 
contracts to supply FarEasTone with approximately $36 million worth of equipment and 
maintenance services for wireless network controllers and base stations and to supply Asia 
Pacific Telecom with approximately $683 million worth of 3.5G networking and 
communications equipment.  It has also built Taiwan Mobile’s fixed-line Ethernet network 
and manufactured many of the headsets marketed by Chunghwa Telecom.  Furthermore, 
nearly all 3G mobile network cards used in Taiwan incorporate parts produced by Huawei 
(USCC Annual Report 2012). 
 
Additional incidents which have drawn government and public opposition include a billion dollar 
deal to “acquire the cable TV services of China Network Systems”, the construction of direct 
undersea cable links between Taiwan and China, and the broadcasting of Chinese radio stations 
(USCC Annual Report 2012).  In addition to disabling service in a time of conflict, these 
communication tools could also be used to provide false information and conduct PSYOPs.  From 
2004 to 2014, there have been approximately 20 high profile incidents of alleged Chinese traditional 
espionage against Taiwan, which directly affect cyber warfare capability (Recent Developments in 
China’s Relations 2014).  Recent cases include a Lenovo computer employee, an air force captain at a 
Taiwan radar surveillance centre, and Major General Lo Hsien-Che, who is believed to have given the 
PRC “highly sensitive information regarding Taiwan military communications and command and 
control systems” (USCC Annual Report 2012).  Increased interaction through the opening up of 
economic and cultural exchanges has allowed increased ability to conduct such activities.  Ironically, 
China can even obtain some value out of espionage activities which have been exposed and resulted 
in arrests.  By using IO, China can weaken the reputation Taiwan’s national security industry.  This 
will problematize military recruitment efforts and lower the perceived ability to defend against an 
invasion.  It can also cause the United States to reconsider the amount and quality of its arms sales 
to Taiwan out of concern that these would be transferred to China.  
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Pre-war preparations can be used to map network architectures, catalogue zero day exploits, and 
establish a covert presence within networks.  In some cases the identification of weak points in 
Taiwan’s critical infrastructure does not require CNE and can be accomplished through IO.  For 
example, natural disasters, such as an earthquake in 1999 and a typhoon in 2001, revealed 
weaknesses and “single-point failure nodes” in Taiwan’s “telecommunications, electric power, and 
transportation infrastructure” (China’s Proliferation Practices 2008).  These weaknesses could be 
targeted through CNA, precision strikes, or physical sabotage.  Further, a landslide revealed that the 
loss of a single power grid tower is capable of knocking out 90 percent of the power grid “in the 
central mountainous region” (China’s Proliferation Practices 2008).  The ability for this type of 
information to be used offensively in a conflict casts suspicions on other agreements, like Taiwan’s 
‘Straits Exchange Foundation’ and China’s ‘Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait’ 
agreeing to cooperate “in the areas of earthquake monitoring and meteorology” (USCC Annual 
Report 2014).  “Building information, including the location of the President’s office”, and daily 
activities, are “openly available on the Internet” (China’s Proliferation Practices 2008).  This is even 
more significant given the lack of security present during the 2004 assassination attempt on 
President Chen Shui-bian and Vice President Annette Lu (President and deputy survive assassination 
attempt 2004).  Further, port statistics and detailed information on the movement of shipments are 
available online.  IO-enabled planning can also yield IO tactics which could be used during conflict, 
such as “an internet rumour in 1999 that a Chinese Su-27 had shot down a Taiwan aircraft [which] 
caused the Taipei stock market to drop more than two percent in less than four hours” (China’s 
Proliferation Practices 2008).  In an effort to ‘win a battle without fighting’, NCW has a minimal role 
due to its direct ties to military hardware.  It does, however, maintain significance and overlap with 
the other branches.  NCW provides a psychological and credible deterrent to conflict, and it is a 
primary recipient of the technology transfer and targeting intelligence obtained through IO and CNE.  
In the event of a conflict, its role dramatically increases. 
 
 
Limited Total War 
 
If the Taiwan situation were to deteriorate into conflict, such as Taiwan declaring independence, it is 
unclear how severe China’s application of force would be.  At one end of the spectrum, China could 
apply the minimal amount of force necessary to return the situation to status quo.  This seems 
unlikely given China’s strong stance against independence and the resolve required by Taiwan to 
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make such a declaration.  At the other end of the spectrum, there is unrestricted warfare, which 
could result in the full application of US force to intervene.  Theoretical examples include China using 
ASAT weapons against US satellites, EMP bursts over continental US, CNA against financial systems, 
IO conducted over broadcast systems, and the full might of China’s armed forces against Taiwan.  
The US possesses equivalent capabilities, in addition to the ability to project power globally in the 
land, air, and sea domains, such as aerial bombardment of the Chinese mainland.  As stated in the 
opening of this chapter’s previous subsection, Victory without War, this is an unlikely escalation 
which all parties hope to avoid; the consequences are too high.  Therefore, the most likely type of 
direct conflict to occur in a Taiwan contingency is an intermediate one.   Even Net-Centric Warfare, 
which is directly tied to traditional military hardware, has been shown to possess characteristics of 
long-distance, precision, and reduced casualties.   
 
China would consider all possibilities, including civilian and commercial targets, yet it would refrain 
from options which have exceedingly high consequences.  Thus, it would be total, yet limited, 
warfare.  According to Mark Stokes, current Chinese doctrine seeks “disruption and paralysis, not 
destruction”; and it draws on the teachings of Mao Zedong who promoted fighting from a great 
distance, disrupting an enemy’s senses, and attempting to confuse commanders (China’s 
Proliferation Practices 2008).  According to the US Department of Defense 2012 Annual Report to 
Congress, the PLA’s best option at present is the use of “limited force or coercive options” (US 
Department of Defense 2012).  This would entail limited computer and traditional attacks against 
key civilian, government, and military targets, along with the use of special operations forces, as 
opposed to a full-scale amphibious landing (Pilger 2015).  The two main centres of gravity in such a 
conflict would be the will to fight on the part of Taiwan and the United States.  China would seek to 
convince Taiwan to surrender as quickly as possible, and it would attempt to deter or delay US 
involvement long enough for Taiwan to do so.  In addition to surgical strikes, assassin’s mace 
techniques would be suitable against Taiwan but not against the US, as this could increase resolve to 
intervene or retaliate (Pillsbury 2004).  In the case of the United States, China would undertake 
restrained actions in accordance with active defence.  When applied to Taiwan, The Science of 
Campaigns and The Science of Military Strategy promote the targeting of C4ISR and logistics 
networks calling them “the heart of information collection, control, and application on the 
battlefield” and “the nerve center of the entire battlefield” (US Department of Defense 2013).   
 
The balance of power in a China-Taiwan conflict has shifted in China’s favour.  China possesses 
approximately 1.25 million active duty personnel, along with more than 2,000 combat aircraft and 
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up to 280 naval vessels that could be used in a Taiwan conflict scenario (US Department of Defense 
2012; USCC Annual Report 2014).  By comparison, Taiwan has roughly 130,000 active duty personnel, 
“410 combat aircraft and 90 naval” ships (US Department of Defense 2012; USCC Annual Report 
2014).  China’s 1,200 mobile SRBMs can be fitted with a range of warheads, including cluster 
munition payloads, which are optimal for runway cratering (Recent Developments in China’s 
Relations 2014; Taiwan-China: Recent Economic 2010; US Department of Defense 2014).  In the 
opening stages of a conflict, China could ground Taiwan’s air force by targeting these runways.  
Between 2004 and 2014, the accuracy of these missiles has improved from around 300 meters to 20 
meters.  Taiwan’s missile defence systems could only stop a small percentage of these due to the 
high volume of incoming missiles and the use of decoys.  Follow-on strikes could target remaining 
aircraft, command and control centres, and ports, while anti-ship missiles could target vessels which 
were out to sea.  Sea Lines of Communications are vital to Taiwan as it imports nearly 98 percent of 
its fossil fuel energy needs and lacks strategic reserves to last beyond two weeks (Hammond 2014).  
As detailed in Chapter 5, China’s modernization efforts have improved its ASBMs, early-warning 
aircraft, integrated air defence, ISR equipment, over-the-horizon radars, stealth aircraft, satellites, 
UAVs, and UCAVs.   
 
NCW works best against an opponent with an intermediate level of NCW development, and Taiwan 
fits this category.  Rigid elements of defence, like “fixed land-based coastal surveillance radars” and 
a “lack of mobile systems”, combined with “insufficient infrastructure hardening”, provide attractive 
targets for PLA precision strikes (Pilger 2015; USCC Annual Report 2013).  Special operations forces, 
which have an increased role under NCW, can provide battle damage assessment, reconnaissance 
information for targeting, and sabotage, all of which are aided by the pre-conflict intelligence 
gathered through CNO and IO.  Further, these forces can serve to overtake and hold key facilities 
with a reduced profile, such as Russia’s alleged actions in the annexation of Crimea (Ash 2015).  
Obtaining entry into Taiwan prior to the conflict has been eased, due to “ethnic and linguistic 
homogeneity and the dramatic increases in cross-strait people flows” (China’s Proliferation Practices 
2008).  Meanwhile, IO and CNO could be used to spread misinformation among the populace, such 
as falsified declarations of surrender, inaccurate war assessments, US abandonment, or a popular 
sentiment to ‘lay down arms’.   
 
Depending on operational assessments, China may choose to use surgical strikes against key 
networks and nodes or take a scattershot approach.   The former is more difficult to accomplish, but 
it minimizes damage.  If China opts for maximum impact, it could begin disrupting, denying, 
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degrading, or destroying as many networks as it is capable of, including critical nodes with a desire 
to cause cascading failures.  The director of Taiwan’s National Security Bureau stated in 2013 that 
Chinese CNA and CNE which traditionally target government networks, had shifted focus towards 
“civilian think tanks, telecommunications service providers, Internet node facilities and traffic signal 
control systems” (Hsiao 2013).  While there has been a lack of reported state-sponsored CNA, and 
computer networks encompass a great range of technical specifications, it remains a credible threat.  
Non-state actors have demonstrated a wide range of possibilities, and the 15-year span of CNE 
incidents detailed in Chapter 3 show an even greater range of targets whose networks were capable 
of being breached.  Maintaining a covert presence within networks prior to conflict, and spreading 
latent malware that contains a timer or can be remotely activated, can allow for a mass attack to be 
synchronized.  At the start of conflict, and without prior notice, China could quickly mobilize full-
scale online people’s war by employing its large Internet population, militias, and botnets, guided by 
IO, PLA officers, and the leaders of hacker groups who could disseminate commands and automated 
toolkits.  This would add quantity to quality.  Web page defacements and DDoS could weaken 
Taiwan’s morale and disrupt communication, possibly causing panic.  If ICT services remain online, 
propaganda images and texts could be sent to mobile phones, and malware-laden emails could be 
sent purporting to contain links to breaking news on the war or government service announcements.  
Attacking financial networks and point of sale software would disrupt the ability of society to 
function.  This could be coupled with tangible strikes on undersea fibre-optic cables, communication 
nodes, and transportation chokepoints.  While chaos ensues in Taiwan under blackout conditions, 
China could use IO internationally to minimize negative perceptions and disguise the true nature of 
the situation.  Domestically, China could censor negative information and propagandize the conflict. 
 
In the event of a Taiwan conflict, China would use cyber warfare to delay US involvement long 
enough for Taiwan to capitulate.  At the same time, it would do so in a restrained fashion, if possible, 
to limit the US response after reunification.  One asymmetric means for accomplishing this is to 
target the logistics apparatus of US force deployment, such as NIPRNet and USTRANSCOM (see 
Chapter 3 for previous intrusions into these systems) (Committee on Armed Services United States 
Senate 2014; Krekel 2009; Mulvenon 1999; Tkacik 2008; US Department of Defense 2012; USCC 
Annual Report 2008).  This includes the organization of forces, food supplies, uniforms, and/or 
communication which are often organised through networks that are connected to the Internet.  
CNO could also delay re-supply to the region by misdirecting stores, fuel, and munitions, corrupting 
or deleting inventory files, and thereby hindering mission capability.  The US is at a geographic 
disadvantage in a Taiwan conflict.  While Taiwan is roughly 180 km from China, it is 2,780 km from 
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Guam, 8,150 km from Hawaii, and 10,370 km from the US west coast (Taiwan-China: Recent 
Economic 2010).  If the PLA lacks the ability to find exploits in these networks, they could simply 
conduct DDoS attacks to bring them down long enough for a Taiwanese surrender.  The United 
States’ reliance on commercial entities for communications could also be targeted, and a significant 
disruption would tax a limited amount of IT personnel capable of administering fixes (Bronk 2011).  
Non-Internet military communications, including satellites, could also be disrupted through 
electronic jamming.  By using proxies, China could use US computers to conduct attacks on other 
states, or use the computers of other states to conduct attacks on the US, in the hope that it will 
draw them into conflict with each other.  If China is unable to delay the United States through such 
methods, or a strong US presence was already in the theatre of operations at the onset of hostilities, 
China may have to conduct limited kinetic strikes and forgo anonymity.   
 
China could use anti-access area denial methods outlined in Chapter 5 to conduct a blinding 
campaign against US C4ISR and use anti-ship missiles to push US aircraft carriers outside the First 
Island Chain (Krekel, Adams, and Bakos 2012).  A less lethal method could be the use of non-nuclear 
EMP warheads to disable an aircraft carrier and serve as a warning shot (Thomas 2009, 224).  
Penetrating the on-board computer systems of aircraft and ships, or activating latent kill-switches 
and exploiting backdoors in military hardware microchips, are all theoretically possible.  These are 
more difficult objectives to achieve than A2/AD capabilities; however, allegations of Chinese CNE 
have shown a long-term and sustained effort to develop such a capability (China’s Proliferation 
Practices 2008).  Attention has been paid to accessing information on a specific system, like the F-35 
fighter jet, and the concept of embedding exploits in microchips has been discussed by the PLA since 
1988.  Escalating the situation, extended range precision strikes could target runways and key 
facilities at forward bases in Japan (Taiwan-China: Recent Economic 2010).  This could precipitate a 
decision to expand operations and seize the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, since many political lines would 
already have been crossed.  Alternatively, China could abstain from kinetic strikes against the US and 
Japan, and instead target computer networks in the United States.  It is unlikely that severe 
disruptions to US critical infrastructure could distract or delay military intervention, especially in a 
conflict which China would prefer to keep short, but these disruptions could serve as a deterrent.  
When combined with IO, it could also be used to turn popular US opinion against involvement. 
 
 
Cyber Defence Considerations 
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Cyber warfare is not restricted to China, so Beijing must consider, and attempt to counter, Taiwan’s 
capability in this field.  Like China and the United States, Taiwan is developing its NCW capability (for 
greater detail on US and Chinese NCW, see Chapter 5).  Taiwan has sought to improve its C4ISR and 
streamline forces, and to this end, it has introduced “one of the world’s most sophisticated 
advanced tactical data link networks” (Taiwan-China: Recent Economic 2010; Pillsbury 2004).  As of 
2014, this system remains in the early stages of development.  Although, these data links are a 
significant step towards interconnecting command, platforms, sensors, and shooters that will 
provide enhanced situational awareness and survivability.  Adding to this, the United States 
approved arms sales to Taiwan worth over $12 billion in the period 2010-2014 since 2010, including 
upgrades to Taiwan’s F-16 A/B fighter jets (US Department of Defense 2014; USCC Annual Report 
2014).  These upgrades comprise a number of items which are frequently mentioned in Net-Centric 
Warfare literature, such as active electronically scanned array radars, data link terminals, GPS 
navigation equipment, helmet targeting systems, improved communication equipment, improved 
electronic warfare systems, laser-guided munitions, logistical support, night vision systems, and 
updated cockpit computer systems (USCC Annual Report 2011).  Taiwan also operates variants of the 
US Lockheed P-3 Orion reconnaissance aircraft.  The One-China Policy limits Taiwan’s options for the 
purchase of weapons; however, it is domestically developing long-range anti-ship cruise missiles, 
stealth technology, UAVs, and UCAVs (USCC Annual Report 2014).  Collaboration between Taiwan 
and the United States could increase, particularly under administration changes and as the US 
rebalance to Asia policy evolves.  Taiwan is located in an advantageous position for enhanced ISR 
against China and shares common security and political views with the US.   
 
Similar to China, yet at an earlier stage of development, Taiwan can develop A2/AD capabilities until 
its NCW competency matures.  Taiwan’s 2013 Quadrennial Defense Review calls for “fielding 
innovative and asymmetric capabilities” (USCC Annual Report 2013).  Among these are truck-
mounted cruise missiles which utilize commercial radar and anti-radiation systems for target 
acquisition (Recent Developments in China’s Relations 2014).  Taiwan’s expanding patrol fleet is 
another example of asymmetric capability.  These ships incorporate stealth technology and are 
armed with anti-ship cruise missiles, AV-2 decoy launchers, and electronic warfare support (Murray 
2013 Pilger 2015).  In comparison to some of the most advanced NCW systems, these are relatively 
inexpensive, allowing for greater numbers to be fielded, and their mobility will challenge the extent 
of China’s speed and precision targeting.  Additional efforts are underway to harden fixed targets 
and limit the PLA’s ability to deny Taiwan use of its runways.  For the latter, Taiwan is improving its 
“rapid runway repair”, reducing the take-off weight of aircraft to limit the required length of 
158 
 
runways, and exploring the option of highway landings (Recent Developments in China’s Relations 
2014).  While China’s arsenal of SRBMs is imposing, it also contains a potential asymmetric 
weaknesses by virtue of being a networked system, and Taiwan has reportedly identified single point 
failures within this system (Taiwan-China: Recent Economic 2010; USCC Annual Report 2013).  Even 
if Taiwan cannot defeat a Chinese invasion, its goal is to raise the cost of such an attempt to an 
unacceptable level, or delay long enough for US assistance.  In this regard, the inability of Taiwan’s 
runways to sustain an air campaign, or the inability of Taiwan’s missile defence systems to stop all 
incoming missiles, does not mean such pursuits should be abandoned; they raise the stakes in 
China’s calculations.  Further, continued pursuit of these systems advances Taiwan’s long-term NCW 
capabilities.   
 
Taiwan is frequently targeted by alleged Chinese CNO and has endured such intrusions for more 
than a decade (Hsiao 2013).  As a result, Taiwan’s computer network defence has strengthened.  It 
established one of the world’s first “cyber operations commands in 1999” and has operated cyber 
units since the mid-1990s (Recent Developments in China’s Relations 2014).  Taiwan has a thriving 
computer security industry and possesses access to China’s microchip supply chains; therefore, like 
China, Taiwan could explore the use of embedded exploits to corrupt systems.  China’s increasing 
reliance on computer networks and ties to Taiwan provide new avenues for attack.  Taipei-based 
corporations that employ or handle the financial transactions of Chinese workers in the mainland, 
for example, could cease communications with China in time of conflict, thereby preventing millions 
of Chinese workers from receiving their income deposits (Recent Developments in China’s Relations 
2014).  Taiwan’s Information and Electronic Warfare Command is comprised of 3,000 military 
officers (Hsiao 2013).  As of 2014, Taiwan is increasing its cyber warfare budget, bolstering the 
defence of C4ISR networks, increasing inspections, and increasing the training of personnel (USCC 
Annual Report 2014).  A fourth cyber unit was also established within the Ministry of National 
Defence, and a cyber warfare simulation facility was constructed to test the defences of Taiwan’s 
civilian critical infrastructure (USCC Annual Report 2013).  China allegedly tests its CNO capabilities 
against Taiwanese systems and uses Taiwan computer networks as a staging ground for conducting 
attacks against the United States (Gold 2013).  This mutual threat fosters Taiwan-US collaboration, 
and Taiwan has sought participation in US cyber exercises (Gold and Wu 2015).  The US can gain 
valuable knowledge from Taiwan due to its experience in dealing with Chinese intrusions and its 
shared language and cultural understanding (USCC Annual Report 2014). 
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Chinese cyber strategies have the potential to backfire.  China’s quasi-endorsement or tolerance of 
patriotic hackers, for instance, could result in these groups undermining an operation such as 
conflict with Taiwan (China’s Proliferation Practices 2008).  Information operations in particular can 
have unintended influence.  The Sunflower Student Movement demonstrates the level of mistrust 
China must overcome, yet overly friendly messages intended to boost soft power might be viewed 
as propaganda.  China cannot remove the threat of force or Taiwan would declare independence, 
yet having 1,200 SRBMs across the narrow strait makes it difficult to establish trust and a favourable 
relationship (Recent Developments in China’s Relations 2014).  Taiwan or the US could conduct their 
own IO to heighten this threat perception as a way to achieve public support for increased defence 
spending.  China must compete with the globally produced messages reaching Taiwan; there is no 
Golden Shield to aid in this task.  Developments in Hong Kong, it should be noted, are closely 
followed by Taiwanese people and impact negatively on the ‘one country, two systems’ principle 
(USCC Annual Report 2014). 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Cyber warfare occupies a central role in China’s attempts to reunify with Taiwan, and it can be 
applied flexibly.  During peacetime, information operations are key, as China is attempting to 
influence Taiwan’s actions – including a relinquishing of media control, establishing favourable 
public opinion, and the fostering of greater dependence.  At the same time, computer network 
exploitation is used as a contingency to prepare for conflict.  In a sense, the keys to virtual doors are 
obtained and virtual explosives are planted.  Online espionage also provides NCW technology 
transfer, while NCW itself is relegated to a deterrent role.  This is China’s preferred strategy.  
However, if conflict becomes necessary, the application of cyber warfare adapts.  IO remains 
important, but its significance is eclipsed by the then dominant NCW and computer network attack.  
Cyber warfare is also applied differently to the two opponents in this scenario.  For the US, China 
seeks to delay and deter with minimal damage inflicted.  For Taiwan, China prefers key-point strikes, 
but the speed of the operation is paramount.  The primary goal is Taiwanese surrender and 
reunification, so a scattershot approach may be permitted depending on capability and assurance.  
This breakdown in the application of cyber warfare to the Taiwan issue does not apply equally in all 
situations.  It is a fluid formula to account for the high number of variables in international relations.  
The tripartite of cyber warfare remains conducive to China’s goals and strategic culture, while 
offering a holistic approach and creating synergy. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
Conclusion 
 
Through a conceptual framework and historical analysis, this research has addressed gaps in China’s 
strategic doctrine and the field of cyber warfare.  A lack of transparency in Chinese military affairs, 
the infancy of the field of cyber warfare, and unconsolidated cyber terminology contributed to the 
absence of China’s cyber warfare doctrine in open source material.  These problems were addressed 
through a comprehensive literature review and the development of an all-inclusive terminology 
model, based on key traits and majority patterns.  Chapter Two of this thesis found that computer 
network operations aids China’s modernization goals, and it corresponds to China’s historical 
tendency towards asymmetric warfare.  The PLA acknowledged the existence of offensive cyber 
units to international audiences in 2011 and 2013, although PLA literature places their creation one 
decade prior (Beech 2011; Gady 2015; Guo, Gu, and Wu 2011; Lewis 2011; Thomas 2004, 61; Tiezzi 
2015).  It was found that China maintains at least 20 cyber units, 33 CNO militia, and 250 hacker 
groups (China’s Proliferation Practices 2008; Clayton 2012; Mandiant 2013; Riley and Dune 2012; 
Segal 2012; USCC Annual Report 2008; USCC Annual Report 2009).  Key entities responsible for the 
development of CNO are the General Staff Department’s Third and Fourth Departments (see 
Diagram 3).  Computer network attack is handled by the Fourth Department, while exploitation and 
defence are the responsibility of the Third Department.  A collection of additional departments and 
ministries within the Central Military Commission and the State Council provide supplementary 
activities.  All computers which are connected to the Internet are susceptible to hacking, and 
intruders can obtain up to complete control, therefore the range of targets and types of theoretical 
tactics are immense.  Networks with unique architectures, such as industrial control systems, mobile 
phones, point of sale systems, and satellites, are also vulnerable to attack and exploitation.  Civilian 
networks are particularly vulnerable as the perceived risk must outweigh the cost of implementing 
advanced security measures.   
 
As of 2014, there have been few state-sponsored computer network attacks.  However, criminal 
organisations, hacker groups, and other non-state actors, have demonstrated that attacks are 
possible.  Documented examples include attacks on electrical grids, financial systems, and 
transportation networks (CBS 60 Minutes 2009; DCSINT 2005; Lewis 2010; Lourdeau 2004; Maynor 
and Graham 2006; Verni 2010; Vijayan 2007; Wilson 2003; Wilson 2008).  In contrast, computer 
network exploitation seeks to remain covert.  Global reach and a high degree of anonymity make 
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CNE ideal for the theft of intellectual property, although it also provides the ability to eavesdrop and 
setup for an attack.  One way to prepare for a potential conflict is the use of embedded backdoors, 
and PLA theorists have been researching this concept since the late 1980s (Thomas 2004, 45; Tkacik 
2008).  With the world’s largest Internet population, and second largest economy, China is 
frequently the target of computer attack and exploitation by non-state actors.  Additionally, as of 
2014, there are over 100 states developing CNO capabilities (Brodkin 2007; Hopkins 2011; McAfee 
2009; Paget 2013).  There have been three recorded incidents in which non-state actors have 
targeted Chinese industrial control systems, and four incidents of state-sponsored exploitation 
targeting large Chinese information gateways (Lam 2013; Weiss 2010, 144).  These are in addition to 
thousands of smaller attacks recorded each year by China’s Computer Network Emergency Response 
Technical Team.  Further, the widespread media attention given to alleged Chinese CNE, may make 
Chinese computers a preferred choice for use as proxies in attacks by other states.  China’s negative 
reputation could add to the belief that China was the culprit.   
 
Chapter Three traced the origins of PLA cyber units to the founding of hacker groups between the 
years 1998 and 2002.  Nationalism served as a common bond between these groups, and they were 
involved in large scale conflicts with Indonesia, Japan, Taiwan, and the United States (Henderson 
2007a).  These groups were not state-sponsored, and their primary mode of operations was attack, 
yet they are credited with demonstrating the Internet’s emerging military application.  Further, their 
computer expertise made them candidates for recruitment by the PLA (China’s Proliferation 
Practices 2008).  Allegations of Chinese state-sponsored CNE gained cohesion around 2002 and 
increased steadily throughout 2014.  This research identified and analysed 19 advanced persistent 
threats and over 100 individual CNE incidents which were attributed to China based on six 
attribution factors.   Intrusions spanned 71 countries and targeted the full spectrum of industries, 
from critical infrastructure and corporations, to government and military networks (see Appendix 1).  
Online espionage allows instantaneous global reach, plausible deniability, and minimal repercussions.  
Among these incidents there were recurring themes, such as allegations of implanting backdoors in 
microchips, particularly by the Huawei Technologies Company and the computer manufacturer 
Lenovo (Krekel 2009; Tkacik 2008; USCC Annual Report 2012).  NASA and information pertaining to 
the F-35 fighter aircraft were frequent targets, and there was an alleged pattern of using traditional 
espionage to facilitate online espionage (Elgin and Epstein 2008; HBGary 2011; Martin 2012; 
Thornburgh 2005; USCC Annual Report 2009; US Attorney’s Office 2014).  Between 2010 and 2014, 
international condemnation of alleged Chinese exploitation experienced a sharp increase.  Open 
source material from this period contains a greater amount of evidence linking intrusions to state-
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sponsorship and stronger stances in assigning blame (Mandiant 2013; US Department of Defense 
2013).  This four-year span was also marked by high profile withdrawals of government and 
commercial contracts with China, and increased legal action taken against accused perpetrators 
(HBGary 2010; McDonald and McGuirk 2012; Su Bin Indictment 2014; The United States Department 
of Justice 2014; USCC Annual Report 2010).  Despite these counter-actions, there has been no 
reduction in alleged intrusions.  
 
In Chapter Four, information operations was found to occupy a large role in Chinese strategy, 
despite being the only legal97 (non-hacking) branch of cyber warfare.  The Three Warfares was found 
to be an inadequate way of conceptualizing IO, and it was replaced by the concept of online 
messages influencing actions (Thomas 2009, 112, 221-223; Wortzel 2013, 151).  This encompasses 
Internet censorship, media, propaganda, and psychological operations, and it can target domestic 
(internal) or foreign (external) audiences.  Further, IO can be utilized during peace or war.  
Information operations exploitation uses false, misleading, or true messages to cause a desired 
action, while information operations defence attempts to block, change, or counter undesirable 
messages.  These messages can be transmitted through a range of mediums, such as commentary, 
images, news, or video.  A number of tactics were revealed for promoting or demoting messages, 
such as drowning out negative comments, blocking specific languages, and artificially inflating polls 
(Access to Information 2008; Cuban 2008).  In comparison to other states, China exerts a high level 
of control over domestic Internet activities.  This is epitomized by the Golden Shield, which utilizes a 
multi-layered approach to censorship.  Information being transmitted to China is first filtered at 
large international hubs and subsequently scrutinized by an array of individuals and software 
programs (Clarke and Knake 2010, 161).  An array of government entities was identified as fostering 
the development of Chinese IO dating back to the mid-1990s (see Diagram 3).  These organisations 
were spread throughout the Central Military Commission and State Council, and efforts are 
underway to streamline this apparatus.  China utilizes thousands of paid commentators, known as 
the 50 Cent Party, to boost public support of government policies and improve China’s image 
(Bristow 2008; Thomas 2009, 90).  Defensively, China must prevent foreign and domestic messages 
from revealing state secrets, threatening national security, or causing social unrest. 
 
Chapter Five examined the historical and linguistic ties which interconnect Net-Centric Warfare with 
the Revolution in Military Affairs, Electronic Warfare, Anti-Access Area Denial, and 
Informationization.  By consolidating these core concepts on the future of warfare, an improved 
                                                          
97 This is legal at a state-level; it does not apply to individuals who use IO to aid criminal activity or cause social 
disturbances. 
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understanding of Chinese NCW development was obtained.  NCW was revealed to be largely 
synonymous with RMA and informationization, and it possesses the most descriptive and precise 
term among the three (Alberts, Garstka, and Stein 2000; Information Office of the State Council 2008; 
Metz and Kievit 1995; Wilson 2007).  Electronic warfare has been identified as a subcomponent of 
NCW, and A2/AD is the use of NCW under set conditions (Electronic Warfare 2007; Tol, Gunzinger, 
Krepinevich, and Thomas 2010).  Net-Centric Warfare rose to prominence in the 1990s following US 
technologic dominance in the Gulf War.  NCW refers to the linking of command, platforms, sensors, 
and shooters through computer networks.  Advanced military hardware relies on computerized 
systems and networks, and NCW seeks to link all of these systems together, within a ‘system of 
systems’ (International Institute for Strategic Studies 2015; Krekel, Adams, and Bakos 2012).  This 
allows enhanced situational awareness, increased speed, increased precision, and the ability to act 
from long distances with smaller forces.  In short, it increases overall battlefield effectiveness and 
efficiency.  NCW is not only the application of advanced technologies and networked systems, it is 
changes in strategy, organisation, and training which allow a military to take full advantage of their 
potential.  A recurring theme is the proliferation of technology, which is allowing less advanced 
militaries to rapidly improve their capability, as well as adopt asymmetric tactics to place NCW-
dominant militaries at risk.  Identified drawbacks to implementing NCW include a high financial cost, 
the rapid pace of technologic change, and the introduction of new vulnerabilities, such as 
information overload and an inability to function in the event of a network disruption.  As of 2014, 
China possesses a regional NCW capability and is rapidly advancing (US Department of Defense 
2014).   
 
Chapter Six applied China’s cyber warfare capability to the Taiwan issue.  This revealed two primary 
operational strategies.  The first is to attain reunification with Taiwan without conflict.  This entails 
the use of information operations to boost China’s image among the Taiwanese population.  IO is 
also used to increase cross-strait economic and cultural integration, deter US arms sales, and 
empower pro-reunification Taiwanese politicians and business owners (Hammond 2014).  At the 
same time, CNE is used to prepare for the possibility of conflict (USCC Annual Report 2012).  This 
includes embedding backdoors in microchips, mapping networks, and maintaining a covet presence 
within networks.  CNE can also yield technology transfer to boost China’s NCW capability, and this 
capability can be used as a deterrent to conflict.  If the Taiwan issue were to deteriorate, and conflict 
was deemed necessary, China would change its operational procedure.  China would attempt to 
obtain Taiwan’s surrender before the US could intervene.  NCW and CNA would be used to target 
critical nodes within Taiwan, such as C4ISR, runways, and civilian communication and transport hubs 
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(China’s Proliferation Practices 2008).  Special Forces would also be utilized, rather than a full scale 
amphibious invasion.  Key point strikes and Special Forces are characteristic of NCW, which places an 
emphasis on long-distance precision strikes, speed, and streamlined forces.  China would take a 
more restrained approach in regard to US forces, in order to minimize consequences.  This includes 
targeting C4ISR and the logistical aspects of force deployment by using NCW and CNE respectively 
(Mulvenon 2013).  CNA against US civilian computer networks, such as financial systems, could act as 
a deterrent.  Similarly, if necessary, anti-ship missiles, jamming, and precision strikes on forward 
bases could be used to push the US fleet outside of the First Island Chain (Krepinevich 2010).  During 
conflict IO would be used to weaken enemy morale and cause confusion or fear.  Beyond opponents, 
IO can be used to minimize negative perceptions of the conflict and win support.  Cyber warfare 
suits China’s strategic culture and offers an enhanced, and fluid, means to attain its goals.   
 
The foregoing chapters of this thesis have provided four significant contributions to the field of study 
and articulated an emerging Chinese doctrine of cyber warfare.  First, a clear conceptual model for 
cyber warfare terminology has been created.  Second, government organisations responsible for the 
development of cyber warfare have been identified and visually mapped.  Third, a complete list of 
open source allegations of Chinese CNE has been assembled and analysed.  Fourth, a comprehensive 
review and historical analysis of China’s cyber warfare development has been conducted.  These 
four contributions do not exist in open source knowledge, let alone in such depth and focus.   
 
There are several key trends present in China’s cyber warfare doctrine.  First, China takes a holistic 
approach (USCC Annual Report 2012).  This is evident the three branch terminology model which 
was developed in accordance with the literature, and evident in their willingness to target civilian 
and non-military targets, which in some cases is less destructive.  Second, there is a focus on 
attacking critical nodes (Andress and Winterfeld 2011, 43; Clarke and Knake 2010, 161; Krekel, 
Adams, and Bakos 2012; Lam 2013).  In CNO this comprises information hubs, critical infrastructure, 
and nodes which can cause cascading failures or disrupt the will of an opposing force.  Examples of 
key point strikes in NCW are C4ISR and logistics (US Department of Defense 2013).  China also 
maintains a scattershot approach as well, as shown in online people’s war.  Reflective of China’s 
strategic culture, Sun Zi’s deception flourishes in cyber warfare.  This is exemplified by China’s 
alleged preference towards CNE to leapfrog in modernization and use of information operations to 
impact on an opponent’s will to fight, rather than resorting to direct conflict.  China is pursuing 
asymmetric deterrents and utilizing CNE in the short term, while building towards regional 
dominance and securing global interest.  A final identified pattern is China’s preference for spear 
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phishing as a low-level means of breaching computer networks (HBGary 2011; Lawrence and Riley 
2013; Mandiant 2013; Stokes and Hsiao 2012; USCC Annual Report 2009). 
 
Supporting the above observations is a body of literature that suggests China is pursuing a more 
streamlined structure for cyber warfare organisation and development.  This was evidenced by the 
transition from INEW to information confrontation, and the renaming of the Internet Security and 
Informationization Leading Group.  By using the three branch model proposed in this thesis, which is 
based on architectural distinctions, China (among other states) could consolidate terminology and 
collaboratively develop new concepts based on a shared model, rather than developing competing 
and overlapping concepts (see Diagram 1; Table 1).  Additional solutions were revealed in the 
identification and visual mapping of key government entities responsible for the development of 
cyber warfare (see Diagram 3).  Currently, the 3PLA has responsibility for CNE and CND, while CNA is 
assigned to the 4PLA.  However, the three components of computer network operations utilize the 
same skillset and equipment.  Additionally, a hacker can transition seamlessly from exploitation to 
attack.  Therefore, it would be more productive to place all CNO components under the same 
authority.  Secondly, EW is separate from the Department of Informationization, yet these too would 
utilize the same equipment and skills.  Lastly, IO has the most dispersed authority of all three 
branches.  Consolidating these activities through the GPD and SCIO appears to be the optimal choice.   
 
The increasing international condemnation over alleged Chinese computer network exploitation 
between the years of 2010 and 2014, along with the over 100 incidents and 19 APTs revelled in 
Chapter Three have implications for policy and practice.  If these allegations are true, China should 
attempt to improve its CNE stealth capability.  In either case, subtle application of IO could be used 
to help repair China’s reputation in this regard. 
 
Three recommendations for further research emerge from this thesis.  First, research could be 
conducted to provide greater detail on the technical specifications of NCW equipment.  In particular, 
it could seek to identify the degree to which these systems are different from one another, and 
whether there are sets of hacking methods to which a great number of systems are vulnerable.  
Second, an investigation into semi-closed networks could reveal the degree to which these networks 
are separated from the Internet.  Subsequently, Diagram 2: Venn of Cyber Warfare with Select 
Callouts could be adjusted to reflect more accurately the revised understanding.  Lastly, the 
application of Chinese cyber warfare demonstrated in Chapter 6 could be applied to other situations, 
such as a potential conflict with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.  Application to multiple 
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scenarios might reveal trends which are present in a majority of situations, or possibly, common to 
the application of cyber warfare as a whole, not only China. 
 
The literature contains no comprehensive and clear view of China’s cyber warfare doctrine, because 
China has never published one.  This research has shown a holistic conceptual and historical 
approach can reveal more than the literature suggests.  In doing so, it has established a foundation 
stone for scholarly research on a topic of profound significance to China’s wider strategic doctrine.    
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Appendix 1: Countries Allegedly Exploited By China and Supporting References 
 
Afghanistan (Kaspersky Lab 2013a) 
Armenia (Villeneuve and Sancho 2011) 
Australia  (China blamed after ASIO 2013; China says hit 2011; Doherty, Gegeny, Spasojevic, 
and Baltazar 2013; Kaspersky Lab 2013a; Krekel 2009; ONCIX 2011; Tkacik 2008; 
USCC Annual Report 2012; USCC Annual Report 2013; Wilkinson 2010) 
Austria  (Kaspersky Lab 2013a; Kaspersky Lab 2013b; Villeneuve and Sancho 2011) 
Azerbaijan (Villeneuve and Sancho 2011) 
Bangladesh  (Information Warfare Monitor 2009; Kaspersky Lab 2013a) 
Barbados  (Information Warfare Monitor 2009) 
Belarus (Kaspersky Lab 2013a; Kaspersky Lab 2013b; Villeneuve and Sancho 2011) 
Belgium  (Chien and O’Gorman 2011; Information Warfare Monitor 2009; Kaspersky Lab 
2013a; Luard 2005; Mandiant 2013; US Department of Defense 2009)  
Bhutan   (Information Warfare Monitor 2009) 
Brazil  (Novetta 2014) 
Brunei   (Information Warfare Monitor 2009) 
Cambodia (Kaspersky Lab 2013a; Villeneuve and Sancho 2011) 
Canada  (Alperovitch 2011; Doherty, Gegeny, Spasojevic, and Baltazar 2013; Information 
Warfare Monitor 2010; Kaspersky Lab 2013a; Tkacik 2008; Mandiant 2013; Nortel hit 
by suspected Chinese 2012; USCC Annual Report 2012)  
Chile  (Kaspersky Lab 2013a) 
Cyprus  (Information Warfare Monitor 2009) 
Czech Republic (Villeneuve and Sancho 2011) 
Denmark  (Alperovitch 2011; Chien and O’Gorman 2011) 
France  (Committee on Foreign Affairs 2011; Doherty, Gegeny, Spasojevic, and Baltazar 2013; 
Jowitt 2013; Kaspersky Lab 2013b; Krekel 2009; Luard 2005; Mandiant 2013; ONCIX 
2011; Tkacik 2008; Villeneuve and Sancho 2011)  
Germany   (Alperovitch 2011; Digital Spying Burdens 2013; Doherty, Gegeny, Spasojevic, and 
Baltazar 2013; Glanz and Markoff 2010; Information Warfare Monitor 2009; Jowitt 
2013; Kaspersky Lab 2013a; Kaspersky Lab 2013b; Krekel 2009; Tkacik 2008; USCC 
Annual Report 2012; Villeneuve and Sancho 2011) 
Greece (Kaspersky Lab 2013a) 
India  (Alperovitch 2011; Doherty, Gegeny, Spasojevic, and Baltazar 2013; Information 
Warfare Monitor 2009; Information Warfare Monitor 2010; Kaspersky Lab 2013a; 
Luckycat Redux 2012; Mandiant 2013; Tkacik 2008; US Department of Defense 2009; 
USCC Annual Report 2012; Villeneuve and Sancho 2011) 
Indonesia  (Alperovitch 2011; Honker Union of China 2010; Information Warfare Monitor 2009; 
Kaspersky Lab 2013a; Novetta 2014) 
Iran   (Information Warfare Monitor 2009; Kaspersky Lab 2013a) 
Ireland  (Doherty, Gegeny, Spasojevic, and Baltazar 2013) 
Israel  (Mandiant 2013)  
Italy  (Chien and O’Gorman 2011; Kaspersky Lab 2013b)  
Japan  (Alperovitch 2011; Chien and O’Gorman 2011; Doherty, Gegeny, Spasojevic, and 
Baltazar 2013; Honker Union of China 2010; Kaspersky Lab 2013a; Kaspersky Lab 
2013b; Krekel 2009; Luckycat Redux 2012; Mandiant 2013; Novetta 2014; Raff 2013; 
USCC Annual Report 2012)  
Jordan  (Kaspersky Lab 2013a) 
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Kazakhstan (Kaspersky Lab 2013a; Villeneuve and Sancho 2011) 
Kyrgyzstan (Kaspersky Lab 2013a; Villeneuve and Sancho 2011) 
Latvia   (Information Warfare Monitor 2009) 
Lithuania (Kaspersky Lab 2013a) 
Luxemburg (Mandiant 2013)  
Malaysia (Doherty, Gegeny, Spasojevic, and Baltazar 2013; Kaspersky Lab 2013a; Kaspersky 
Lab 2013b; USCC Annual Report 2013)  
Maldives  (Kaspersky Lab 2013b) 
Malta   (Information Warfare Monitor 2009) 
Mongolia (Kaspersky Lab 2013a; Villeneuve and Sancho 2011) 
Morocco (Kaspersky Lab 2013a) 
Nepal  (Kaspersky Lab 2013a) 
Netherlands (Chien and O’Gorman 2011; Kaspersky Lab 2013b; Villeneuve and Sancho 2011) 
New Zealand  (Krekel 2009; Tkacik 2008) 
Norway  (Mandiant 2013)  
Pakistan  (Information Warfare Monitor 2009; Information Warfare Monitor 2010; Kaspersky 
Lab 2013a; Kaspersky Lab 2013b; Villeneuve and Sancho 2011) 
Philippines  (Information Warfare Monitor 2009; Krekel 2009; Passeri 2012)  
Portugal  (Information Warfare Monitor 2009) 
Qatar  (Kaspersky Lab 2013a) 
Romania (Information Warfare Monitor 2009) 
Russia (Doherty, Gegeny, Spasojevic, and Baltazar 2013; Kaspersky Lab 2013a; Kaspersky 
Lab 2013b; Villeneuve and Sancho 2011) 
Saudi Arabia (Chien and O’Gorman 2011)  
Singapore  (Alperovitch 2011; Doherty, Gegeny, Spasojevic, and Baltazar 2013; Kaspersky Lab 
2013b; Mandiant 2013)  
Slovenia (Kaspersky Lab 2013a) 
South Africa (Mandiant 2013)  
South Korea  (Alperovitch 2011; Doherty, Gegeny, Spasojevic, and Baltazar 2013; Information 
Warfare Monitor 2009; Kaspersky Lab 2013a; Kaspersky Lab 2013b; Krekel 2009; 
Novetta 2014; ONCIX 2011; Villeneuve and Sancho 2011) 
Spain  (Villeneuve and Sancho 2011) 
Sri Lanka (Kaspersky Lab 2013b) 
Suriname (Kaspersky Lab 2013a) 
Sweden  (Luard 2005) 
Switzerland  (Alperovitch 2011; Mandiant 2013; Villeneuve and Sancho 2011)  
Syria (Kaspersky Lab 2013a) 
Taiwan  (Alperovitch 2011; China says hit 2011; Doherty, Gegeny, Spasojevic, and Baltazar 
2013; Honker Union of China 2010; Hsiao 2013; Information Warfare Monitor 2009; 
Information Warfare Monitor 2010; Kaspersky Lab 2013b; Krekel 2009; Mandiant 
2013; Novetta 2014)  
Tajikistan (Kaspersky Lab 2013a; Villeneuve and Sancho 2011) 
Thailand  (Information Warfare Monitor 2009; Kaspersky Lab 2013a; USCC Annual Report 
2012; Villeneuve and Sancho 2011)  
Turkey  (Kaspersky Lab 2013a) 
Turkmenistan (Kaspersky Lab 2013a; Villeneuve and Sancho 2011) 
UAE  (Mandiant 2013; Villeneuve and Sancho 2011) 
Ukraine (Doherty, Gegeny, Spasojevic, and Baltazar 2013; Kaspersky Lab 2013a; Villeneuve 
and Sancho 2011) 
UK  (Chien and O’Gorman 2011; Committee on Foreign Affairs 2011; Doherty, Gegeny, 
Spasojevic, and Baltazar 2013; Jowitt 2013; Kaspersky Lab 2013a; Mandiant 2013; 
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Norton-Taylor 2007; ONCIX 2011; Protalinski 2012; Tkacik 2008; USCC Annual 
Report 2012; Villeneuve and Sancho 2011) 
US  (Information Warfare Monitor 2010; Mandiant 2013; Novetta 2014; US Department 
of Defense 2014; USCC Annual Report 2013; et al.) 
Uzbekistan (Kaspersky Lab 2013a; Villeneuve and Sancho 2011) 
Vietnam  (Alperovitch 2011; Information Warfare Monitor 2009; Information Warfare Monitor 
2010; Villeneuve and Sancho 2011)  
 
 
Appendix 2: Alleged City or Province within China responsible for CNE 
 
These are often stated as ‘from sites in x’, ‘x-based IP addresses’, or ‘server(s) located in x’.  Possible 
connections to specific PLA units are listed in column two; boxes shaded in red represent a greater 
degree of credibility.  APT/campaigns (or select incidents) are noted in column three.  Campaigns not 
listed, such as Avocado, Nitro, and Sykipot, are alleged to be from an unknown location in China.  
This list is restricted to only those incidents discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
 
Location Possible PLA Unit Major Campaigns Sources 
Beijing 66407, 61580, or 
61046 
Axiom; Ephemeral 
Hydra; Hidden 
Lynx; Operation 
Aurora; Operation 
DeputyDog 
Clayton 2012; Digital Spying Burdens 
2013; Krekel, Adams, and Bakos 2012; 
Stokes, Lin, and Hsiao 2011; USCC Annual 
Report 2011 
Chengdu 78006 The Shadow 
network 
Grow and Hosenball 2011; Information 
Warfare Monitor 2010; Krekel, Adams, 
and Bakos 2012; Stokes, Lin, and Hsiao 
2011 
Fujian P. 61716  Krekel 2009; Stokes, Lin, and Hsiao 2011 
Guangzhou 75770 Code Red Worms; 
Titan Rain 
Digital Spying Burdens 2013; Henderson 
2007a; Stokes, Krekel, Adams, and Bakos 
2012; Lin, and Hsiao 2011; Tkacik 2008 
Hainan P. Unknown GhostNet Information Warfare Monitor 2009 
Hubei P. Unknown  Krekel 2009 
Jinan   72959 Fake Mandiant 
Report 
Krekel, Adams, and Bakos 2012; Raff 
2013; Stokes, Lin, and Hsiao 2011; USCC 
Annual Report 2011 
Nanjing 73610  Krekel, Adams, and Bakos 2012; Stokes, 
Lin, and Hsiao 2011; USCC Annual Report 
2012 
Shanghai 61398 APT1; Shady Rat Digital Spying Burdens 2013; Grow and 
Hosenball 2011; Mandiant 2013; Riley 
and Dune 2012; Stokes, Lin, and Hsiao 
2011 
Shanghai 61486  CrowdStrike Intelligence Report 2014; 
Stokes, Lin, and Hsiao 2011 
Shaoxing Unknown  Nusca 2010 
Tianjin   Unknown Myfip Brenner 2005; Henderson 2007a 
Wuhan 61726  Hsiao 2013; Stokes, Lin, and Hsiao 2011 
Zigong Unknown  Saporito and Lewis 2013 
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Diagrams 
 
 
Diagram 1: Linear Venn of Cyber Warfare Branches  
 
 
(Fritz 2013b) 
 
 
Diagram 2: Venn of Cyber Warfare with Select Callouts  
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Diagram 3: Key Government Entities Responsible for the Development of Chinese Cyber Warfare 
 
The SCIO and OFP operate under a dual nameplate system.  Dashed lines represent close ties/brother 
organizations.  This chart is not comprehensive; it only notes key departments which are recurringly 
referenced as being relevant to cyber warfare.  MIIT, MOC, MPS, and MSS have been named as 
participating in some aspects of CNO, and the armed service branches will inevitably have some input 
in the development of NCW; however, the primary departments responsible for those cyber warfare 
branches are currently the 3PLA and 4PLA.  IO has a wide range of participants whose inclusion varies 
by source.  The most probable collection of IO actors are the GPD & SCIO.  The CAC, formerly SIIO, is a 
dual nameplate with the Office of the Central Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs, formerly the 
Internet Security and Informationization Leading Group. 
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Figure 3: Key Components of a Satellite System  
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Comparison of Cyber Warfare Branches  
 
 Computer Networks Internet Connected Hacking Military Hardware 
CNO Yes Yes Yes No 
IO Yes Yes No No 
NCW Yes No Yes Yes 
(Updated from Fritz 2013b) 
 
 
Table 2: Use of Key Terms in China’s National Defence White Papers 
 
 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2013 
Informa-terms 1 1 40 30 48 34 11 
Moderniz- 20 18 14 16 21 20 7 
Technolog- 43 64 81 46 50 55 10 
CNO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IO 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 
Internet 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Online 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Web 0 2 2 0 5 1 0 
NCW 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Network 3 6 6 7 5 8 2 
RMA 0 0 10 7 8 3 0 
EW 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Electromagnetic 0 0 1 0 8 8 0 
(Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China 2000; Information Office of 
the State Council of the People's Republic of China 2002; Information Office of the State Council of 
the People's Republic of China 2004; Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic 
of China 2006; Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China 2008; 
Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China 2010; Information Office of 
the State Council of the People's Republic of China 2013) 
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